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Abstract
Abstract
Digital  watermarking  has  found  many  applications  in  many  fields,  such  as:
copyright  tracking,  media  authentication,  tamper  localisation  and  recovery,
hardware control, and data hiding. The idea of digital watermarking is to embed
arbitrary data inside a multimedia cover without affecting the perceptibility of the
multimedia cover itself.  The main advantage of using digital watermarking over
other techniques, such as signature based techniques, is that the watermark is
embedded into the multimedia cover itself and will not be removed even with the
format change.
Image  watermarking  techniques  are  categorised  according  to  their  robustness
against modification into: fragile, semi-fragile, and robust watermarking. In fragile
watermarking any change to the image will affect the watermark, this makes fragile
watermarking very useful in image authentication applications, as in medical and
forensic  fields,  where  any  tampering  of  the  image  is:  detected,  localised,  and
possibly recovered. Fragile watermarking techniques are also characterised by a
higher capacity when compared to semi-fragile and robust watermarking. Semi-
fragile  watermarking  techniques  resist  some  modifications,  such  as  lossy
compression  and low pass filtering.  Semi-fragile  watermarking  can be used in
authentication  and  copyright  validation  applications  whenever  the  amount  of
embedded information is small  and the expected modifications are not severe.
Robust  watermarking  techniques  are  supposed  to  withstand  more  severe
modifications, such as rotation and geometrical bending. Robust watermarking is
used in copyright validation applications, where copyright information in the image
must remains accessible even after severe modification.
This  research  focuses  on  the  application  of  image  watermarking  in  tamper
localisation  and  recovery  and  it  aims  to  provide  optimisation  for  some  of  its
aspects. The optimisation aims to produce watermarking techniques that enhance
one  or  more  of  the  following  aspects:  consuming  less  payload,  having  better
recovery quality, recovering larger tampered area, requiring less calculations, and
being robust against the different counterfeiting attacks.
i
Abstract
Through the survey of the main existing techniques, it was found that most of them
are using two separate sets of data for the localisation and the recovery of the
tampered  area,  which  is  considered as  a  redundancy.  The  main  focus in  this
research is to investigate employing image filtering techniques in order to use only
one  set  of  data  for  both  purposes,  leading  to  a  reduced  redundancy  in  the
watermark  embedding  and  enhanced  capacity.  Four  tamper  localisation  and
recovery  techniques  were  proposed,  three  of  them  use  one  set  of  data  for
localisation and recovery while the fourth one is designed to be optimised and
gives  a  better  performance  even  though  it  uses  separate  sets  of  data  for
localisation and recovery. 
The four techniques were analysed and compared to two recent techniques in the
literature. The performance of the proposed techniques vary from one technique to
another. The fourth technique shows the best results regarding recovery quality
and Probability of False Acceptance (PFA) when compared to the other proposed
techniques and the two techniques in the literature, also, all proposed techniques
show  better  recovery  quality  when  compared  to  the  two  techniques  in  the
literature.
ii
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter presents a general introduction about watermarking and its different
types  and applications.  The  motivation,  aim,  objectives,  methodology,  and
contributions of this research are also presented in this chapter.
1.1- General Background
The idea behind digital watermarking [1-3] is to embed arbitrary information inside
a multimedia cover work in a way that is not perceptible. The cover work could be
an image,  a  video,  or  an  audio  file.  The  nature  of  the  embedded information
depends on the application and the goal of watermarking.
A watermarked  cover  work  might  get  modified  before  being  received by  the
designated recipient. The modifications are called attacks, especially of they are
intentionally applied by an intruder to change the information inside the watermark.
Based  on  the  the  ability  to  extract  the  watermark  after  attacks;  watermarking
techniques  are  categorised  into:  robust,  semi-fragile,  and  fragile  techniques.
These categories are described as follows:
• Robust  watermarking  techniques  [4,  5]  are  supposed  to  resist  severe
attacks, such as: cropping, rotation, scaling, bending, spatial distortion, high
lossy compression, and filtering. Using frequency domain transforms, such
as  Discrete  Cosine  Transform  (DCT)  and  Discrete  Wavelet  Transform
(DWT),  makes  the  watermarking  technique  capable  of  resisting  lossy
compression and filtering attacks; however,  geometrical  attacks,  such as
rotation and bending, are the most difficult attacks to deal with because of
the  loss  of  synchronisation  with  the  watermark  data  [6,  7].  Geometrical
attacks could be global, i.e. applied to whole image, or local, i.e. applied to
some parts of the image. Local geometrical attacks are the most difficult
ones to deal with.
Many techniques have been proposed to  deal  with  geometrical  attacks,
some of them are:
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◦ Transformation invariant domains techniques [8,  9], which rely on  the
fact that any translation in the spatial domain will not affect the amplitude
of  2D Discrete Fourier  Transform (DFT),  and any rotation in  the  the
spatial domain will affect DFT by the same angle [10], also, any scaling
in the spatial domain will not affect the amplitude of 2D Mellin Transform
(MT) [11].
◦ Image normalisation techniques [12-14],  which rely on embedding the
watermark on a normalised version of the image, the normalisation is
done using image moments [7]
◦ Template  based  synchronisation  techniques  [15,  16],  which  rely  on
inserting  a  synchronisation  pattern  in  the  spatial  or  the  frequency
domain,  this  pattern  is  used for  resynchronising  the  watermark.  This
technique compromises the capacity of the watermark because it uses
part  of  the  original  capacity  for  synchronisation  purposes,  also,  it  is
susceptible to template removal attacks [4].
◦ Synchronisation techniques based on image features [17-19], which rely
on detecting intrinsic image features, such as edges, texture, corners,
etc.,  before  and  after  the  attack  and  using  these  features  for
synchronising  the  watermark.  These  techniques  are  hard  to  analyse
because  of  the  lack  of  predefined  mathematical  models  that
characterise the transformation used in  the attacks,  also, there is no
guarantee on the results or guarantee on finding appropriate features for
synchronisation.
Robust  watermarking  techniques are mainly  used in  copyright  validation
applications, where even after modifying the cover work it  is  possible to
extract  the watermark,  or  a part  of  it,  which will  be used to identify  the
copyright information of the cover work.
• Semi-fragile watermarking techniques resist some attacks, such as lossy
compression and low-pass filtering [20]. Semi-fragile techniques are used
sometimes in image authentication and are less frequently used in image
recovery due to their low capacity [21-23].
• Fragile watermarking techniques are characterised by their high sensitivity
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to modification and their high capacity, which makes them frequently used
in tamper localisation and recovery applications [24-27].
More theoretical information about watermarking is presented in Chapter 2.
1.2- Motivation and Problem Statement
Image authentication plays an important role in many fields, such as medical and
forensic applications [24, 27]. One way of authentication is to calculate a signature
information, such as a hash function, and attach it  to the image as meta-data;
however, this method does not have the ability to locate or recover the tampering.
In addition, the attached meta-data might be removed due to format change [28].
Fragile watermarking provides an excellent choice for authentication applications
because it provides the ability to locate and even recover the tampered area; also,
the watermark will not be removed due to format change.
This research is focused on tamper localisation and recovery due to its importance
in the field of authentication and because it is still an active field of research [25-
27].
In  tamper  localisation  and  recovery,  the  image  is  usually  partitioned  into  non
overlapping blocks, and two sets of data are generated for each block. The first set
is used to localise the tampered blocks, and it is usually composed of the parity or
a hash of the block. The localisation data is usually stored in the block from which
it is generated. The second set of data is used to recover the tampered block, and
it is composed of an approximation of the block it  is supposed to recover. The
recovery  data  is  mapped  into  a  different  block  from the  one  from which  it  is
generated.
A literature survey was conducted, and the different techniques used in tamper
localisation  and recovery  were  investigated.  Through  the  survey,  some
shortcomings of the technique in the literature were found, these shortcomings
resulted  in  reducing  the  capacity  of  the  watermark  or  reducing  the  quality  of
recovered image. The main shortcoming that was found is the use of two different
sets of data, one for localisation and another for recovery. Since both sets are
related to the data inside the block and the data in each set can be useful for both
purposes of localisation and recovery, it is more suitable to have one set of data
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that is used for both purposes instead of using one set of data for each purpose.
Having one set of data for each purpose results in redundancy and wast of the
watermark  data,  and  it  could  be  avoided  by  having  one  set  of  data  for  both
purposes. 
Other shortcomings were also found, such as using multiple copies of the recovery
data  and  the  overcomplicated  partitioning  and  mapping  schemes that  are  not
effective in enhancing the performance of the watermarking techniques.
1.3- Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to develop some optimised tamper localisation and
recovery watermarking techniques that enhance the recovered image quality while
maintaining high recoverable area ratio and being resistive to the different types of
attacks.  The  optimisation  is  mainly  based  on  using  one  set  of  data  for  both
purposes of localisation and recovery instead of using a separate set of data for
each purpose. To realise the aim of this research, the following objectives need to
be achieved:
• Conduct a general literature survey in the field of image watermarking. This
survey  helps  in  determining  the  active  research  topics  in  the  field  of
watermarking, and to focus the research in one topic. Based on this survey,
tamper localisation and recovery was selected as a topic for this research.
• Conduct a literature survey in the existing watermarking techniques that are
used for tamper localisation and recovery. The goal of this survey is to know
the different methods, ideas, and challenges that exist in the research topic.
• Analyse the existing tamper recovery techniques in order to determine the
shortcomings  and  the  problems to  which  the  research  will  contribute  in
finding new solutions or enhance existing ones.
• Design some algorithms for watermarking techniques that optimise tamper
localisation and recovery methods in the surveyed literature and provide
some solutions for the existing shortcomings.
• Validate the performance of the proposed techniques by comparing them to
some  of  the  existing  ones  using  the  validation  parameters  used  in  the
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literature.
• Submit the findings to a journal in order to publish them.
1.4- Research Methodology
Research  methodologies  can  be  categorised  into  quantitative  and  qualitative
based on the characteristics of the collected data [29]. In quantitative research, the
data can be reduced into numbers,  such as measuring temperature,  pressure,
number of bits, etc. In qualitative research, the data is usually expressed in words
instead of numbers, such as describing people’s feelings, judgments, beliefs, etc.
Quantitative methodology is used in this research, where the different aspects of
the  performance  of  the  proposed  watermarking  techniques  are  measured  and
expressed  as  numbers,  then  they  are  compared  to  the  numbers  from  other
techniques. The details about the evaluation parameters used in this research are
presented in Chapter 2.
1.5- Research Contributions and Statement of 
Originality
The contributions of this research could be summarised as follows:
• Proposing three techniques  that use one set of data for both purposes of
localisation  and  recovery.  These  techniques  rely  on  direct  comparison
between the recovery data, i.e. the watermark image, and the watermarked
image. Image filtering is applied on the resulting image after comparison,
which is called the difference image, in order to localise the tampered area.
A threshold is applied to the difference image so that any pixel greater than
0 will  become 255,  i.e. white.  Image filtering is applied to the difference
image  to  extract  the  tampered area.  The resulting  image after  applying
filtering to the difference image is called the mask image. Any white pixel in
the  mask  image  corresponds  to  a  tampered  pixel  in  the  watermarked
image. The differences between the three techniques are as follows:
◦ The first  technique uses random mapping for the recovery data. The
spatial filter used in mask image generation returns 0 if the ratio of white
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pixels inside its window is above certain threshold, which is selected to
be 70%.  Median filtering  is  also  used to  enhance  the  quality  of  the
watermark  image  which  is  used  to  recover  the  tampered  area.  The
technique is not sensitive to the tampering pattern; however, the quality
of the recovered image degrades as the tampering ratio increases.
◦ The second technique divides the watermark image into 3 groups and
maps  these  groups  in  the  vertical,  the  horizontal,  and  the  diagonal
directions based on maximum-distance mapping. The spatial filter used
for localisation uses 3x3 px window and returns white if its window has
more  than  3  white  pixels  inside  it.  The  watermark  is  XORed with  a
random sequence in order to secure it. The bits inside the watermark
pixels are randomly permuted to prevent knowing the secret sequence.
The technique guarantees the recovery of any tampered area as long as
its width and height does not exceed 50% of the width and the height of
the watermarked image respectively.
◦ The third  technique relies on measuring the high frequency contents
(HFCs)  in  the  watermark  image  to  localise  the  tampered  area.  The
HFCs in the tampered area appear because of XORing the watermark
image with the same random sequence in  the encoding  and decoding
stages, which cancel each others except for the tampered area, which is
XORed  only  once  and  that  results  in  the  random  contents  in  it.
Maximum distance mapping is used in the third technique, which results
in a large recoverable area of 50% of the image size. The technique
guarantees the recovery of any tampered area as long as both of its
width and height do not together exceed 50% of the width and the height
of the watermarked image respectively.
• Proposing a fourth technique that has optimisation aspects such as using
DCT to generate the recovery data and using maximum-distance mapping
to ensure larger recoverable area. The technique guarantees the recovery
of any tampered area as long as both of its width and height do not together
exceed  50%  of  the  width  and  the  height  of  the  watermark  image
respectively.
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• Proposing random bit permutation inside each pixel in the second and the
third techniques, and inside each block in the fourth technique. In these
techniques maximum-distance mapping is used, which makes it possible to
know the random sequence that is used to secure the watermark unless
random bit permutation is used.
Some  aspects  of  the  proposed  techniques  exist  in  other  techniques  in  the
literature; however, the exact implementation of the techniques is novel, up to the
knowledge of the author, and it was not proposed by other researchers, especially
proposing image filtering to use recovery data in tamper localisation process.
1.6- Thesis Organisation 
A general  introduction  is  presented  in  Chapter  1,  then  Chapter  2  presents  a
general  theoretical  overview  of  some  topics  related  to  the  thesis.  A literature
survey and analysis are presented in Chapter 3. The descriptions of the proposed
techniques and the two techniques from the literature are presented in Chapter 4,
followed  by  the  experimental  evaluation  in  Chapter  5.  The  final  discussion,
conclusion, and future work are presented in Chapter 6, followed by the references
and the appendices at the end of the thesis.
1.7- Notes About Terminology
• The  terms:  localisation,  authentication,  and  detection  will  be  used
interchangeably depending on the context;  however,  they give the same
meaning, which is determining which part of the image is tampered with.
• For simplicity, the term "random" will be used in this thesis instead of the
term "pseudorandom"; however, the term "pseudorandom" is scientifically
more accurate.
• The suffix "px" will be used in the description of block size and it means
"pixels", such as "2x2 px" which means "2x2 pixels".
1.8- The Image Database Used in this Research
The Kodak image database [30] is used in this research for the following reasons:
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• Direct download availability of the database images.
• The number of images in the database is sufficient for acceptable statistical
results.
• The  database  contains  images  with  variety  of  detail  levels  and  colour
ranges, which makes it adequate for statistical calculations.
• The images  in  the  database  are  coloured,  which  makes  it  useful  if  the
research is  extended to  coloured images.  The database images can be
converted into grey-level whenever it is needed.
Kodak image database contains 24 true-colour images (i.e. each image has red,
green, and blue channels with 8 bits assigned for each channel). The dimensions
of the images are 768x512 px or 512x768 px. A preview of the images is shown in
Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2, and the image number is shown below each one.
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01 02 03
04 05 06
07 08 09
10 11 12
Figure 1.1: A preview for images 1 to 12 in the Kodak image database.
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13 14 15
16 17 18
19 20 21
22 23 24
Figure 1.2: A preview for images 13 to 24 in the Kodak image database.
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Chapter 2: General Theoretical Overview 
2.1- Introduction
This  chapter  presents  a  general  overview  about  some  aspects  of  digital
watermarking and an overview of some techniques that were used or mentioned in
this research, such as:  DCT, JPEG compression standard, Spatial Image Filtering,
Singular Value Decomposition (SVD), and Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). The
theoretical  overview  in  this  chapter  is  intended  to  give  the  reader  general
information about the intended topics without going into details.
2.2- Digital Watermarking Definition
Digital  watermarking  [1-3]  is  the  embedding  of  arbitrary  information,  i.e.  the
watermark, in noise tolerant data, i.e. the cover work, such as: images, video and
audio, in a way that is not perceptible by the observer.
Digital watermarking is different from meta-data [28], where in watermarking the
cover work itself  is used to embed the watermark, which means that the cover
work is changed, while in meta-data the additional information is stored separately
and the cover work remains intact. Therefore, watermarking can not be used with
error-intolerant data such as computer programs or text files. 
The  cover  work  could  either  be  an  image,  audio,  or  video  file;  however,  this
research is only concerned with image watermarking since it is widely used and
audio/video watermarking is beyond the scope of this research.
The  cover  work  might  suffer  certain  modifications  before  reception,  these
modifications are known as attacks and they might be intentional or unintentional.
In  intentional  attacks,  the  attacker  usually  tries  to  counterfeit  the  cover  work
without being detected, and that could be done by forging a new watermark for the
counterfeited cover work. In forensics, for example, a fake image is counterfeited
to appear as an authentic one. Therefore, the watermark is usually encrypted and
a secret key is used to protect it from being forged by unauthorised intruders. The
diagram shown in Figure  2.1 represents the general watermark embedding and
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extraction process. 
Cover Work
Watermark Embedding
Cover WorkAttack
Watermark Extraction
Secret key
Figure 2.1: Watermark embedding and extraction process.
2.3- Applications of Digital Watermarking
There are many applications for digital watermarking, such as:
2.3.1- Copyright Protection
In  this  case,  the  embedded data represents  a copyright  information about  the
cover work, such as its:  owner, date of production, etc.
2.3.2- Hardware Control
For  example,  a  digital  video  player  could  be  designed  to  play  only  the  video
stream that has an authentic watermark embedded in it.
2.3.3- Tamper Localisation and Recovery
The aim of tamper localisation is to locate any tamper in the cover work. The
watermark is usually related to the cover work, such as using hash functions or
parity check. 
In the case of recovery, the  watermark is usually an approximation of the cover
work and its position is remapped in a way that the tampering is unlikely to affect
the cover work and watermark in same position. This will enable the recovery of
the damaged parts in the cover work from the undamaged parts in the watermark.
Since  this  research  is  concerned  with  tamper  localisation  and  recovery,  more
details about it will be provided later in section 2.7.
2.3.4- Steganography
Steganography  [31]  is  a  way  of  data  hiding,  in  which  the  data  is  securely
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exchanged by embedding it inside a cover work and extracting it at the receiving
end by the authorised recipient. The advantage of steganography over encryption
is that the cover work is not a potential target for an intruder to suspect that some
secret data is hidden inside it.
2.4- Classifications of Digital Watermarking
There are many ways in which watermarking can be classified, the main ones are
listed in this section.
2.4.1- Spatial and Frequency Domain Watermarking
Depending  into  which  domain  the  watermark  is  embedded,  watermarking  is
categorised  as  spatial  or  frequency  domain  watermarking.  In  spatial  domain
watermarking,  the watermark is  embedded directly  into the pixels  of  the cover
work, such as embedding it in the Least Significant Bits (LSBs) of image pixels. In
frequency domain watermarking, the cover work is transformed into the frequency
domain where the embedding is done. Different transforms could be used such as:
DFT, DCT, and DWT.
2.4.2- Fragile, Semi-fragile, and Robust Watermarking
Watermarking techniques are categorised according to their robustness against
modifications into: fragile, semi-Fragile, and robust watermarking techniques.
Fragile  watermarking  is  usually  used  in  authentication  applications  where  any
change to the cover work will alter the watermark. When this alteration is detected
at the receiving end, this means that the cover work was tampered with and it is
not authentic.
Semi-fragile  watermarking  techniques  resist  some  attacks,  such  as  lossy
compression [20]. Semi-fragile watermarking techniques are used sometimes in
image authentication and are used less frequently in image recovery due to their
low capacity [21-23]. 
Robust watermarking is used in copyright applications, where even after modifying
the cover work it is possible to extract the watermark, or a part of it, which will be
used to identify some information about the cover work.
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2.4.3- Reversible Watermarking
In reversible watermarking, also known as lossless watermarking, [32,  33]  it  is
possible to fully recover the original cover work along with the watermark. This is
usually achieved by applying lossless compression to the cover work and store the
watermark data in the remaining space after compression.
2.4.4- Blind vs Informed (Non-Blind) Watermarking
In  blind  (or  oblivious)  watermarking,  the  original  cover  work  is  not  required  to
extract the watermark; on the other hand, in informed watermarking the original
cover work is required to extract the watermark correctly.
2.5- Types of Attacks on Watermarked Images
Watermarked images might suffer different types of attacks [34] and these attacks
might be intentional or unintentional. Some examples of possible attacks are listed
below:
2.5.1- Lossy Compression
In lossy compression, the pixel level is altered and the high frequency components
are  reduced,  which  could  result  in  destroying  the  watermark.  Lossless
compression is not used for attacking watermarked images because it does not
alter the pixel-values in the image.
2.5.2- Geometrical Attacks
Such as:  scaling,  rotation,  cropping,  and flipping.  Geometrical  attacks result  in
losing the spatial synchronisation needed for the watermarking algorithms to work.
2.5.3- Filtering
Such as applying low-pass filter which will remove the high frequency components
in the image and alter the values of its pixels.
2.5.4- Collusion Attack
In  a  collusion  attack  [25],  the  watermark  is  detected  and  removed  by  using
different watermarked versions of the cover work. This method, however, requires
different watermarked versions of the cover work, which might not be available.
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2.5.5- Vector Quantisation Counterfeiting Attack
In order to understand Vector Quantisation (VQ) counterfeiting attack [35], assume
there  is  a  watermarked  image  with  an  embedded  watermark  W .  The
watermarking is applied in an independent block-wise way where each block in
the watermarked image is treated independently and it generates a corresponding
block in the watermark. Assume there are some blocks in the same watermarked
image, or from other watermarked images, that generate the same corresponding
blocks in the watermark, then these blocks could be used as a codebook. From
this codebook an approximation of the counterfeiting block is generated. By using
the codebook, it is possible to generate a watermarked counterfeited image which
will generate the same watermark and will be considered as an authentic one. This
attack works without knowing the secret key that is used during watermarking, and
sometimes  even  without  knowing  the  watermark  itself,  especially  if  there  are
different images that use the same watermark.
The counterfeiting becomes harder as the block size in the watermarked image
increases, also the watermarking process becomes more resistive to this type of
attacks  by  introducing  dependency  between  the  blocks  of  the  image.  Collage
attack [36] is a variation of VQ counterfeiting attack and it does not require the
knowledge of the watermark, it  only requires a number of images that use the
same secret key.
2.6- Chaotic Maps and Watermark Shuffling
In order to increase the security and invisibility of the watermark, the watermark is
shuffled using a chaotic map. One example of chaotic maps is Arnold’s cat map
[37,  38], which transforms the location ( xold ,  yold ) in an  M×N  image into new
locations ( xnew , ynew ) according to the following equations: 
xnew=(xold+ yold )modM
ynew=(xold+2 yold )mod N
(2.1)
Where mod  is modulo operation. For example, if the size of the image is 256x256
px, then the pixel at position (100,200) will be relocated to (100+200, 100+2*200)
mod 256 = (300, 500) mod 256 = (44, 244).
Arnold's cat map could be expanded [39] to use the initial condition p  and q  as
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follows:
xnew=(xold+ p y old)mod M
ynew=(q xold+( pq+1) yold)mod N
(2.2)
After  some  iterations,  the  image  will  look  random and  with  more  iterations  it
returns back to its original appearance, as seen in Figure 2.2, where the map is
applied to 150x150 px bird image taken from Kodak database image number 23.
The number of iterations is shown under each image.
Original 1 3
132 155 157
200 211 240
275 299 300
Figure 2.2: Arnold chaotic map applied to
a 150x150 px image, the number of
iterations is shown under each image.
2.7- The General Steps of Tamper Localisation and 
Recovery
This  section  provides  a  general  introduction  about  the  steps  used  in  tamper
localisation and recovery watermarking techniques, in order to have a good idea
about  the  process  before  presenting  the  literature  survey.  This  introduction  is
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concerned with the steps that are used in the techniques similar to the proposed
ones, such as using the spatial domain for watermark embedding.
The encoding stage starts by dividing the image into blocks that have a size of one
pixel or more, such as 2x2 px, 4x4 px, etc. Some LSBs in each block are reserved
to store the watermark information, usually not more than 3 LSBs or otherwise the
quality of the image will degrade to a noticeable level.
Two  sets  of  data  are  usually  extracted  for  each  block.  The  first  set  is  the
localisation data which is used to locate any changes in the pixels inside the block,
usually parity check or hash function is used for that purpose. The other set is the
recovery  data,  which  is  usually  a  low  resolution  version  of  the  block  that  is
generated using its average or DCT. Localisation data is usually stored in the block
it is generated from,  and recovery data is stored in another block located as far
away as possible from it. Encryption is applied to the watermark in order to secure
it,  one common method of encryption is to XOR the watermark with a random
sequence that is generated based on a secret key.
The decoding stage involves the localisation of any tampering by calculating the
localisation data and comparing it with the stored one. If any block is found to be
tampered with, it will be recovered using the recovery data. When the block that
has  the  recovery  data  is  also  tampered  with,  this  is  known  as  tamper
coincidence and it results in a failure of the recovery of the tampered block.
When some parts of the image are not tampered with, the watermark data related
to these parts is ignored and does not contribute to the quality of the untampered
parts,  which  is  considered as  a  waste  of  the  watermark  data,  this  problem is
known as watermark-data waste problem.
Tamper localisation and recovery techniques are categorised according to their
recovery  quality  into:  (a)  Flexible quality  techniques,  where  the  quality  of  the
recovered image increases as the tampered area decreases, and (b) Fixed quality
techniques, where the quality of  the recovered image is the same for different
tampered area sizes.
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2.8- Evaluation Parameters Used in Tamper 
Localisation and Recovery
This section introduces the main evaluation parameters that are used in tamper
localisation and recovery techniques.
2.8.1- Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR)
Peak  signal  to  noise  ratio  (PSNR)  [40,  41] is  used  to  measure  the  similarity
between two images, the PSNR value increases as the similarity between them
increases  and  it  reaches  infinity  for  identical  images.  In  the  case  of  tamper
recovery, it is used to measure the similarity between the original unwatermarked
image and the watermarked image,  or between the original  and the recovered
image.
The PSNR between two images is defined as follows:
PSNR=10 log10( PMAXMSE ) (2.3)
where PMAX  is the maximum possible power in a pixel and is defined as follows:
PMAX=(2
b−1)2 (2.4)
where b  is the number of bits assigned for each pixel. For example, if grey-level is
stored in 8 bits then:
PMAX=(2
8−1)2=2552=65025
 MSE  is the Mean Squared Error and is defined as follows:
MSE= 1
MN ∑m=1
M
∑
n=1
N
( I 1 (m,n)−I 2 (m,n ) )2 (2.5)
where  I1  and  I2  are the two images to be compared and they must have the
same width ( M ) and height ( N ).
The PSNR gives a good indication about the similarity between two images and
any distortion that results from the watermarking process; however, it  might be
deceiving sometimes [42] and does not reflect the measured perceptibility by the
human eye. For example, adding a constant value to the whole image might give a
PSNR value that is less than the one resulting from adding some noise to the
image,  but  the  noise  will  be  more  perceptible  to  the  human  eye  since  it  is
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concentrated in a few pixels.
In some cases, the value of the PSNR could be enhanced by introducing irrelevant
information, as in the following test which shows the PSNR values resulting from
setting some LSBs in the image to zero and how these values could be enhanced
by storing irrelevant information instead of the deleted LSBs. The 24 images in
Kodak image database were used in the following test, they were converted to
grey-scale and 1 to 8 of their LSBs are set to zeros. The average PSNR for the 24
images was measured when the deleted LSBs are replaced by: zeros (Case 1), or
random values (Case 2), or a constant value that equals 2(d−1)  (Case 3), where d
is the number of deleted LSBs, and that is about half the maximum value that
could be stored in the deleted LSBs. The results are shown in Table 2.1
Table 2.1: Average PSNR values when some LSBs are removed from the 24 images in 
Kodak image database
Number of
deleted
LSBs, ( d )
Average PSNR (dB)
LSBs are replaced
by 0
LSBs are replaced by
random numbers
LSBs are replaced by a
constant value ( 2(d−1) )
1 51.077 51.140 51.211
2 42.617 44.141 46.406
3 35.656 37.912 40.742
4 29.111 31.781 34.704
5 22.843 25.759 28.742
6 16.758 19.695 22.634
7 10.369 13.814 17.026
8 6.669 8.780 13.413
It  can be seen from Table  2.1 how the values of  the PSNR were significantly
improved by storing irrelevant information instead of the deleted one. The second
case of storing random numbers is similar to the case of storing the watermark
data in the LSBs of the image.
Sometimes, the PSNR value of the recovered image is intentionally improved by
storing a constant value in the deleted LSBs, as in the third case, which imposes a
problem  when  comparing  the  published  PSNR  values  of  different  techniques.
Therefore, there should be enough awareness about this problem when dealing
with the PSNR.
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2.8.2- Normalised Correlation Coefficient (NCC)
NCC measures the similarity  between two images and is  calculated using the
following expression:
NCC=
∑
m=1
M
∑
n=1
N
I 1(m ,n) I 2(m,n)
√∑m=1
M
∑
n=1
N
I 1(m ,n)
2√∑m=1
M
∑
n=1
N
I2(m,n)
2
(2.6)
where I1  and I2  are two images with the same width ( M ) and height ( N ).
In general, NCC varies from 1 when the two compared signals are identical, to -1
when one signal is the negative of the other, i.e. The first signal = -1 x The second
signal.
2.8.3- Structural SIMilarity Index (SSIM)
SSIM was introduced by Wang and Bovik [43,  44] and it can be expressed as
follows:
SSIM=
σ( I1, I 2)
σ(I 1)σ (I 2)
2σ(I 1)σ ( I 2)
(σ (I1))
2+(σ( I 2))
2
2 I1 I 2
(I 1)
2+( I 2)
2 (2.7)
where I1  and I2  are two images, I1  and I2  are their means, σ( I 1)  and σ(I 2)
are their standard deviations, and  σ(I 1 , I 2)  is their cross covariance. The three
terms  in  equation  2.7 measure  the  distortion  in  correlation,  contrast,  and
luminance, respectively.
2.8.4- Tamper Localisation Failure Rate Metrics
The main metrics that are used to measure the failure rate of tamper localisation
are: Probability of False Acceptance (PFA), Probability of False Rejection (PFR),
and Probability of False Detection (PFD).
PFA, PFR, and PFD will be defined based on the following definitions:
T tampered : The total number of the tampered blocks in the image.
T authentic : The total number of the authentic blocks in the image.
T=T tampered+T authentic : The total number of blocks in the image.
T falserejection : The number of authentic blocks incorrectly detected as tampered ones.
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T falseacceptance :  The  number  of  tampered  blocks  incorrectly  detected  as  authentic
ones.
PFA is the probability of classifying a tampered block as an authentic one, and it is
defined as follows:
PFA=
T falseacceptance
T tampered
(2.8)
PFR is the probability of classifying an authentic block as a tampered one, and it is
defined as follows:
PFR=
T false rejection
T authentic
(2.9)
PFD is  the probability  of  incorrect  detection of  a  block in  the image,  and it  is
defined as follows:
PFD=
T false rejection+T false acceptance
T
(2.10)
The  most  accurate  measurement  of  failure  metrics  is  when  single  pixels  are
considered in the calculations. Therefore, in this research the calculation of failure
metrics will be conducted based on single pixels.
To estimate the relationship between the number of authentication bits and PFA,
assume that a block has a total of b  bits where L  bits of them are assigned as
authentication bits, as shown in Figure 2.3.
10010101.....010101 0111.....0011
The total number of bits in the block = b
The number of authentication bits = L
Figure 2.3: An illustration of the authentication bits in a block.
The contents of the block are considered authentic only when the authentication
bits are equal to the number generated at the encoding stage, and assuming a
uniform  random  distribution  for  the  possible  contents  of  the  block,  then  the
probability  of  considering  the  block  as  an  authentic  one  is
1/(The number of possiblities for L bits)  which is equal to  1/2L . However, only one
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of the possible contents of the block is authentic, which means that the probability
of  having  an  authentic  block  is  1/(The number of possiblities for bbits) ,  which  is
equal to 1/2b , therefore:
PFA=P(Considering a block as an authentic one)−P(Having an authentic block )= 1
2L
− 1
2b
where P( )  refers to the probability, or:
 PFA=2−L−2−b (2.11)
Since b>L , then 2−b≪2−L , which leads to:
 PFA≈2−L (2.12)
2.9- Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) and JPEG 
Compression Standard
This section is included because DCT and some of the techniques used in JPEG
compression standard were used in some of the proposed techniques. For further
information, the reader can refer to references [45-47].
2.9.1- Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT)
The DCT is a reversible linear transform that is widely used in lossy compression
formats,  such  as  Joint  Photographic  Experts  Group (JPEG)  format.  DCT
converts a signal from the spatial or time domain into the frequency domain, where
the signal is expressed as a sum of cosine waveforms.
If  f (m,n)  is an MxN matrix that represents the spatial information of an image,
then it is transformed using DCT into  F(u , v)  which is an MxN DCT coefficient
matrix  that  contains  the  components  of  f (m,n)  along  cosine  waves  that  are
expressed as cos (2m+1)uπ
2M
.cos (2n+1)v π
2N
. The formulas [47] for calculating DCT
and inverse DCT coefficients are:
F [u , v]=C [u ]C [v ]∑
m=0
M−1
∑
n=0
N−1
f (m,n)cos
(2m+1)uπ
2M
cos
(2n+1)v π
2N
, {0≤u≤M−10≤v≤N−1 (2.13)
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f (m,n)=∑
u=1
M−1
∑
v=0
N−1
C [u ]C [v ]F (u ,v )cos
(2m+1)uπ
2M
cos
(2 n+1)v π
2N
, {0≤m≤M−10≤n≤N−1 (2.14)
where
C [u]={ 1√M , u=02
√M
, 1≤u≤M−1
(2.15)
C [v ]={ 1√N , v=02
√N
, 1≤v≤N−1
(2.16)
 
2.9.2- JPEG Compression Standard
This section presents a general overview of the JPEG compression standard. Only
the main steps will be highlighted without going into detail. Figure 2.4 shows the
main  steps that  are  carried  out  in  JPEG,  these  steps  can  be summarised as
follows:
Compressed
Image
Input 
Image
Colour 
transformation
and subsampling
Image
partitioning 
(8x8 pixels)
DCT
coding
Quantisation Zigzag ordering
Entropy coding
Figure 2.4: Block diagram for JPEG compression
2.9.2.1- Colour Transformation and Subsampling
The colour space of the input image is converted from RGB (Red, Green, Blue)
into YCrCb colour space, where: Y is the luminance component, Cr and Cb are the
chrominance components.
The human eye [45] has between 75 to 150 million rod photoreceptors, which are
sensitive  to  the  luminance  component,  compared  to  6  to  7  million  cone
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photoreceptors, which are sensitive to the chrominance components. The human
eye is less sensitive to the details in chrominance components and that gives the
possibility  of  using  subsampling  to  reduce  the  amount  of  information  in  the
chrominance component by grouping adjacent pixels into one pixel (i.e. Cr and Cb
components  have  less  resolution  than  Y  component).  For  example  a  4:2:0
subsampling, which is used for high compression in JPEG, groups every 4 pixels
in chroma components into one pixel which reduces their data size to one fourth.
2.9.2.2- Image Partitioning and DCT Coding
Each colour component is divided into 8x8 px blocks, then the DCT coefficients of
each block are found.
2.9.2.3- Quantisation
Most of the lossy compression is done in the quantisation step, where the number
of bits required by each DCT coefficient is reduced. Higher frequency components
get fewer bits than lower frequency components because they are less noticeable
by the human eye. The quantisation is carried out by dividing the DCT coefficient
matrix by a quantisation matrix and rounding the result, a higher number in the
quantisation matrix results in a fewer number of bits for a DCT coefficient. The
standard quantisation matrices for luminance and chrominance components [47]
are shown in Figure 2.5, these matrices correspond to a quality factor of 50.
16  11  10  16   24   40    51    61
12  12  14  19   26   58    60    55
14  13  16  24   40   57    69    56
14  17  22  29   51   87    80    62
18  22  37  56   68   109  103  77
24  35  55  64   81   104  113  92
49  64  78  87  103  121  120  101
72  92  95  98  112  100  103  99
17  18  24  47  99  99  99  99
18  21  26  66  99  99  99  99
24  26  56  99  99  99  99  99
47  66  99  99  99  99  99  99
99  99  99  99  99  99  99  99
99  99  99  99  99  99  99  99
99  99  99  99  99  99  99  99
99  99  99  99  99  99  99  99
Luminance quantisation matrix Chrominance quantisation matrix
Figure 2.5: Standard JPEG quantisation matrices for luminance and chrominance
components [47].
2.9.2.4- Zigzag Ordering
The quantised DCT coefficients are transformed into a sequence by reading them
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in a zigzag manner [47] as shown in Figure 2.6.
1 3 4 10 11 21 22 36
2 5 9 12 20 23 35 37
6 8 13 19 24 34 38 49
7 14 18 25 33 39 48 50
15 17 26 32 40 47 51 58
16 27 31 41 46 52 57 59
28 30 42 45 53 56 60 63
29 43 44 54 55 61 62 64
Figure 2.6: Zigzag ordering
2.9.2.5- Entropy Encoding
Lossless entropy encoding is applied to the quantised DCT components. The DC
coefficients are encoded using Differential Pulse-Code Modulation (DPCM)  (DC
coefficient  is  in  the  top-left  of  the  DCT  matrix  and  it  corresponds  to  zero
frequency),  while  the  AC  coefficients  (all  coefficients  except  the  DC  one)  are
encoded using Run-Length Encoding (RLE). The details of the entropy encoding
stage will be skipped because they are beyond the scope of this research.
2.10- Image Filtering in the Spatial Domain
Spatial domain filters [45-47] (also known as spatial masks, kernels, templates,
and windows) are divided into linear and non-linear filters. Linear filters use linear
operations, such as finding the mean value, and they have correspondence in the
frequency  domain,  while  non-linear  filters  use  non-linear  operations,  such  as
finding the median value, and they do not have correspondence in the frequency
domain.  Spatial  domain  filtering  is  considered  to  have  more  versatility  than
frequency domain filtering because non-linear filtering can be done in it.
In  spatial  filtering,  a  sliding  window  w (x , y )  (also  called  a  mask  or  a  kernel)
moves along the image and a linear or a non-linear operation is performed on the
image pixels encompassed by this window. The spatial filter produces a new pixel
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with coordinates equal to the coordinates of the centre of the window as shown in
Figure 2.7.
w(-1,-1) w(-1,0) w(-1,1)
w(0,-1) w(0,0) w(0,1)
w(1,-1) w(1,0) w(1,1)
Filtered ImageFilter window
Figure 2.7: Spatial filter sliding window 
One example of linear filters is averaging filter, where the outcome of the filter
operation is the summation of the pixels encompassed by the window divided by
the number of pixels inside the window. A median filter is an example of non-linear
filters,  where  the  outcome  of  the  filter  operation  is  the  median  of  the  pixels
encompassed by the filter window. Any operation could be defined for the filter
operation, such as calculating the maximum or the minimum of the encompassed
pixels.
2.11- Singular Value Decomposition (SVD)
In Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) [48], an  r×c  matrix  Z  is decomposed
into the product of three matrices in the form:
Z=U ΣV * (2.17)
Where:
r  and c  are the number of rows and columns in the matrix. U  is an r×r  unitary
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matrix (i.e. its conjugate transpose is also its inverse, or U U*=U *U=I  where I
is the identity matrix). If Z  is a real valued matrix, then U  is an orthogonal matrix
(i.e. its transpose is also its inverse, or U UT=UTU=I ). The conjugate transpose
of a complex valued matrix is the transpose of the conjugates of its elements. 
Σ  is a diagonal r×c  matrix with non-negative real numbers on its diagonal, the
values in the diagonal of Σ  (i.e. sv1, sv2, ... ) are called the Singular Values (SVs).
V  is a c×c  unitary matrix. If Z  is a real valued matrix, then V  is an orthogonal
matrix, V *  is the conjugate transpose of V .
2.11.1- Geometrical Interpretation of SVD
In  the  special  case  when  Z  is  an  r×r  real  square  matrix  with  a  positive
determinant: U ,  V * , and Σ  are real r×r  matrices as well.  U  and V *  can be
regraded as rotation matrices, while Σ  can be regarded as a scaling matrix. Thus
the  expression  U ΣV *  can  be  interpreted  as  a  composition  of  three
transformations: a rotation or reflection ( U ), a scaling ( Σ ) , and another rotation
or reflection ( V * )
2.11.2- Invariance of Singular Values to Rotation, 
Transposition, and Flipping
Since singular values in Σ  correspond to scaling along the different dimensions,
the  singular  values do not  change when rotation,  transposition,  or  flipping  are
applied to  the matrix [49].
2.12- Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC)
A Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) code [50] is commonly used for error detection
in  digital  networks  and  storage  devices,  where  a  fixed-length  checksum  is
generated from a stream of data and this checksum will most probably change if
any change occurs to the data stream. The CRC code is attached to the end of the
data stream before transmission so that it can be compared to the one generated
at the receiving end, or simply the CRC is calculated for the data stream with the
CRC attached to it and if the result is 0, then the CRC of the data stream is the
same as the attached one and the data stream is assumed to be uncorrupted.
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CRC  codes  are  commonly  used  because  they  are  simple  to  implement  in
hardware and easy to analyse mathematically and efficient in detecting errors that
are caused by noise. CRC generation functions are considered as hash functions
since they produce a fixed-length checksum value.
The basic idea behind CRC is in treating the input data as a long polynomial that is
divided using long division by what is called a generator polynomial, where the
remainder of this division is the value of the CRC code. To generate an n-bit CRC
code,  a generator  polynomial  of  power  n is  needed.  This  polynomial  has  n+1
terms,  i.e.  bits,  and  the  highest  and  the  lowest  terms  in  it  must  be  1.  The
polynomial coefficients are calculated according to the arithmetic of  finite field,
where addition operation can always be performed without carry between digits,
i.e. the long division in CRC calculation is carried out using XOR operation. In
CRC calculation, the quotient is discarded because it is not needed.
2.12.1- An illustration for Manual Calculation of CRC Code
An  illustrative  hypothetical  example  is  presented  to  understand  the  basic
operations in CRC calculation and how to perform it manually. Assume that a 4-bit
CRC code is to be generated for the following binary sequence:
S  =  10101011
which could be expressed as the following polynomial:
S = 1*x7+0*x6+1*x5+0*x4+1*x3+0*x2+1*x1+1*x0 =  x7+x5+x3+x+1
The binary representation of the generator polynomial is:
G  =  11001
which is expressed as the following polynomial:
G = x4+x3+1
The calculation of an b-bit CRC code starts by appending b zeros (4 zeros in this 
example) to the input sequence S, therefore S becomes 101010110000. The 
resulting binary sequence is XORed with G as follows:
• G is aligned below S so that the leftmost 1 in G is aligned to the leftmost 1 
in S, then they are XORed and the remaining digits in S are appended to 
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the result of the XOR operation.
• G is XORed again to the result as in the previous step and the process is 
repeated until the remainder (which is the CRC value) is less than G.
The manual calculation for the previous example is illustrated as follows:
    101010110000
XOR 11001
---------↓↓↓↓↓↓↓
    011000110000
XOR  11001
----------↓↓↓↓↓↓
     00001110000
XOR      11001
--------------↓↓
         0010100
XOR        11001
----------------
           01101  -> CRC = remainder = 1101
2.12.2- Implementation of CRC Using Shift Register
CRC can be implemented using a shift-left register. For  n-bit CRC code an n-bit
shift register is required. The CRC calculation proceeds as follows:
• The calculation starts by initialising the shift-left register with zeros.
• The leftmost  bits  of  the  input  binary  sequence,  including  the  appended
zeros, are fed into the register until  a one pops from the left side of the
register.
• The contents of the  register are then XORed with the rightmost n bits of the
generator polynomial, the leftmost bit is excluded because its XOR result is
always 0.
• The remaining bits of the input binary sequence continue to be fed into the
register until a one pops out from the left side of the register and the XOR
operation  in  the  previous  step  is  repeated  until  all  the  bits  in  the  input
sequence are fed into the register, then the contents of the register will be
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the value of the CRC code.
Figure 2.8 illustrates the calculation of the CRC for the previous example.
00 0 0 101010110000
4-bit shift-left register Input binary sequenceXOR operation
The initial state of the 
shift register
01 1 0 10110000
The input sequence 
is fed to the register 
until the leftmost bit 
in the register is 1
11 0 0 0110000
In the next clock a 
value of 1 will pop 
out of the register 
and will be XORed 
with the first and the 
fourth bits
00 0 1 110000
11 1 0 000
00
11
11
00
10 0 1 00
11
11 0 1
The process 
continues until all 
input sequence is 
fed to the register, 
the content of the 
register is the CRC 
value = 1101 
11
In the next clock a 
value of 1 will pop 
out of the register 
and will be XORed 
with the first and the 
fourth bits
The input sequence 
is fed to the register 
until the leftmost bit 
in the register is 1
In the next clock a 
value of 1 will pop 
out of the register 
and will be XORed 
with the first and the 
fourth bits
Figure 2.8: An illustration of using a shift register for CRC calculation.
2.12.3- Using a Look-Up-Table for CRC Calculation
CRC  function  is  linear  and  therefore  CRC  calculation  can  be  performed  by
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applying it to the separate parts of the input sequence. To illustrate, let the input
number  S be broken into a sequence of half bytes or nibbles  S1, S2, ..., Sk (1
nibble  = 4 bits), then:
CRC(S1,S2) = CRC(S2 XOR CRC(S1))
CRC(S1,S2,S3) = CRC(S3 XOR CRC(S1,S2))
....
CRC(S1,S2, ..., Sk) = CRC( Sk XOR CRC(S1, S2, ..., S(k-1))
In another word, the CRC of S is found by finding the CRC of the first nibble then
XORing the result with the second nibble and find the CRC of the result and so on
until the CRC of the last nibble in S is found.
The following example shows how to do it manually for the previous example:
input sequence = 10101011 -> S1 = 1010, S2 = 1011
To find CRC for S1 = 1010
    10100000
XOR 11001
---------↓↓↓
    01101000
XOR  11001
----------↓↓
     0001100 -> CRC = 1100
XOR CRC(S1) with S2 -> 1100 XOR 1011 = 0111
to find CRC for 0111
    01110000
XOR  11001
----------↓↓
    00010100
XOR    11001
------------
     0001101 -> CRC = 1101
The calculation of CRC can be sped up by storing the CRC of each nibble in a
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look-up-table instead of calculating it each time, this will consume more memory
but will increase the speed of calculation dramatically.
The principles that were presented in the previous examples are applied for CRC
with  larger  block  size.  For  example  for  CRC16-CCITT  (from  French:  Comité
Consultatif International Téléphonique et Télégraphique [51]) standard,  the CRC
is 16 bit wide, with a polynomial G = x16+x12+x5+1 [50], a look-up-table of 256 16-
bit long elements could be used to find the CRC value for blocks of 1 byte long.
2.12.4- Initial Value, XOR Output, Reflected Input, and 
Reflected Output
The actual implementation of CRC includes some pre and post processing stages.
The first one is the initial value of the CRC that is XORed with the start of the input
sequence, this initial value is important to solve the problem of leading zeros in the
input sequence,  which have no effect on the value of the CRC regardless of their
length, unless the initial value of the CRC is different from 0, usually it is initialised
to all  ones. Regarding the XOR output stage, sometimes the final value of the
CRC is XORed with a number, usually all ones. The other two stages are reflect
input and reflect output stages which determine whether the input bytes to the
encoder and the final CRC output will be reflected. In reflection, the bit positions
are flipped so that the higher bits become lower and vice versa.
A CRC calculator for different CRC standards along with their specification can be
found  in  [52],  and  a  good  tutorial  for  CRC  calculation  can  be  found  in  [50].
Appendix  D.4 has  a  GNU  Octave  implementation  for  CRC16  where  the
parameters can be changed to find the CRC for different standards.
2.13- Summary
Some aspects of  digital  watermarking were presented in this  chapter,  such as
digital  watermarking  definition,  applications,  classifications,  types  of  attacks,
chaotic maps, general steps for tamper localisation and recovery, as well as the
evaluation parameters used in tamper localisation and recovery techniques. Some
topics that are mentioned in this research were also introduced, such as: Discrete
Cosine Transform (DCT), JPEG compression standard, Image filtering in spatial
domain,  Singular  Value  Decomposition  (SVD),  and  Cyclic  Redundancy  Check
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(CRC). The overview in this chapter was intended to be general and simplified
without going into details, in order to give the reader some introductory information
to make the understanding of the following chapters easier.
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Chapter 3: Literature Survey and Analysis 
for Tamper Localisation and 
Recovery Techniques
3.1- Introduction
This chapter presents a literature survey for fragile and semi-fragile watermarking
techniques that perform not only localisation but both localisation and recovery.
The survey will highlight the main properties of these techniques, such as number
of  bits  used  for  localisation,  number  of  bits  used  for  recovery,  methods  of
localisation-data generation, methods of recovery-data generation,  localisation-
data  mapping,  and  recovery-data  mapping.  The  papers  in  this  survey  are
presented according to the year of publication and in an ascending order. The last
section in this  chapter presents some analysis of the techniques in the literature.
3.2- Fragile Tamper Localisation and Recovery 
Techniques
Due to  their  higher  capacity  and  sensitivity  to  tampering,  fragile  watermarking
techniques are the most used techniques in the literature for tamper localisation
and recovery,  this section presents a literature survey about the most important
and recent fragile tamper localisation and recovery techniques.
The first  work in tamper recovery was proposed by Fridrich and Goljan [53] in
1999. In their technique the image is divided into 8x8 px blocks and the recovery
data consists  of  the  DCT transform of  each block.  The DCT coefficients  were
quantised using JPEG quantisation matrix that corresponds to a quality factor of
50%. After quantisation, 1 or 2 LSBs could be used to store 64 or 128 bits of the
resulting DCT coefficients. The quality factor is determined by the matrix used in
the quantisation of the DCT coefficients, as was discussed in Section 2.9.2.3. No
localisation bits were used in this method and the recovery bits were mapped into
another block that is at a distance approximately equals 1/3 of image size and the
direction of mapping is randomly chosen, the detection is done by back tracing any
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tampered block. Even though the technique is simple and gives good recovery
quality  with  only  1  or  2  LSBs being used,  but  the recovery area is  small,  not
exceeding 1/3  of  image dimensions,  and the  direction  of  embedding could  be
detected, which makes the method vulnerable to attacks.
A hierarchical localisation and recovery method is presented by Lin et al. [54] in
which three levels of tamper localisation are applied. The image is divided into 4x4
px blocks and each block is further divided into 2x2 px sub-blocks, each sub-block
has 2 bits assigned for tamper localisation and 6 bits assigned for recovery, which
means that 2 LSBs are assigned for the watermark. The first localisation bit is set
to one if the average of the 4x4 px block is larger or equal to average of the 2x2 px
sub-block, the second localisation bit is the odd parity of the average of the 2x2 px
block,  the  third  detection  level  depends  on  the  inspection  of  3x3  block-
neighbourhood. Recovery bits represents the average of 6 MSBs of the 2x2 px
block. Localisation bits are stored in the same corresponding block while recovery
bits are stored in another block determined by a mapping method that depends on
a  secret  key.  The  mapping  method  used  does  not  ensure  enough  distance
between the tampered block and its recovery data; therefore, some blocks will not
be recovered even when the tampered area is small, e.g. 25%.
Haouzia  and  Noumeir  [24]  presented  a  survey  about  image  authentication
techniques  such  as:  cryptography,  fragile  and  semi-fragile  watermarking,  and
digital signatures. One major disadvantage of digital signature based techniques is
their inability of tamper localisation. Authentication techniques were divided into
strict  and selective  authentication,  in  strict  authentication  techniques no image
processing  is  tolerated,  while  in  selective techniques  some image  processing,
such as lossy compression, is permitted.  
Noriega  et  al.  [55]  proposed  a  method  that  uses  two  different  watermarking
techniques, one semi-fragile watermark is used for authentication and the other is
a fragile one and consists of an approximation of the original image (referred to as
the digest image). This approximation is generated using DCT and re-compressed
using  arithmetic  codes,  then  redundancy  is  added  using  Bose-Chaudhuri-
Hochquenghem (BCH) code to detect errors. Both watermarks are embedded in
the Integer Wavelet Transform (IWT) domain. Secret keys, K1 and K2, are used to
generate  the  first  watermark  and  to  permute,  i.e.  shuffle,  the  second  one.
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Successful  recovery  is  shown  for  tampering  of  10%  of  the  image  and  noise
insertion of  about  5%; however,  using compression codes and error correction
codes  adds  more  complexity  to  the  algorithm.  The  recovery  capability  in  this
method is limited to the correction ratio of the BCH code.
Zhang  et  al.  [56]  used  a  hybrid  block-wise  and  pixel-wise  approach.  The
localization is done on 8x8 px blocks and the recovery is carried out in a pixel-by-
pixel manner within these blocks. Three LSBs are reserved for the watermark, the
recovery  data  is  160  bits  per  block  and  it  is  calculated  by  performing  XOR
operation between five MSBs in two different blocks which gives 320 bits that are
mapped into two different blocks throughout the image. The remaining 32 bits of
the watermark in each block are used for localisation. The quality of the recovered
image  degrades  dramatically  as  the  tampered  area  increases  because  the
recovery data is distributed throughout the image in a random manner.
In their paper, Zhang et al. [57] proposed two techniques, the first one relies on a
reference sharing mechanism where the image is divided into 8x8 px blocks and
3 LSBs are reserved for the watermark, 160 bits are reserved for recovery data,
and 32 bits are reserved for localisation data which consists of the hash of 5 MSBs
and the recovery data in that block. The recovery bits are generated by permuting
5 MSBs from the whole image according to a secret key and dividing them into
groups with  E elements in each group, then  E/2 recovery bits are generated by
multiplying the group with a random matrix of size (E/2)x(E), and by using modulo-
2 summation this will produce linear system of E/2 equations. The tampering will
be reflected as unknown values in this system and Gaussian elimination could be
used to find these unknowns as long as the system solvable. The recovery in the
proposed technique is probabilistic and works for small areas, up to 1/3 of image
size in the best case [57], and it works better for large E, such as E >1024, which
makes the technique require more time for computation.
Zhang  et  al.  [58]  proposed  a  flexible-quality  recovery  technique  that  claims
avoiding the tampering coincidence and the watermark-data waste problems. In
their technique the image is divided into 8x8 px blocks and 3 LSBs are set to 0 in
order to store the watermark in them, which gives a total of 192 bits. 161 bits are
used  to  store  the  recovery  data,  which  is  generated  by  quantising  23  DCT
coefficients into 7 bits for each one. The recovery data is randomly distributed
Page 36/209
Chapter 3: Literature Survey and Analysis for Tamper Localisation and Recovery Techniques
throughout the image. The localisation bits consist of 31 bits hash function that is
generated for the 5 MSBs and the recovery data from each 8x8 px block. The
localisation  data  is  stored  in  the  same  block  from  which  it  is  generated.
Compositive reconstruction and compressive sensing are used to  estimate the
contents of the tampered blocks if their recovery data is missing due to tampering.
The proposed method suffers from high complexity and low recovery quality at
high tamper ratios.
Dadkhah et al. [59] modified the LSB hierarchical method proposed by Chaluvadi
and Prasad [60] in which the image is divided into 2x2 px blocks and a 12 bit
watermark is stored in 3 LSBs of each block. The watermark consists of 5 bits for
the average of a particular 2x2 px block and 5 bits for the average of another
block, which means that there are two copies of the average value of each block
distributed throughout the image, and two bits are left for parity check. The parity
check was considered as the first level for integrity check, which might lead to a
false decision since different pixel values could have the same parity.
Hisham  et  al.  [61]  presented  a  fragile  watermarking  technique  for  tamper
localisation and recovery for the Holy Quran text images, the presented technique
is based on the method proposed by Zain and Fauzi  [62]. The mapping between
the  original  block  and  the  watermark  block  is  carried  out  using  the  spiral
numbering proposed by Afifah and Jasni [63]. Each 8x8 px block B  is divided into
4x4 px blocks B s  and the recovery data consists of the average of each B s  block.
The authentication of each block is done by calculating the parity of the B s  blocks
and by comparing the average value of the B s  blocks to the original block. Some
disadvantages of this method are the low resolution of the recovered image and
the complicated method used for authentication, also the spiral mapping does not
work for non-square images. 
Tong et al. [64] divided the image into 2x2 px blocks and 3 LSBs are reserved for
the watermark, that gives 12 bits for the watermark in each block. Two bits are
used as authentication bits and 10 bits contain the recovery data which consists of
two copies of the average of 5 MSBs of each block. The authentication bits are
stored in the same block while the copies of the recovery bits are mapped in two
different blocks using a chaotic map. The method suffers from high PFA because
of using only two bits for authentication and that results in a low recovery quality.
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In [65] Korus and Dziech present a model for the recovery problem that is inspired
by the work in [57]. In their work, the tamper recovery problem is modelled as an
erasure  communication  channel,  and  they  used  the  Random  Linear  Fountain
(RLF) codes [66] to recover the tampered part of the image. The model does not
impose any criteria for the generation of localisation and recovery data; however,
in their  paper the image was partitioned into  8x8 px blocks and 3 LSBs were
reserved  for  the  watermark.  32  bits  of  the  watermark  are  reserved  for
authentication using hashing function and 160 bits are reserved for recovery using
the DCT transform of 5 MSB of the each block. Their technique gives a quality of
37 dB with a tamper ratio that reaches 50% of the image. The main disadvantage
of this technique is its high computational complexity due to the use of fountain
coding that is applied to the whole image. Another disadvantage of the proposed
technique is the probabilistic behaviour of fountain codes. This behaviour is due to
the random selection of the blocks that will be included in the linear system that
represents the watermark. That means there is a probability that the generated
linear system might not be solvable for some variables, i.e. some tampered blocks
might not be recovered.
Nyeem [67] proposed a standard model for image watermarking and he defined a
set of watermarking properties according to that model, also a set of expected
attack models were developed. Self-authentication schemes have been analysed
in order to detect  and recover any possible  alteration or  tampering of medical
images,  also  a  watermarking  embedding  scheme  and  watermarking  capacity
control models were developed.
In  another  thesis,  Jassim [68]  implemented blind watermarking using one-level
and  two-level  DWT,  mobile  number  with  international  code  was  used  as
watermarking  data.  Fragile  watermarking  and  a  combined  fragile  and  robust
watermarking  were  implemented  too.  The  main  disadvantage  of  the  proposed
robust technique is its vulnerability against geometrical attacks such as rotation
and cropping,  due  to  the  lost  of  synchronisation  of  the  watermark  data.  The
copyrighted data is restricted to mobile number, where more general types of data
should  be  investigated.  The  main  disadvantage  of  the  proposed  fragile
authentication technique is the lack of ability to recover the tampered area.
Dadkhah et al. [69] divided the image into 4x4 px blocks and each block is further
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divided into 2x2 px sub-blocks,  two LSBs in each block were reserved for the
watermark which gives 8 bits per each sub-block. Singular Value Decomposition
(SVD) is used to generate the authentication data, which is stored into 3 bits, and
5 bits are assigned for the recovery data which are the average value of 5 MSBs
the sub-block. The recovery bits are also used in the authentication process which
improves the localisation rate and robustness against attacks. A random mapping
is used for recovery bits, but the upper part of the image is mapped to lower part of
the  image  and  vice  versa.  The  use  of  SVD  and  hierarchical  block  division
increases the complexity of the algorithm without introducing noticeable efficiency
and  the  mapping  of  recovery  blocks  is  not  efficient  and  suffers  from  tamper
coincidence problem.
Tareef  et  al.  [70]  presented  a  tamper  localisation  and  recovery  technique  for
medical images. The electronic patient record and the Region Of Interest (ROI) are
sparsely coded and embedded in the Region Of Non-Interest (RONI). If the image
is tampered, then the ROI could be extracted from the embedded watermark in the
RONI.  Sparse  coding  (SC)  and  SVD  are  used  in  the  proposed  technique  to
increase robustness and reduce perceptibility of the proposed technique.
Eswaraiah and Sreenivasa [71] proposed a technique for medical images where
the embedding of the recovery information of the ROI is done in the RONI. The
ROI  is  divided  into  non  overlapping  3x3  px  blocks  and  the  recovery  data  is
generated  from  the  grey  level  of  the  central  pixel  (8  bits)  and  the  difference
between it  and each surrounding pixel  with 6 bits for each pixel. The RONI is
divided into 8x8 px blocks and each block is decomposed using wavelet transform
and the recovery data is stored in the 2 LSB of LH1, HL1, LH2 and HL2 levels.
One problem with this method is that it assumes the difference between adjacent
pixels will not exceed 6 bits, which might not be the case. Another problem is when
the middle pixel is changed, this will affect all surrounding pixels which makes the
method  more  sensitive  to  errors  and  noise.  The  value  of  the  grey  level  after
performing inverse wavelet  transform (IWT) might  exceed 255 or become less
than 0, this was solved by performing a check on the possibly affected blocks in
the  RONI  and  change  their  grey  level  prior  to  embedding,  this  will  add  more
complexity and encoding time to the method and leads to a degradation in the
image quality.
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Singh et al. [72] proposed a method that uses 2x2 px blocks with 3 LSBs reserved
for the watermark, DCT was used to generate recovery data which takes 10 bits in
each block and 2 bits were reserved for authentication. The authentication bits are
stored in the same block and recovery bits are mapped randomly using a secret
key. The method shows good recovery quality; however, using only two bits for
authentication and storing the  authentication bits  in  the  same block  make this
method vulnerable to attacks such as VQ and collage attacks and increase the
PFA.
Sreenivas  and  Prasad  [26]  presented  a  survey  about  fragile  watermarking
techniques where they highlighted the main schemes used in fragile watermarking
especially self-embedding schemes. The survey presented the main issues and
problems faced when using self-embedding schemes and some of the work that
has been done to solve these issues.
A comprehensive survey paper in the field of image authentication and integrity
was presented by Korus [27]. Image authentication approaches were categorised
into  four  main  categories,  which  are:  (a)  Digital  signatures  (b)  Authentication
watermarks  (c)  Forensic  analysis  (d)  Phylogeny  reconstruction.  The  paper
highlighted  that  the  definition  of  image  authenticity  is  more  general  and
encompasses image integrity by ensuring the truthfulness of the presented image
and taking into account using an unaltered image in an incorrect context, such as
taking an image in a different time than the original one. The paper addressed
active  and  passive  approaches  used  in  image  authentication  from  different
aspects  such  as   (a)  Analysis  capabilities  (b)  Fundamental  limitations  (c)
Documented  vulnerabilities  (d)  Maturity  and  availability  of  software  tools.  The
paper also described some recently proposed alternative approaches to image
authentication that do not directly fall  into any of the discussed classes. It also
reviewed resources available in the research community such as publicly available
datasets  and  software  tools  and  it  concluded  with  a  discussion  in  the  open
problems and future research perspectives.
In  [73]  Sreenivas  and  Kamakshiprasad  proposed  a  localisation  technique  that
enhances the technique proposed by Chang et al. in [74]. The proposed technique
utilises logistic chaotic map [75] and Arnold’s cat map [37, 38] in the generation of
the localisation data. The technique divides the image into 2x2 px blocks and uses
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3  LSBs  for  watermark  embedding.  Based  on  their  localisation  technique,
Sreenivas and Kamakshiprasad also proposed a tamper recovery technique, their
technique divides the image into 2x2 px blocks and uses 3 LSBs for watermark
embedding. In their technique, 4 bits are used for localisation and 8 bits are used
for recovery. Two recovery sets are used, one has 5 bits and represents the mean
of 5 MSBs of the block, the other is an approximation of the mean, which was
previously calculated, and it is stored in 3 bits. The localisation bits are stored in
the same block and the two recovery sets are stored in different blocks. Using two
recovery sets enables the recovery of a larger tampered area; however, the quality
of recovery is low considering that 3 LSBs are reserved for the watermark.
Qin et al. [76] used a different approach for image partitioning where the image is
divided into  3x3  px  overlapping  blocks  that  are  overlapped  in  1  pixel  in  each
direction. Recovery data is generated using the average of 6 MSBs of each block.
The number of LSBs used for embedding the recovery data is 2 LSB in 4 pixels at
the corners of each block and 1 LSBs in the pixels at the sides of each block. The
number of LSBs used for localisation data embedding is 2, 3, or 4 LSBs that are
stored  in  the  centre  pixel  of  each  block  and  is  generated  depending  on  the
complexity of  the block.  Inspection of the neighbouring blocks is also used for
localisation where a block is considered as a tampered one if it is surrounded by 5
or more tampered blocks. Depending on the position of each pixel in each block, a
set of equations describes the value of that pixel depending on its neighbouring
blocks which enables a pixel-wise recovery of the tampered blocks. The proposed
method has high level  of  complexity  and since the blocks are overlapped this
might lead to a reduced recovery capability especially when the tampered area is
spread all over the image as in the case of adding noise to the image.
Qin et al. [77] proposed a technique that relies on VQ and index sharing, where a
VQ codebook is  constructed for  the  image and each non-overlapping block is
represented by VQ index bits. The encoding process is carried out by dividing the
image into non-overlapping 8x8 px blocks and reserving 1, 2, or 3 LSBs in each
block for the watermark. 32 bits of the first LSB are reserved for the authentication
bits, which are generated by finding a hash for the contents of the block along with
the recovery bits. Each 8x8 px block is further divided into 4x4 px sub-blocks and
the  recovery  bits  are  found  for  each  sub-block  using  a  compressed  VQ
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representation  of  the  image.  The  recovery  bits  are  permuted  randomly  in  the
image and a level of redundancy is applied for the recovery data in order to ensure
high  recoverable  area  ratio.  One  advantage  of  the  proposed  technique  is  the
ability  of  recovering  large  tampered  area,  up  to  80% of  the  image  size.  The
proposed technique has flexible recovery quality, which depends on the number of
LSBs reserved for the watermark and the size of the VQ codebook. The recovery
quality ranges from 37 dB to 28 dB for tamper ratios that range from 10% to 80%
respectively.
In the technique proposed by Shehab et al.  [78],  the watermark is stored in 2
LSBs, and the image is divided into 4x4 px blocks. The authentication bits are
generated using SVD and they are stored in 12 bits, which leaves 20 bits for the
recovery bits. The 4x4 px block is further divided into 2x2 px sub-blocks and 5
recovery bits are found for each one, the recovery bits represent 5 bits of  the
average value of each sub-block. Arnold chaotic mapping is used to distribute the
recovery bits randomly throughout the image. The parameters controlling Arnold
chaotic mapping are chosen based on a secret key. The proposed technique was
tested against some attacks, such as: copy and paste attack, text addition, content
removal, and VQ attacks. The proposed method suffers from low recovery quality
because of the random mapping and the low number of recovery bits.
Haghighi  et  al.  [79]  proposed a technique that generates 2 recovery data sets
based on lifting wavelet and halftoning techniques. The recovery data is mapped
randomly based on Arnold Cat Map. The image is partitioned into 2x2 px blocks
and 2 LSBs are reserved for the watermark. LSB rounding mechanism is proposed
to enhance the recovery quality, and shift-aside operation is proposed to enhance
the  recovery  rate.  The  technique  suffer  from  low  recovery  quality  and  high
complexity;  however,  having  2  recovery  data  sets  increases  the  recoverable
tampered area size.
Hemida et al. [80] proposed a tamper localisation and recovery technique that is
targeting natural and text images. The authentication is done using 4 bits for 4x4
px blocks, while the recovery is based on 2x2 px blocks. The DCT of the 2x2 px
block is used to generate the recovery data, which has variable length from 6 to 10
bits based on the nature of the bock contents. More recovery bits are assigned to
the blocks containing text, and less are assigned to the ones containing natural
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contents. The recovery data is XORed with a secret key to enhance the security of
the technique. The recovery data is mapped randomly based on a secret key. A
multi-stage neighbour detection strategy is used to improve the performance of
tamper detection. In general, the proposed technique has low computational time,
but it suffers from low PFA value and the variable length encoding of the recovery
data  requires  extra  bits  to  determine  the  length  of  the  recovery  data,  which
increases the watermark-data waste problem.
Niu et al. [81] investigated reducing the computational complexity of referencing
sharing mechanism used in some tamper localisation and recovery techniques. In
their paper, they reviewed the main literature where reference sharing mechanism
was used. The main advantage of reference sharing mechanism is solving the
tamper-coincidence problem and the vulnerability of recovery to tampering pattern.
Reference  sharing  relies  on  converting  the  recovery  information  into  a  linear
system and solving this system for any loss in recovery information. The tampering
appears as unknown variables in the linear system. The main problem with this
scheme is the high computational time required to solve the linear system, and this
time increases dramatically as the size of the image increases. Niu et al. build their
work based on the idea that if the encoded recovery matrix is more sparse, then
the  required  computational  time  will  be  reduced.  The  experimental  results
presented in their paper shows an improvement in the computational time while
maintaining the same restoration capability.
3.3- Semi-Fragile Tamper Localisation and Recovery 
Techniques
A  few  semi-fragile  tamper  recovery  techniques  have  been  proposed  in  the
literature [82], this is due to their limited capacity and low sensitivity to tampering,
this section reviews the most important techniques presented in the literature.
In [83]  Lin and Chang proposed a design for  Self-Authentication-and-Recovery
Image  (SARI)  watermarking  system  based  on  their  semi-fragile  watermarking
technique that was proposed in [84] which is considered as the first work using
semi-fragile  techniques  for  tamper  localisation  and  recovery.  Their  system  is
compatible with JPEG image format and can detect  malicious tampering while
accepting the changes introduced in the image due to JPEG lossy compression.
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Lin  and  Chang  mentioned  that  SARI  is  based  on  two  invariant  properties  of
quantization-based lossy compression. The first property shows that if a transform-
domain (such as DCT in JPEG) coefficient is modified to an integral multiple of a
quantization step, which is larger than the steps used in later JPEG compressions,
then this coefficient  can be exactly reconstructed after later JPEG compression.
The second one is the invariant relationships between two coefficients in a block
pair before and after JPEG compression. In SARI, the second property is used to
generate  authentication  signature,  and  the  first  one  is  used  for  watermark
embedding. The proposed technique suffers from small-size and low quality of the
recovered area.
Yafei et al. [85] proposed a semi-fragile technique for recovering missed blocks in
block coded image formats, such as JPEG, by embedding the DCT coefficients of
a low-quality version of the image into the LSBs of the DCT coefficients of the
original  image.  The  number  of  the  generated  DCT coefficients  for  each  block
depends on how much detail it contains where 7 coefficients are used for smooth
blocks and 15 coefficients are used for high detail blocks.
Zhu  et  al.  [86]  proposed  a  semi-fragile  tamper  localisation  and  recovery
watermarking  technique  in  which  the  recovery  problem  is  formulated  as  an
irregular sampling problem, the recovery is performed through iterative projections
onto convex sets. The proposed technique suffers from small  recoverable area
and the quality of recovery decreases as the tampered area increases.
Hasan and Hassan in [87] and Cruz et al. in [88] proposed some techniques that
generate recovery information for Region of Interest (ROI) and the embedding is
carried out in the remaining region, i.e. Region of Embedding (ROE). However,
these techniques suffer from limited recovery area and can not be used for general
purposes where all parts of the image are equally important.
Cheddad et al. [89] proposed a technique based on a steganography approach to
protect scanned documents from forgery. In their technique the original image is
converted into a halftone image and embedded into the first-level 2D Haar DWT.
The technique suffers from low quality of the recovered area due to using half-tone
mechanism. Another halftone-based technique was also proposed by Mendoza-
Noriega  et al. [90] where the halftone image is embedded into middle-frequency
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DCT coefficients of the original image and the inverse halftoning process is carried
out using Multi-Layer Perception neural network (MLP). The technique suffers from
high computational complexity and low quality of the recovered image.
In  [82]  Korus  et  al.  proposed  a  technique  that  aims  at  providing  a  practical
recovery capability for lossy compressed JPEG images, their technique is based
on the technique proposed in [65, 91] but with far less computation complexity, the
reduced  encoding  and  decoding  time  enables  using  their  technique  for  high
resolution  images  and  on  mobile  devices.  The  reduction  of  computation  time
comes  from  dividing  the  image  into  small  sub-images  and  applying  Digital
Fountain Codes (DFC) on them instead of the whole image. An improved model
for calculating the probability of successful  restoration is introduced also in this
paper.  In  their  proposed  technique  the  damaged  parts  of  the  watermark  are
discarded  and  do  not  contribute  to  the  recovery  process  which  results  in  a
constant  recovery  quality,  4  quality  levels  were  defined  from  low  fidelity  with
average PSNR of 28 dB to a high fidelity with average PSNR of 33 dB, the claimed
achievable tampering rate vary between 67% and 20% depending on the selected
quality  level.  In  the  encoding  process,  the  image  is  compressed  using  JPEG
compression with a quality factor  Q1  and the resulting JPEG image is used to
generate the recovery bits which are grouped as units of macro-blocks of 16x16 px
where each block has 4 sub-blocks of  8x8 px.  The number of  watermark bits
corresponding  to  each  macro  block  is  4 λΛ+2 L ,  where  Λ  is  the  number  of
recovery bits for each 8x8 block, L  is the number of localisation, or hash, bits for
the  macro-block,  and  λ  is  the  fidelity  level.  The  generated  recovery  bits  are
encoded using RLF codes, then localisation bits appended to them, the resulting
stream is scrambled and embedded in the coefficients of the JPEG image. In order
for the technique to work, any further compression after encoding should have a
compression quality that is higher than Q1 . 
In [92] Chen et al. proposed a technique in which the recovery data consists of 5
bits for DC coefficient and 6 bits for 2 AC coefficients from the DCT coefficients of
8x8 px block after downsampling it to 4x4 px block. Recovery bits are used for
both  localisation  and  recovery  purposes,  and  the  DC  and  AC  values  in  the
watermark are embedded in 7 middle frequency DCT coefficients of two different
blocks in order to increase robustness against attacks, the embedding blocks are
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selected  according  to  a  secret  key.  Multi-neighbour  characteristic  and  multi-
threshold  optimization  are  used  in  the  localisation  stage  to  improve  the
performance.  The  proposed  technique  suffers  from  severe  distortion  and  low
quality of the recovered area.
Semi-fragile techniques for tamper localisation and recovery are also proposed in
the papers [93-95]
3.4- Analysis and Shortcomings of the Techniques 
Proposed in the Literature
In this section, analysis is carried out for the different stages of tamper localisation
and recovery process and some shortcomings are highlighted. The analysis will
not go deep into the different methods proposed in the literature, instead it will try
to  highlight  the main  approaches that  could be used and the advantages and
disadvantages of each one.
3.4.1- Using Separate Sets of Bits for Localisation and 
Recovery
The  main  shortcoming  that  has  been  found  in  the  survey  is  the  use  of  two
separate sets of bits, one for the localisation and another for the recovery of the
tampered area. The disadvantages of this can be summarised as follows:
• Reducing the capacity of the watermarking method, because both sets are
related to the values of the pixels in each block and both sets can contribute
to localisation and recovery processes, but since each set is used for one
purpose  only,  that  results  in  a  redundancy  which  decreases  the
watermarking capacity.
• Increasing the complexity of  watermarking: Because the localisation and
the recovery are done as separate processes instead of doing them as a
single process with a single set of bits.
• Reducing the localisation efficiency: Because a limited number of  bits is
used  for  localisation  instead  of  using  all  of  the  available  bits  in  the
watermark and that  increases the probability  that  some tampered pixels
might go undetected, which increases the PFA. The PFA can be estimated
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by equation 3.1, where L  is the number of localisation, i.e. authentication,
bits.  For  example,  if  2  bits  are  used  for  localisation  then  25%  of  the
tampered blocks will  be detected as valid ones,  which leads to reduced
recovery quality because these blocks will not be recovered.
PFA≈2−L (3.1)
• Increasing the ability of counterfeiting: Because when a limited number of
bits is used in localisation, that will result in a larger number of blocks that
can  generate  the  same  localisation  bits  and  hence  more  ease  of
counterfeiting.
3.4.2- Multiple Copies of the Recovery Data
It has been noticed that some techniques use multiple copies of the recovery data
to  increase the  size  of  the  recoverable  area and to  overcome the  problem of
tamper coincidence; however, this increases the watermark-data waste problem.
3.4.3- Localisation Bit Mapping
Another shortcoming that has been noticed is that the localisation bits are stored in
the same block they are generated from. This is done to maximise the localisation
rate  by  simply  considering  the  missing  localisation  bits  in  each  block  as  an
indication of the tampering of that block. Storing the localisation bits in the same
block will  make each block independent from the others and it  could easily be
counterfeited using VQ and collage attacks.
3.4.4- Generation of Localisation and Recovery Bits
The generation of localisation bits could take one of two distinct approaches, the
first one is when localisation is equally sensitive to the change in any bit in the
watermarked block and the best choice for that approach is to use a form of parity
check or hash function. The other approach is to use localisation bits  that are
related  to  the  energy  in  the  watermarked  block  and  the  best  choice  for  this
approach is to use average value or DCT.
The problem with the first  approach is that it  gives the intruder more ability to
replace the original block with another one that is visually very different but yet it
produces the same localisation bits, which means more ability to counterfeit the
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original block, meanwhile in the second approach the intruder’s choices are more
limited. Since the number of localisation bits is less than the number of bits in each
block, a perfect localisation scheme is impossible and deliberately counterfeited
blocks could go undetected.
3.4.5- Image Partitioning
The partitioning of the input image could be done in a pixel-wise or a block-wise
manner.  Pixel-wise  methods  have  a  better  localisation  rate  whilst  block-wise
methods give more flexibility, especially if the watermark generation depends on a
block-wise  operation  such  as  DCT or  SVD.  Nested  blocking  is  used  in  some
techniques; however, this increases the complexity of the technique.
3.4.6- Recovery Bit Mapping
It is very important to store the recovery bits of a certain block in another one that
is  separated  from  it  by  enough  distance,  which  is  determined  by  a  mapping
criteria.  If  the recovery bits  are stored close to  the block from which they are
generated, this will result in a tamper coincidence problem.
There are two distinct approaches to map the recovery bits, the first one is to use
a random distance that depends on a secret key. This will make the watermarking
process more secure and the counterfeiting more difficult; however, the probability
of tampering coincidence is higher in this method because some recovery bits will
be close to the original block they are supposed to recover. 
The other approach to ensure a  maximum-distance in each direction between
the recovery bits and the block from which they are generated, and this distance is
half the size of the image.
In maximum-distance mapping [69] for MxN image, block Bx , y  is mapped to the
block Bx+Δ x, y+Δ y  where:
Δ x={ M /2, x≤M /2−M /2 , x>M /2     ,     Δ y={ N /2 , y≤N /2−N /2 , y>N /2 (3.2)
The main disadvantage of the maximum-distance approach is that the position of
the  recovery  bits  is  known  to  the  intruder,  which  gives  more  ability  of
counterfeiting. One solution to this problem is to permute the order of the bits in
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each pixel using a secret key, which could be considered as a permutation in the z
direction,  this  will  enhance  the  security  of  the  watermarking  technique  whilst
maintaining maximum-distance condition.
Another  disadvantage  of  maximum-distance  approach  is  its  sensitivity  to
tampering  pattern  where  the  most  suitable  tampering  patterns  are  vertical
tampering that does not exceed half the width of the image or horizontal tampering
that does not exceed half the height of the image, but any tampering that exceeds
half  of  both  the  width  and  the  height  of  the  image  will  result  in  tampering
coincidence.
3.4.7- Watermark Security
It is very important to encrypt the embedded watermark to prevent any intruder
from  knowing  it.  Using  common  encryption  algorithms  such  as  Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) [96] will cause error spread in the watermark [97] and
can not  be used for  small  watermark data size.  Therefore,  most  methods use
simple XOR operation with a random sequence to encrypt the watermark.
Using  XOR operation  imposes  a  security  problem if  the  exact  position  of  the
watermark content is known, which is the case when maximum distance mapping
is used, because if  the intruder knows how to generate the watermark and its
exact position then the random sequence will easily be known by comparing the
generated watermark with the embedded one.
Some level of randomisation of the position of recovery bits must be ensured when
XOR operation is used for encryption, this randomisation could be done for the
position of the bits in watermark pixels, this solution will enhance the security of
the watermarking whist maintaining maximum distance condition.
3.4.8- How to Resist VQ and Collage Attacks
The watermarked image could be attacked in different ways; however, the most
difficult  attacks  to  deal  with  are  VQ  and  collage  attacks,  since  they  rely  on
replacing parts of the watermarked image with others that are taken from images
that use the same secret key.
If each block of the watermark is encoded separately, then it could be replaced
with any block from other image that uses the same secret key. Therefore, inter-
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block dependency is required to prevent VQ and collage attacks.
In the case of tamper recovery, the intruder should insert the counterfeited pixels
in both the image and the watermark in order for the tampering to be successful.
By randomising the position of the watermark bits, the watermarking technique will
be more immune against VQ and collage attacks since the exact position of the
recovery bits is not known by the intruder.
One solution for VQ and collage attacks is to make the encryption of the image
dependent on the number of each block [65] and on a unique serial number for
each image, which makes each block distinct and can not be replaced by another
from the same image or another image.
3.5- Summary
A literature survey for tamper localisation and recovery watermarking techniques
was conducted in this chapter, fragile and semi-fragile watermarking techniques
were surveyed, even though  this research is intended for fragile ones. The survey
focused on the techniques that perform not only localisation but both localisation
and  recovery.  The  main  technical  aspects  of  the  surveyed  techniques  were
highlighted,  namely:  the  partitioning  scheme,  the  number  of  bits  used  for
localisation and recovery,  the methods used for  localisation and recovery data
generation,  mapping  methods,  recovered  area  quality  and  size,  and  the
techniques advantages and shortcomings.
Varies methods have been implemented for each aspect of tamper localisation
and recovery. Image partitioning is usually done using non-overlapping blocks and
the block size depends mainly on the method used for recovery data generation,
such as using averaging with 2x2 px blocks or DCT with 8x8 px blocks. Other
partitioning schemes have been proposed in the literature, such as hierarchical
and overlapping partitioning. Some techniques rely on having more than one copy
of the recovery data to increase the recoverable area ratio and reducing tamper
coincidence  probability;  however,  that increases  the  watermark-data  waste
problem.  Most of the techniques rely on storing the recovery data directly into the
destination blocks whilst a fewer techniques store the recovery data as a linear
system of equations, where the lost blocks are represented as unknown variables
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and the system is solved to find these variables. Storing recovery data as a linear
system  helps  in  overcoming  tamper  coincidence  problem  and  sensitivity  to
tampering  pattern;  however,  it  increases  the  decoding  time  significantly.  The
localisation data is usually stored in the block from which it is generated. Random
or  maximum-distance mapping is  used to  map the  recovery data.  Semi-fragile
tamper recovery techniques suffers mainly from small recoverable area  and low
recovery quality.
The  surveyed  techniques  were  analysed  in  this  chapter  and  some  of  the
shortcomings  were  highlighted,  such  as:  using  two  different  sets  of  data  for
localisation  and  recovery,  using  multiple  copies  of  the  recovery  data,  and
vulnerability  against  attacks  and  counterfeiting.  The  disadvantage  of  mapping
techniques were also highlighted, such as higher tamper coincidence in random
mapping and vulnerability to counterfeiting in maximum-distance mapping. Some
solutions have been proposed, such as using bit permutation inside each pixel for
maximum-distance mapping.
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Chapter 4: The Description of the Proposed
and the Referenced Techniques
4.1- Introduction
In this chapter, the challenge of using one set of data for tamper localisation and
recovery  is  highlighted  and  the  encoding/decoding  stages  of  the  proposed
techniques  are  presented.  This  chapter  also  presents  the  description  and  the
shortcomings of the two techniques in literature to which the proposed techniques
will  be  compared,  these  two  techniques  are  referred  to  as  the  referenced
techniques.
4.2- The Challenge of Using One Set of Data for 
Tamper Localisation and Recovery
Two separate  sets  of  data  are  used in  most  tamper  localisation  and recovery
techniques, one set is used for localisation and it is usually embedded in the block
it is related to, the other set is used for recovery and it is usually embedded in a
block as far as possible from its related one. It has been noticed that the recovery
data  represents  a  low  resolution  version  of  the  watermarked  image  and  any
tamper  in  the  watermarked  image  could  be  localised  with  direct  comparison
between the watermark and the watermarked image. Therefore, the use of extra
localisation  data  can be avoided  and the  recovery  data  only  can be used  for
localisation and recovery.
The  main  problem  that  arises  when  using  direct  comparison  between  the
watermark  and  the  watermarked  image  is  that  the  tampering  will  affect  the
watermark and watermarked image in two different places and when comparing
them together there will be two regions that are different, one region coincides with
the tampered area in the watermarked image while the other does not; therefore, it
will not be possible to directly distinguish the tampered area.
The example shown in Figure 4.1 illustrates this problem. The original lighthouse
image  [30]  is  shown  in  Figure  4.1 (a)  and  the  watermark  is  mapped  using
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maximum-distance mapping as shown in Figure 4.1 (b). The watermarked image
is tampered by inserting an image of a hot air balloon as shown in Figure 4.1 (c).
The inserted image will affect both the watermark and the watermarked image in
the top-left corner but when the watermark is remapped to its original position, the
tampering  in  it  will  be  in  the  bottom-right  corner.  The  watermark  and  the
watermarked image are compared using XOR operation and a threshold is applied
to the result of comparison so that any different pixels between the two images will
have a white colour as shown in Figure 4.1 (d). From Figure 4.1 (d) it is noticed
that there are two areas in the difference image, one coincides with the tampered
area  in  the  watermarked  image  while  the  other  does  not,  this  will  impose  a
problem of distinguishing the tampered area. 
The first three techniques proposed in this research overcome this problem and
use the recovery data for the localisation and the recovery of the tampered area,
which  gives them more capacity  than most  of  the  proposed techniques in  the
literature,  also  they  have  the  characteristic  of  employing  image  filtering  in  the
localisation process. Each technique uses different criteria for the mapping of the
localisation/recovery  data,  which  requires  appropriate  filtering  and  localisation
procedures for each technique.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 4.1: An illustration of how the tampered area appears when the watermarked
image is compared with the watermark. a) The original image. b) The watermark
with maximum-distance mapping. c) The tampered image. d) The difference
between the watermarked image and watermark. (Lighthouse image taken from
[30])
4.3- Notes About the Selected Block Size of the 
Proposed Techniques
This section presents the reasons behind selecting 2x2 px blocks for the first, the
second, and the third technique, and choosing 8x8 px for the fourth one.
The selected block size depends mainly on: the method used for generating the
recovery data, the available number of bits provided by that block size, and the
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number of deleted LSBs.
For the first, the second, and the third techniques, a block averaging is chosen to
generate the recovery data for each block. As block size increases, the quality of
the recovered area decreases and pixelation artefacts start  to appear. For that
reason, the block size needs to be as small as possible, preferably 2x2 px, as long
as the available number of bits in the block is sufficient to store the generated
watermark data.
The available number of bits inside a block depends on the number of deleted
LSBs. The available number of bits when 2 or 3 LSBs are deleted is 8 or 12 bits
respectively, which is sufficient to store the average value of the remaining MSBs
in the block. Authentication data and/or extra recovery data could be stored in the
remain space. Many researchers [54,  59,  64,  69,  72,  73]  have chosen 2x2 px
block size when averaging is used to generate the recovery data.
When  1  LSB  is  reserved  for  the  watermark,  only  4  bits  will  be  available  for
recovery data, in this case 4 MSBs of the average value could be used to fit in the
available space, as was done in the first proposed technique. Increasing the block
size to 4x4 px will provide 16 bits for watermark; however, this number is more
than needed and the quality of the recovered image will be worse than using 2x2
px block with only 4 MSBs.
To verify the previous statement,  the 24 images in Kodak image database are
converted to grey-scale and the average PSNR is calculated for two cases. The
first one is when the images are converted into 2x2 px averaging blocks and 4
LSBs set to 0. The second case is when they are converted into 4x4 px averaging
blocks with 1 LSB set to 0. The average PSNR is 23.6 dB for the first case and
21.1 dB for the second case, which confirm the that using 2x2 px blocks with 4
MSBs  of  the  average  is  better  than  using  4x4  px  block  with  7  MSBs  of  the
average.
For the fourth technique, the DCT is used to generate the recovery data. In this
case a larger block size will be better for approximation, at the same time it will
result in less precise localisation; therefore, a compromise is needed. A block size
of 8x8 px is selected because it provides a good compromise and it has been used
by many researchers [53, 56-58, 65]. A block size of 8x8 px is also used in JPEG
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compression.
4.4- The Description of the Encoding and the Decoding
Stages of the First Technique
The localisation/recovery bits in this technique are distributed in a random manner
throughout the image. This makes the technique more resistive to VQ and collage
attacks  and  less  sensitive  to  the  tampering  pattern;  however,  the  tampering
coincidence  in  this  technique  is  very  high,  which  makes  the  quality  of  the
recovered image very low. In this technique the image is divided into 2x2 px blocks
and one LSBs is reserved for the watermark, which gives 4 bits in each block to
store the watermark data that consists of 4 MSBs of the mean value of the block. 
When comparing the watermark with the watermarked image, the tampered area
will appear as a dense white area while the untampered area will appear as a dark
noisy area. The nature of the noise is similar to salt and pepper noise. Median
filtering is used in the localisation of the tampered area and in the enhancement of
the quality of the recovered image.
This technique is suitable for applications where the number of sacrificed bits in
the image should be as low as possible and the quality of the recovered area is
not a priority.
The  implemented  code  for  the  encoding  and  the  decoding  stages  of  the  first
proposed technique is provided in Appendix A.
4.4.1- The Encoding Stage of the First Technique
A general block diagram for the encoding stage is shown in Figure 4.2.
Image 
Partitioning
LSB
Deletion
Watermark Shuffling
(Random)
Watermark
Encryption 
Input
Image
Watermarked
Image
Watermark
Embedding 
Watermark
Generation
Figure 4.2: A block diagram for the encoding stage of the first proposed technique
The steps for the encoding stage are described as follows:
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• Image Partitioning: The input image is divided into non-overlapping 2x2 px
blocks. The dimensions of the input image must be multiples of 2.
• LSB Deletion: 1 LSB in the image is set to 0, i.e. deleted, in order to store
the watermark in it.
• Watermark Generation:  The watermark is generated by taking 4 bits of
the average of each block. The watermark has half the width and half the
height of the input image.
• Watermark Shuffling: Each row in the watermark image is rotated,  i.e.
circularly shifted, a random horizontal distance, then each column of the
resulting image is rotated a random vertical distance. A secret key K is used
as a seed for the generation of the random numbers used in the rotation
process. The whole rotation process of the rows and the columns could be
repeated  to  ensure  a  better  shuffling  for  the  watermark  pixels.  In  the
proposed technique the rotation is repeated once.
• Watermark Encryption: For securing the watermark, it is XORed with a
random sequence. The secret key K is used as a seed for generating the
random  sequence.  The  whole  watermark  is  XORed  with  a  random
sequence, which means that the random sequence for the individual blocks
is not the same, which means the inability of using a block from the same
image to replace another. A block from another image that is encrypted with
same secret key can be used to replace a block from the current image as
long as they have the same position. Therefore, it is necessary to assign a
unique serial number for each encoded image and to make the generation
of  the  random  sequence  dependant  on  the  secret  key  and  the  serial
number of the image.
• Watermark  Embedding: The number  of  pixels  in  the  watermark  is  the
same as the number of 2x2 px blocks in the watermarked image. 4 MSBs of
each pixel in the watermark are embedded in the LSB of the block that
coincides with that pixel. The bits from the same pixel in the watermark are
kept close to each other in order to give them a better chance of survival
from tampering.
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4.4.2- The Decoding Stage of the First Technique
A general block diagram for the decoding stage is shown in Figure 4.3.
Watermark
Extraction
Watermark
Decryption
Difference-Image
Generation
Mask Image
Generation
Tampered-Area
Recovery
Watermarked
Image
Recovered
Image
Image
Partitioning
Watermark Reshuffling
(Random)
Watermark
Filtering
Approximation-Image
Generation
Figure 4.3: A block diagram for the decoding stage of the first proposed technique.
The lighthouse image in Figure 4.1 (a) will be used to illustrate the decoding stage.
The image is tampered with by inserting an image of a hot-air balloon, as in Figure
4.1 (c). The steps for the decoding stage are described as follows:
• Image Partitioning: The  input  watermarked image  is  divided into  non-
overlapping 2x2 px blocks.
• Watermark Extraction: The pixels of the watermark are extracted from the
LSB of each block.
• Watermark  Decryption: The  watermark  is  XORed  with  the  random
sequence generated in the encoding stage, this will  return the pixels to
their original values.
• Watermark Reshuffling: The columns and the rows of the watermark are
rotated as in the encoding stage but with a reversed order and reversed
direction,  this  will  return the watermark pixels to their  original  positions,
then 4 LSBs in the watermark are set to 0. The resulting image is referred
to as the watermark image. See Figure 4.4
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Figure 4.4: An illustration of the watermark image in
the decoding stage of the first technique
• Approximation Image Generation: An approximation image is generated
from the watermarked image by setting 4 LSBs in each block to 0 and
finding the block average, then 4 LSBs of the resulting image are set to 0 to
match  the  watermark  image.  The  resulting  image  is  referred  to  as  the
approximation image.
• Difference Image Generation: The watermark image is XORed with the
approximation image, a threshold is then applied to the result so that each
pixel with a value more than 0 will have a value of 255. The resulting image
is referred to as the  difference image.  Due to watermark shuffling, the
tampering  will  be  scattered  throughout  the  watermark,  and  when  it  is
compared with the approximation image, the tampered area will appear as
a dense white area while the untampered area will appear as a dark area
with noise that is similar to salt and pepper noise. See Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: An illustration of the difference image in the
decoding stage of the first technique
• Mask Image Generation: The mask image determines the tampered area
in the watermarked image and it is generated by applying a non-linear filter
to the difference image. The non-linear filter returns 255 if the ratio of white
pixels  inside  the  window  is  above  a  threshold  Γ ,  and  it  returns  0
otherwise. The lighthouse image is used to illustrate the best value of Γ ,
where it was tampered by erasing a central squared area. The ratio of the
erased  area  varies  from  10%  to  50%.  The  ratio  of  white  pixels  was
calculated for the tampered and the untampered areas. The results are
shown in Table  4.1 which shows that the ratio of white pixels is always
greater  than  90%  for  the  tampered  area  and  less  than  50%  for  the
untampered area; therefore, 50%< Γ <90%. The value 70% was selected
because  it  was  found  to  give  good  results.  The  selection  of  the  filter
window size needs some optimisation because it must be large enough for
the calculation of the ratio to be statistically accepted; however, a large
block  size  will  result  in  missing  some  pixels  at  the  boundaries  of  the
tampered area. A window size of 7x7 px was selected because it was found
to give good results, as will be illustrated in Section 4.4.3.
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Some tampered pixels at the boundaries of the tampered area are missed
due to the use of the non-linear filter. To solve this problem, the localised
area is enlarged by applying an averaging filter, then a threshold is applied
so that any pixel with a grey level more than 0 will become 255. A window
size of 5x5 px was selected because it was found to give good results. The
resulting  image  from this  step  is  referred  to  as  the  mask image.  See
Figure 4.6.
Table 4.1: The ratio of white pixels in the difference image for the tampered and the 
untampered areas
Tamper ratio 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Ratio of white pixels in 
the tampered area 99.3% 98.5% 98.0% 97.4% 96.6%
Ratio of white pixels in 
the untampered area 9.3% 18.9% 28.5% 37.7%  46.7%
Figure 4.6: An illustration of the mask image in the
decoding stage of the first technique
• Watermark  Filtering: The  watermark  image  is  used  to  recover  the
tampered area; however, the noise in the watermark needs to be reduced.
A median filter is used for this purpose because the noise is similar to salt
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and pepper noise. A median filter with window size of 3x3 px is selected
because it  was found to  give  good results.  The quality  of  the  recovery
depends on the percentage of the tampered area and the efficiency of the
filter used for noise removal.
• Tampered Area Recovery: Finally, the filtered watermark image and the
mask image are scaled  up by  a factor  of  2  to  match  the watermarked
image size. The tampered area is replaced by the corresponding area from
the  filtered  watermark  image.  The  location  of  the  tampered  area  is
determined by the mask image. Figure  4.7 shows the recovered image.
The recovered area is recognisable in the image because of the use of
median filtering and because only 4 bits are assigned for each pixel in the
watermark.
Figure 4.7: An illustration of the recovered image in the
decoding stage of first proposed technique.
4.4.3- Validation of the Selected Parameters in the Decoding 
Stage of the First Technique
This section presents a validation test for the selected values of the parameters in
the decoding stage of the first technique, namely: the threshold value of the white
pixels in the localisation window, the localisation filter window size, the averaging
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filter window size, and the median filter window size.
The test starts by converting the 24 images in the Kodak database to grey-scale
and cropping them to 512x512 px. Each of the 24 images is encoded using the
first technique, then it is tampered with by inserting the content of the next image
into it according to the white pixels in the pattern shown in Figure  4.8. The last
image is  tampered with  using the  first  one.  The percentage of  white  pixels  in
pattern  is  10%,  which  represents  the  tampering  ratio.  Each  image  is  then
recovered and the average PSNR, PFA, and PFR are calculated, the PFA and the
PFR are calculated according to equations 5.1 and 5.2. The recovery process is
repeated 4 times, in each time one parameter is varied while the others are fixed.
The variation of the parameters is shown in Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5. The fixed
values for the parameters are as follows: threshold = 70%, localisation window
size = 7x7 px, averaging filter window size = 5x5 px, and median filter window size
= 3x3 px.
Figure 4.8: The pattern used in the tampering of Kodak
database images which are used in parameter validation
test of the first technique.
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Table 4.2: The average value of PSNR, PFA, and PFR when varying the threshold value 
in the first technique.
Threshold % average PSNR (dB) average PFA % average PFR %
50% 31.53 0.26% 4.49%
60% 31.81 0.74% 3.44%
70% 32.08 1.84% 2.39%
80% 32.12 4.80% 1.37%
Table 4.3: The average value of PSNR, PFA, and PFR when varying the localisation filter 
window size in the first technique.
Localisation filter
window Size average PSNR (dB) average PFA % average PFR %
3x3 px 31.75 0.45% 3.69%
5x5 px 31.90 1.07% 3.10%
7x5 px 32.08 1.84% 2.39%
9x9 px 32.03 3.02% 1.77%
11x11 px 31.39 5.20% 1.24%
Table 4.4: The average value of PSNR, PFA, and PFR when varying the averaging filter 
window size in the first technique.
Averaging filter
Window Size average PSNR (dB) average PFA % average PFR %
3x3 px 32.26 4.02% 0.92%
5x5 px 32.08 1.84% 2.39%
7x7 px 31.64 1.03% 4.00%
9x9 px 31.23 0.65% 5.60%
Table 4.5: The average value of PSNR, PFA, and PFR when varying the median filter 
window size in the first technique.
Median filter
Window Size average PSNR (dB) average PFA % average PFR %
3x3 px 32.08 1.84% 2.39%
5x5 px 31.03 1.84% 2.39%
7x7 px 30.35 1.84% 2.39%
9x9 px 29.91 1.84% 2.39%
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It can be seen in Table 4.2 that as the threshold value increases, the PSNR and
the PFA values increase while the PFR values decrease. Since higher values of
PSNR and lower values of PFA and PFR are required, a compromise is needed;
therefore, a threshold value of 70% is selected. A compromise is also needed with
the localisation filter windows size and the averaging filter window size; therefore,
the selected window sizes are 7x7 px and 5x5 px for the localisation filter and
averaging filter respectively. It can be seen from Table 4.5 that the average PFA
and PFR are not affected by the median window size because they are already
determined by the mask image; therefore, a window size of 3x3 px is selected
because it provides the best value of PSNR.
4.5- The Description of the Encoding and the Decoding
Stages of the Second Technique
The second technique divides the watermark pixels into three groups and maps
each group based on maximum distance mapping. The mapping is carried out in
three directions which are: the horizontal, the vertical, and the diagonal direction.
This technique has higher recovery quality and better localisation accuracy when
compared  to  the  first  one;  however,  it  requires  that  the  tampering  is  within  a
rectangular area that has half the width and half the height of the watermarked
image,  otherwise  tampering  coincidence occurs  and recovery  quality  degrades
dramatically. The technique divides the image into 2x2 px blocks and uses 2 LSBs
to store the watermark, which gives 8 bits in each block for the watermark, 6 MSBs
are used to store the average of 6 MSBs of the block and the remaining 2 LSBs in
watermark are used to store the average of the deleted 2 LSBs in the block, which
increases the recovery quality.
The implemented code for the encoding and the decoding stages of the second
proposed technique is provided in Appendix B.
4.5.1- The Encoding Stage of the Second Technique
A general block diagram for the encoding stage is shown in Figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.9: A block diagram for the encoding stage of the second proposed technique.
The steps for the encoding stage are described as follows:
• Image Partitioning: The input image is divided into non-overlapping 2x2 px
blocks. The dimensions of the input image must be multiples of 12.
• Watermark  Generation: The  average  of  6  MSBs  of  each  block  is
calculated and stored in 6 MSBs in the watermark, this average will be used
in tamper localisation/recovery process. The average of 2 LSBs of each
block is calculated and is stored in 2 LSBs of the watermark, this average
will be used to partially recover the deleted 2 LSBs in the input image. The
watermark has half the width and half the height of the input image.
• LSB Deletion: 2 LSBs in the input image are set to 0 in order to store the
watermark in them.
• Watermark Mapping: The watermark is  divided into  3x3 px blocks,  the
pixels in each block are divided into 3 groups as shown in Figure 4.10 (a),
the groups are mapped based on maximum-distance mapping. Group 1, 2,
and  3  will  be  mapped  horizontally,  vertically,  and  diagonally,  as  shown
shown in Figure 4.10 (b). The groups are selected so that no group has two
pixels that are adjacent horizontally or vertically, this will enable the use of
non-linear filter to localise the tampered area.
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Figure 4.10: The groups of pixels in each 3x3 px block and
their mapping. a) The distribution of each group. b) The
mapping of each group.
• Bit Permutation: The bits inside each individual pixel in the watermark are
permuted randomly  using  the  secret  key  K as  a seed,  this  will  prevent
knowing the random sequence used in securing the watermark even though
maximum-distance  mapping  is  used  and  the  position  of  the  watermark
pixels is known, as discussed in section 3.4.6.
• Watermark Encryption: The watermark is encrypted as done in the first
proposed technique by XORing it with a random sequence.
• Watermark  Embedding: The  number  of  pixels  in  the  watermark  is  the
same as  the  number  of  2x2  px  blocks  in  the  watermarked  image.  The
watermark is embedded in the watermarked image by storing each pixel in
2 LSBs of the block that coincides with that pixel.
4.5.2- The Decoding Stage of the Second Technique
A general block diagram for the decoding stage is shown in Figure 4.11.
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Figure 4.11: A block diagram for the decoding stage of the second proposed technique.
The lighthouse image in Figure 4.1 (a) will be used to illustrate the decoding stage.
The image is tampered with by inserting an image of a hot-air balloon, as in Figure
4.1 (c). The steps for the decoding stage are described as follows:
• Image  Partitioning: The  input  watermarked  image  is  divided  into  non-
overlapping 2x2 px blocks.
• Watermark Extraction: The pixels of the watermark are extracted from 2
LSBs of each block. The watermark has half the width and half the height of
the watermarked image.
• Watermark  Decryption: Similar  to  the  first  proposed  technique,  the
watermark is XORed with the random sequence generated in the encoding
stage.
• Bit Permutation: The bits of the pixels of the watermark are permuted as in
the encoding stage, this will return the bits to their original positions.
• Watermark Remapping: The pixels of the watermark are mapped in three
directions  as  in  the  encoding  stage,  this  will  return  the  pixels  of  the
watermark to their original positions. At the end of this stage, the watermark
represents a scaled-down version of the original image and the tampering
will be scattered in three directions as shown in Figure 4.12. The resulting
image is referred to as the watermark image.
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Figure 4.12: An illustration of the watermark image in the
decoding stage of the second proposed technique. The
tampering is scattered in three directions.
• Approximation Image Generation: An approximation image is generated
from the watermarked image by setting 2 LSBs in  each block to  0 and
finding  the  block  average.  The  resulting  image  is  referred  to  as  the
approximation image.
• Difference Image Generation: The watermark image is XORed with the
approximation  image,  then  2  LSBs  in  the  resulting  image  are  set  to  0
because the comparison depends only on the 6 MSBs of the two images. A
threshold is then applied to the result so that any pixels value greater than 0
will  become  255.  The  resulting  image  is  referred  to  as  the  difference
image, as shown in Figure 4.13. In the difference image, the tampered area
is almost completely white and there are three copies of it, each one of
these copies has at most 3 white pixels in any 3x3 px block, these areas
are referred to as ghost areas.
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Figure 4.13: An illustration of the difference image in the
decoding stage of the second proposed technique.
• Mask Image Generation: To generate the mask image,  the ghost areas
are removed by applying a non-linear filter with a window size of 3x3 px. If
the window has more than 3 white pixels, then the central pixel is replaced
with 255, otherwise, it is replaced with 0. The resulting image of this step is
referred to as the mask image. See Figure 4.14.
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Figure 4.14: An illustration of the mask image in the
decoding stage of second proposed technique.
• Tampered Area  Recovery: Similar  to  the  first  proposed  technique,  the
watermark image and the mask image are scaled up by a factor of 2 and
the  tampered  area  is  replaced  by  the  corresponding  area  from  the
watermark image.  Also,  the  lost  2  LSBs in  the  untampered area in  the
watermarked  image  will  be  partially  recovered  by  the  2  LSBs from the
watermark image. Figure 4.15 shows the recovered image.
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Figure 4.15: An illustration of the recovered image in the
decoding stage of second proposed technique.
For  the  second  proposed  technique,  the  maximum  recoverable  area  without
tamper-coincidence is when the tampering is within a rectangular area that has
half the width and half the height of the watermarked image, i.e. 25% tampering
ratio, otherwise tamper-coincidence will occur. In Figure  4.16 (a), the lighthouse
image is tampered with by deleting a central squared area that has 60% ratio of
the image width and height. Figure  4.16 (b) shows the detected tampered area
and Figure 4.16 (c) shows the recovered image. 
The technique also suffers from high PFR when the tampering ratio is equal to or
higher than 25%, as shown in Figure 4.16 (b) where large untampered area has
been considered as a tampered area.
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 4.16: An example of the second technique. a) The tampered area, where its
width and height are 60% of the image dimensions. b) The mask image, which
shows the detected tampered area. c) The recovered image.
4.6- The Description of the Encoding and the Decoding
Stages of the Third Technique
The third technique employs the fact that the watermark is XORed with a random
sequence  at  the  encoding  stage,  and  when  the  image  is  tampered  with,  the
tampered area in the watermark will be the only area that is not XORed with the
random  sequence.  When  the  watermark  is  XORed  again  with  the  random
sequence at the decoding stage, all the pixels in the watermark will  be XORed
twice and hence they will return to their original values, except for the tampered
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area which will be XORed only once and this will result in high-frequency contents
(HFCs) in the tampered area of the watermark, these contents could be measured
and used to localise the tampered area.
Maximum-distance mapping is used in the third technique, which will increase the
recoverable area ratio to 50% of the watermarked image instead of 25% when
compared  to  the  second  technique.  Tampering  coincidence  will  occur  if  the
tampered area exceeds half  the width and half  the height  of  the watermarked
image simultaneously, but it will not occur if the tampered area exceeds half of one
dimension only.
As in the second technique,  the third technique divides the image into 2x2 px
blocks and uses 2 LSBs to  store the watermark data;  therefore,  8 bits will  be
available for the watermark in each block. The technique also uses 6 MSBs in the
watermark to store the localisation/recovery data which is 6 MSBs of the average
of the block. The remaining 2 LSBs in the watermark are used to store the average
of the deleted 2 LSBs in the original image, this will partially recover them and will
increase the recovery quality.
The implemented code for  the  encoding and the  decoding stages of  the  third
proposed technique is provided in Appendix C.
4.6.1- The Encoding Stage of the Third Technique
A general block diagram for the encoding stage is shown in Figure 4.17.
Image 
Partitioning
LSB
Deletion
Bit
Permutation
Watermark
Encryption 
Input
Image
Watermarked
Image
Watermark
Embedding 
Watermark
Generation
Watermark Mapping
(Maximum-Distance)
Figure 4.17: A block diagram for the encoding stage of the third proposed technique
The steps for the encoding stage are described as follows:
• Image Partitioning: The input image is divided into non-overlapping 2x2 px
blocks. The dimensions of the input image must be multiples of 2.
• Watermark  Generation: Similar  to  the  second  proposed technique,  the
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watermark is generated by finding the average of 6 MSBs and 2 LSBs of
each block.
• LSB Deletion: 2 LSBs in the input image are set to 0 in order to store the
watermark in them.
• Watermark Mapping: The watermark is mapped using maximum-distance
mapping described in section 3.4.6, the mapping is done in both horizontal
and vertical directions.
• Bit Permutation: The bits of the watermark pixels are permuted as in the
second proposed technique.
• Watermark  Encryption: Similar  to  the  first  and  the  second  proposed
techniques,  the  watermark  is  encrypted  by  XORing  it  with  a  random
sequence.
• Watermark Embedding: Similar to the second proposed technique, each
pixel in the watermark is stored in 2 LSBs of the block that coincides with
that pixel.
4.6.2- The Decoding Stage of the Third Technique
A general block diagram for the decoding stage is shown in Figure 4.18.
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Figure 4.18: A block diagram for the decoding stage of the third proposed technique.
The lighthouse image in Figure 4.1 (a) will be used to illustrate the decoding stage.
The image is tampered with by inserting an image of a hot-air balloon, as in Figure
4.1 (c). The steps for the decoding stage are described as follows:
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• Image  Partitioning: The  input  watermarked  image  is  divided  into  non-
overlapping 2x2 px blocks.
• Watermark Extraction: The pixels of the watermark are extracted from 2
LSBs of each block, the watermark has half the width and half the height of
the watermarked image.
• Watermark  Decryption: Similar  to  the  first  and  second  proposed
techniques, the watermark is XORed with the random sequence generated
in the encoding stage.
• Bit Permutation: The bits of the pixels of the watermark are permuted as in
the encoding stage, this will return the bits to their original positions.
• Watermark  Remapping: The  watermark  pixels  are  mapped  using
maximum-distance mapping, as in the encoding stage, this will return them
to  their  original  position.  The  resulting  image  is  referred  to  as  the
watermark image. See Figure 4.19. 
Figure 4.19: An illustration of the watermark image in the
decoding stage of the third proposed technique.
• Approximation  Image  Generation: Similar  to  the  second  proposed
technique, the  approximation image is generated from the watermarked
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image.
• Difference Image Generation: Similar to the second proposed technique,
the  difference  image is  generated  from  the  approximation  and  the
watermark images. See Figure 4.20.
Figure 4.20: An illustration of the difference image in the
decoding stage of the third proposed technique.
• Mask Image Generation: It can be noticed from the difference image that
there  are  two  copies  of  the  tampered  area,  one  coincides  with  the
tampering in the watermark image and the other  twin copy is shifted half
the width and half the height of the image and it coincides with the actual
tampered  area  in  the  watermarked  image.  The  tampered  area  in  the
watermark  image  is  distinguished  by  its  HFCs.  Therefore,  the  actual
tampered area can be detected by measuring the HFCs in the watermark
image and choosing the area that has less HFCs as follows:
For each white pixel in the difference image, the HFCs in the watermark
image are measured, this is done by using a window with an appropriate
size and finding the DCT coefficients in this window, then the low-frequency
coefficients are set to zero and the summation of the absolute values of the
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remaining coefficients is found.
To  determine  the  appropriate  window  size,  the  test  in  section  4.4.3 is
carried out for the third technique and block sizes of 3x3 px, 5x5 px, 7x7 px,
and 9x9 px were tested, the results are shown in Table 4.6. It can be seen
that the average PSNR and PFA are significantly improved when selecting
block sizes higher than 3x3 px; however, the improvement is not significant
for sizes higher than 5x5 px. Since a larger block size requires more time in
DCT calculation, a block size of 5x5 px is selected.
Table 4.6: The average value of PSNR, PFA, and PFR when varying the window size in 
the third technique.
Window
size % average PSNR (dB) average PFA % average PFR %
3x3 px 36.13 0.33% 0.46%
5x5 px 37.19 0.08% 0.43%
7x7 px 37.23 0.07% 0.43%
9x9 px 37.23 0.07% 0.43%
The first row and the first column in the DCT coefficients matrix are set to 0,
because  they  correspond  to  the  low  frequency  contents.  The  HFCs
correspond to each white pixel in the difference image and its twin pixel are
calculated. The tampered area is then detected by choosing the pixel with
less corresponding HFCs. The resulting image is referred to as the mask
image, as  shown  in  Figure  4.21.  Figure  4.22 shows  the  HFCs  for
watermark image, the tampered area in the watermark image is brighter
than the rest of it.
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Figure 4.21: An illustration of the mask image in the
decoding stage of third proposed technique.
Figure 4.22: The high-frequency contents in the
watermark image.
• Tampered Area Recovery: Recovering the tampered area is identical the
one in the second proposed technique. The recovered image is similar to
the one in Figure 4.15.
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4.7- The Description of the Encoding and the Decoding
Stages of the Fourth Technique
In this technique, the parameters used for the watermarking process are optimised
to give the best recovery quality and resistance to counterfeiting. This is done by
using blocks of size 8x8 px and generating the recovery data using the DCT of the
block,  which gives better  quality  than averaging 2x2 px blocks.  Since it  is  not
feasible to use the ideas that were used in the previous three techniques to avoid
using separate sets of bits for localisation and recovery; 16 bits were assigned in
each block to generate separate localisation data which is generated using CRC
and specifically CRC16-CCITT that is used in communications protocols. Using
CRC16 gives a very low PFA (about 2−16 ) and makes the technique more resistive
to counterfeiting than the previous proposed techniques (such as detecting pixel
exchange  in  the  same  block  which  is  not  detectable  by  previous  proposed
techniques).
The generation of the recovery bits has some similarity with JPEG compression
standard, the reader can refer to Section 2.9.2 for further information about JPEG
compression standard.
The implemented code for the encoding and the decoding stages of the fourth
proposed technique is provided in Appendix D.
4.7.1- The Encoding Stage of the Fourth Technique
A general block diagram for the encoding stage is shown in Figure 4.23.
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Figure 4.23: A block diagram for the encoding stage of the fourth proposed technique
The steps for the encoding stage are described as follows:
• Image Partitioning: The input image has a size of MxN  where M  and N
are the width and the height of the image respectively. M  and N  must be
multiples  of  8.  The  image  is  divided  into  8x8  px  blocks  B (i , j) ,  where
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1≤i≤M /8  and 1≤ j≤N /8 .
• LSB  Deletion: 2  LSBs  in  B (i , j)  are  set  to  0  in  order  to  store  the
watermark in them.
• Recovery Data Generation: The recovery data for B (i , j)  is generated by
finding the DCT coefficients for B (i , j) , the DCT coefficients are quantized
according  to  the  standard  JPEG  luminance  quantisation  matrix  which
corresponds  to  50%  quality,  the  matrix  is  shown  in  Figure  2.5.  The
quantisation is carried out by dividing the elements in the DCT coefficient
matrix by the elements in the quantisation matrix and rounding the results.
Each DCT coefficient is stored in a fixed number of bits as shown in Figure
4.24.  The  numbers  are  chosen  so  that  the  total  number  of  bits  for  all
coefficients will be 112 bits. The DCT coefficients are then converted into a
zigzag sequence as in Figure 2.6. The sequence is then converted into a bit
stream which is stored into 14 bytes, and they represent the recovery data
R(i , j)  of the block B (i , j) . 
8   7   6   5   4   3   2   0
7   6   5   4   3   2   0   0
6   5   4   3   2   0   0   0
5   4   3   2   0   0   0   0
4   3   2   0   0   0   0   0
3   2   0   0   0   0   0   0
2   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
Figure 4.24: The number of bits assigned for each DCT
coefficient in the fourth proposed technique.
• Recovery  Data  Mapping: The  recovery  data  generated  for  the  block
B (i , j) , which is referred to as R( i^ , j^) , is stored in another block B ( i^ , j^) .
The recovery data stored in  B (i , j) , i.e.  R(i , j) , is for the block  B ( i^ , j^) .
The   mapping  of  the  recovery  data  is  based  on  maximum-distance
mapping, so that the block position  (x , y )  is mapped to  (x+Δ x , y+Δ y)
where:
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Δ x={ M /2, x≤M /2−M /2 , x>M /2     ,     Δ y={ N /2 , y≤N /2−N /2 , y>N /2 (4.1)
• Localisation  Data  Generation: The  localisation  data  is  generated  by
finding the CRC16 for the concatenation of the bytes in B (i , j)  and R(i , j) .
The resulting 16 bits  are converted into  2 bytes and they represent  the
authentication data A (i , j)  which will be stored in the block B (i , j) .
• Bit Permutation: R(i , j)  and  A (i , j)  are stored in 2 LSBs of an 8x8 px
block  W (i , j)  and it  represents the watermark to be stored in the block
B (i , j) .  The elements in  W (i , j)  are permuted randomly according to a
secret key K.
• Watermark Encryption: W (i , j)  is XORed with a random sequence, the
generation of the seed of the random sequence depends on the secret key
K and the values of i  and j , in this way no block in the image can be used
to replace anther block in the same image. To make the technique resistant
to VQ attack, the generation of the seed should also depend on a unique
serial number for the image so that no block from another image could be
used to replace a block from this image even if the same secret key is used
in the encoding of both images.
• Watermark Embedding: Finally, 2 LSBs from W (i , j)  are stored in 2 LSBs
in B (i , j) .
4.7.2- The Decoding Stage of the Fourth Technique
A general block diagram for the decoding stage is shown in Figure 4.25.
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Figure 4.25: A block diagram for the decoding stage of the fourth proposed technique.
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The steps for the decoding stage are described as follows:
• Image Partitioning: The input image has a size of MxN  where M  and N
are the width and the height of the image respectively. M  and N  must be
multiples  of  8.  The  image  is  divided  into  8x8  px  blocks  B (i , j) ,  where
1≤i≤M /8  and 1≤ j≤N /8 .
• Watermark Extraction: The watermark  W (i , j)  is  retrieved by taking 2
LSBs from B (i , j) , then 2 LSBs in B (i , j)  are set to 0. The size of W (i , j)
is 8x8 px.
• Watermark  Decryption: W (i , j)  is  decrypted  by  XORing  it  with  the
random sequence used in the encoding stage.
• Bit  Permutation: The  elements  in  W (i , j)  are  permuted  back  to  their
original positions.
• Localisation Data Extraction: The authentication data A (i , j)  is retrieved
from W (i , j) .
• Tampered  Block  Localisation: The CRC  for  the  concatenation  of  the
bytes in B (i , j)  and R(i , j)  is calculated and converted into 2 bytes which
will be referred to as A^ (i , j) .  A^ (i , j)  is then compared to A (i , j) , if they
are  equal  then  the  block  is  authentic,  otherwise  it  is  tampered.  The
authentication process is carried out for all of the blocks in the image.
• Recovery Data Retrieving: If a block B (i , j)  is tampered, then its recovery
data is retrieved from the block B ( i^ , j^)  which has maximum-distance from
B (i , j)  as described before in the encoding stage, the recovery data will be
referred to as R( i^ , j^) .
• Tampered Block Recovery: If  B ( i^ , j^)  is also tampered, then B (i , j)  can
not be recovered, otherwise the recovery data  R( i^ , j^)  is used to recover
the block B (i , j) . To recover B (i , j) , R( i^ , j^)  is converted into a bit stream,
then into a DCT sequence by taking the number of bits specified in Figure
4.24 and converting them into decimal values. The DCT sequence is then
stored into 8x8 matrix which is de-quantised and converted back from DCT
domain  into  spatial  domain,  then it  is  used to  recover  B (i , j) .  The de-
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quantisation is carried out by multiplying the elements in the DCT matrix
with  the  elements  in  the  quantisation  matrix  shown  in  Figure  2.5.  The
recovery process is carried out for all of the blocks in the image.
As was done for the previous techniques, the lighthouse image in Figure 4.1 (a) is
tampered with by inserting an image of a hot-air  balloon, as in Figure  4.1 (c).
Figure 4.26 shows the detected tampered area by the fourth technique, it can be
seen that at the edges of the tampered area some untampered pixels are included
and that is due to using block size of 8x8 px, which means that the PFR is a little
bit high for this technique; however, the PFA is extremely low due to using 16 bit
CRC for block authentication. When it comes to practical use, a high PFR does not
impose a problem as much as a high PFA; therefore, the high PFR of this method
is accepted, especially with the advantages that it has, such as its resistance to
counterfeiting and high recovery quality. 
Figure 4.26: An illustration of the detected tampered area
in the decoding stage of the fourth proposed technique.
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4.8- The Description and the Shortcomings of the 
Referenced Techniques
The first referenced technique was proposed in 2013 by Tong et al. in [64] and the
second one was proposed in 2014 by Dadkhah et al. in [69]. The techniques will
be referred to as Tong’s and Dadkhah’s techniques. These two techniques were
selected because they share some similarities with the proposed techniques, such
as dividing the image into 2x2 px and generating the recovery data using the
averages  of  these  blocks.  The  referenced techniques  have  some advantages,
such  as  low  computational  complexity  for  Tong’s  technique,  and  low  PFA for
Dadkhah’s technique. The referenced techniques are also well-cited and used for
comparison in many papers [79, 98-104]. In the following sections, the referenced
techniques are described and their shortcomings are highlighted.
4.8.1- The Description of Tong’s Technique
The main feature of this technique is that it uses the two-dimensional chaotic map
proposed in  [105]  to  encrypt  the watermark by shuffling its  rows and columns
using the outcomes of the map. The chaotic map is defined as follows:
x i+1= xi−α . y i
2
y i+1=cos (β .cos
−1(xi))
 , −1<(x , y)<1 (4.2)
where α  and β  are control parameters. When α=2  and β=6  the map exhibits
a chaotic behaviour.
The  implemented  code  for  the  encoding  and  the  decoding  stages  of  Tong's
technique is provided in Appendix E.
A general block diagram for the encoding stage is shown in Figure 4.27.
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Figure 4.27: A block diagram for the encoding stage of Tong's technique.
The steps for the encoding stage are described as follows:
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• Image Partitioning: The input image has a size of M×N   where M  and
N  are the width and the height of the image respectively. M  and N  must
be multiple of 4. The image is divided into 2x2 px blocks  B (i , j) , where
1≤i≤M /2  and 1≤ j≤N /2 .
• LSB Deletion: 3 LSBs in each B (i , j)  are set to 0 to store the watermark
in them.
• First  Recovery  Data  Generation: The  first  recovery  data  W 1(i , j)  is
generated by taking 5 MSBs of the average of B (i , j) .
• First Recovery Data mapping: The image that is formed by all W 1(i , j) ,
which is referred to as  W 1 , is mapped, i.e. shuffled, by taking each row
and rotate, i.e. circularly-shift, it for a random distance, then each column is
rotated too. In this research, the whole rotation process is repeated once to
make it more efficient. The random sequence used in the shuffling process
is generated using the chaotic map in equation 4.2 with α=2  and β=6 .
By using the initial values x0 , y0  and after some iterations, the generated
chaotic sequence is used as the random numbers in the shuffling process.
The x  values are used for the rows and the y  values are used for the
columns.  The  initial  values  x0 ,  y0  and  the  number  of  iterations  are
considered as the secret key for the watermark.
• Second  Recovery  Data  Generation: After  shuffling  W 1 ,  a  second
recovery matrix W 2  is generated by taking a copy of W 1 .
• Second  Recovery  Data  Mapping: W 2  is  circularly-shifted  using
maximum-distance mapping in both the horizontal and vertical directions,
this  will  provide  another  chance for  recovery  when tamper  coincidence
occurs.
• Authentication Data Generation: Two authentication bits are generated
for each block  B (i , j) , the first bit is  A1(i , j)=mod2(ϵ)  where  ϵ  is total
number  of  ones  in  B (i , j) ,  W 1(i , j) ,  and  W 2(i , j) ,  mod2(ϵ)  is  the
remainder  after  dividing  by  2.  The  second  authentication  bit
A2(i , j)=A1(i , j)  is the complement of A1 .
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• Watermark Embedding: Finally, W 1(i , j) , W 2(i , j) , A1(i , j) , and A2(i , j)
are embedded in 3 LSBs of B (i , j) .
A general block diagram for the decoding stage is shown in Figure 4.28.
Watermark
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Tampered-Block
Recovery
Watermarked
Image
Recovered
Image
Image
Partitioning
First  and Second
Recovery-Data
Remapping
Tampered-Block
Localisation
Recovery
Using Second
Recovery-Data
Tamper
Coincidence
Recovery
Failure
         Yes
Recovery using
First Recovery-Data
Tamper
Coincidence
Yes
No
No
Figure 4.28: A block diagram for the decoding stage of Tong's technique.
The steps for the decoding stage are described as follows:
• Image Partitioning: The input watermarked image has a size of  MxN
where M  and N  are the width and the height of the image respectively.
M  and N  must be multiple of 4. The input image is divided into 2x2 px
blocks B (i , j) , where 1≤i≤M /2  and 1≤ j≤N /2 .
• Watermark  Extraction: A1(i , j) ,  A2(i , j) ,  W 1(i , j) ,  and  W 2(i , j)  are
extracted from B (i , j) , then 3 LSBs in B (i , j)  are set to 0.
• Tampered Block Localisation: The number of ones  ϵ  in all of  B (i , j) ,
W 1(i , j) , and W 2(i , j)  is calculated. A^1(i , j)  and A^2(i , j)  are generated,
where  A^1(i , j)=mod2(ϵ)  and  A^2(i , j)=A^1(i , j)  is  the  complement  of
A^1(i , j) ,  then  B (i , j)  is  authenticated,  where  B (i , j)  is  authentic  if
A^1(i , j)=A1(i , j)  and  A^2(i , j)=A2(i , j) .  If  B (i , j)  is tampered with, then
W 1(i , j) ,  W 2(i , j)  are marked as invalid.  The authentication process is
carried out for all of B (i , j) .
• First and Second Recovery Data Remapping: W 1  is shuffled back by
reversing the shuffling process that was carried out in the encoding stage.
W 2  is  remapped  using  maximum-distance  mapping,  then  it  is  shuffled
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back as was done for W 1 .
• Tampered Block Recovery: If a block B (i , j)  is tampered with, W 1(i , j)
is used to recover it. If W 1(i , j)  is invalid, W 2(i , j)  is used for recovery, if
W 2(i , j)  is also invalid, the block recovery fails. The recovery process is
carried out for all tampered blocks in the image.
4.8.2- The Shortcomings of Tong’s Technique
The main shortcomings of Tong's technique are summarised as follows:
• High PFA due to the limited number of authentication bits in each block,
where 2 bits are used for authentication and that means  PFA≈2−2≈25%
which  means  that  about  one  fourth  of  the  tampered  blocks  will  remain
unrecovered, which leads to low recovery quality. Figure  4.29 shows the
recovered image after tampering a central squared area of the lighthouse
image by inserting the contents of  "Peppers" image [106] in it.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.29: An example of Tong’s technique: a) The tampered image. b) The
recovered image. (Peppers image taken from [106]).
• The  position  of  the  authentication  bits  is  known  and  that  makes  the
technique very vulnerable and the intruder can easily put any counterfeited
content inside the block B (i , j)  as long as they generate the same A1(i , j)
and A2(i , j) .
• The watermark is not encrypted and that makes the technique vulnerable
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against counterfeiting attacks.
• The  authentication  scheme  is  vulnerable  against  counterfeiting,  so  that
replacing 5 MSBs in a block with any values that gives the same parity will
not be detected.
4.8.3- The Description of Dadkhah’s Technique
The  main  feature  in  this  technique  is  the  use  of  SVD  for  calculating  the
authentication bits for each block. The image is divided into 4x4 px blocks B (i , j)
and each block is further divided into four 2x2 px blocks BS1  to  BS4 . 2 singular
values (SVs) are found for each BS  block and 3 authentication bits are generated
for each  BS  based on these SVs. See section  2.11 for more information about
SVD. 
The authentication is done for  B (i , j)  block even though the authentication bits
are calculated for BS  blocks, i.e. B (i , j)  is considered authentic only if all its BS
blocks are authentic. Therefore, the total  number of authentication bits used to
authenticate B (i , j)  block is 12 bits, which makes the PFA about 2−12≈0.0244 % .
The calculation of  the authentication bits  for  BS  block can be summarised as
follows:
• Get the two SVs for the BS  block.
• If any SV has a fractional part, then the calculation of the authentication bits
is carried out as follows:
◦ Let X 1  be 1 if the two leftmost digits in the fractional part of the first SV
are greater than 50 and 0 else wise.
◦ Let X 2  be 1 if the two leftmost digits in the fractional part of the second
SV are greater than 50 and 0 else wise.
◦ Let  X 3  be 1 if the integer part of each SVs (as binary numbers) has
even number of ones and 0 else wise.
◦ The authentication bits are generated depending on the values of X 1 ,
X 2 , and X 3  as follows:
Page 89/209
Chapter 4: The Description of the Proposed and the Referenced Techniques 
Authenticationbits={
000 if X1=1,X 2=1,X 3=1
100 if X 1=1, X 2=0,X 3=1
010 if X 1=1, X 2=1, X 3=0
001 if X 1=0,X 2=1,X 3=1
110 if X 1=0, X 2=0, X 3=1
101 if X 1=1, X 2=0, X 3=0
011 if X 1=0, X 2=1, X 3=0
111 if X 1=0,X 2=0, X3=0
• If both SVs are integer numbers, then the three authentication bits A1 , A2 ,
and A3  are generated as follows:
◦ A1  is 1 if both SVs (as binary numbers) have even number of ones and
0 else wise.
◦ A2  is 1 if both SVs are less than or equal 50 and 0 else wise.
◦ A3  is the complement of A1 .
The code implemented for the encoding and the decoding stages of Dadkhah's
technique is provided in Appendix F.
A general block diagram for the encoding stage is shown in Figure 4.30.
Image 
Partitioning
LSB
Deletion
Recovery-Data
Mapping
Watermark
Encryption 
Input
Image
Watermarked
Image
Watermark
Embedding 
Recovery-Data
Generation
Authentication-Data
Generation
Figure 4.30: A block diagram for the encoding stage of Dadkhah's technique.
The steps for the encoding stage are described as follows:
• Image Partitioning: The input image has a size of M×N  where M  and
N  are the width and the height of the image respectively. M  and N  must
be multiples of 4. The image is divided into 2x2 px blocks  B (i , j) , where
1≤i≤M /2  and 1≤ j≤N /2 . B (i , j)  is divided into 4 of 2x2 px blocks BS1  to
BS4 .
• LSB Deletion: 2 LSBs in each B (i , j)  are set to 0 to store the watermark
in them.
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• Authentication Data Generation: 3 authentication bits are found for each
BS  block, let AS1  to AS 4  refer to the authentication bits of the blocks BS1
to BS4  and A (i , j)  refer to the concatenation of all AS1  to AS 4  in the block
B (i , j) .
• Recovery  Data  Generation: The  recovery  information  for  B (i , j)  is  5
MSBs of the average of each sub-block BS , this means there will be 20 bits
of recovery information for B (i , j) .
• Recovery Data Mapping: For each block  B (i , j)  in the upper half of the
image,  a  block  B ( i^ , j^)  is  selected randomly  from the  lower  half  of  the
image, and for each block in the lower half of the image, a block is selected
randomly from the upper half of the image. The mapping is done so that if
the recovery information of  B (i , j)  is stored in  B ( i^ , j^) , then the recovery
information of  B ( i^ , j^)  should not be stored in  B (i , j) . The recovery data
stored  in  B (i , j)  is  referred  to  as  R(i , j)  and  it  consists  of  the
concatenation of  RS1  to  RS 4  which are the recovery data of sub-blocks
BS1  to BS4 .
• Watermark Encryption: The authentication data A (i , j)  and the recovery
data R(i , j)  are encrypted by XORing them with a random sequence. The
generation  of  the  random  sequence  is  based  on  a  secret  key  and  is
different  for  each  B (i , j)  block,  so  that  no  block  can  be  used  as  a
replacement for another one from the same image.
• Watermark Embedding: The 12 bits in A (i , j)  and the 20 bits in R(i , j) ,
which are 32 bits in total, are stored in 2 LSBs in the block  B (i , j) . The
process is repeated for all B (i , j)  blocks in the image.
A general block diagram for the decoding stage is shown in Figure 4.31.
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Figure 4.31: A block diagram for the decoding stage of Dadkhah's technique.
The steps for the decoding stage are described as follows:
• Image Partitioning: The input watermarked image has a size of  MxN
where M ,  N  are the width and the height of the image respectively. M
and  N  must be multiples of 4. The input image is divided into 4x4 px
blocks B (i , j) , where 1≤i≤M /2  and 1≤ j≤N /2 .
• Watermark Extraction: The authentication bits  A (i , j)  and the recovery
bits R(i , j)  are retrieved from the block B (i , j) , then 2 LSBs in B (i , j)  are
set to 0.
• Watermark Decryption: A (i , j)  and  R(i , j)  are  decrypted by XORing
them with the random sequence as in the encoding stage
• Tampered Block Localisation: B (i , j)  is divided into four 2x2 px blocks
BS1  to  BS4  and the 3 authentication bits are calculated for each  BS . Let
A^S1  to A^S 4  refer to the calculated authentication bits for BS1  to BS4 , and
A^ (i , j)  refer to the concatenation of all A^S1  to A^S 4  in the block B (i , j) . 
The block  B (i , j)  is authenticated by comparing all  A^S1  to  A^S 4  with all
AS1  to AS 4 . If anyone of them is not equal to the corresponding one, then
B (i , j)  is  considered  as  invalid  (i.e.  tampered  block).  The  validation
process is carried out for blocks B (i , j) .
Another level of validation is carried out by retrieving the 20 recovery bits of
B (i , j)  from its mapped block  B ( i^ , j^) , which is mapped randomly in the
opposite half of the image and must be valid too. The recovery information
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is compared to 5 MSBs of the average of each BS1  to BS4  sub-block inside
B (i , j)  and if it is found to be different, then B (i , j)  is considered invalid.
• Recovery Data Retrieving:  After validating all of the blocks in the image, if
any B (i , j)  is tampered, then it is recovered by retrieving its recovery bits
from  its  mapped  block  B ( i^ , j^) .  If  B ( i^ , j^)  is  invalid,  then  the  recovery
process fails. The recovery process is carried out for all tampered blocks in
the image.
4.8.4- The Shortcomings of Dadkhah’s Technique
The main shortcomings found in Dadkhah’s et al. technique are summarised as
follows:
• High tamper-coincidence: Due to the mapping between the blocks in the
upper half and the lower half of the image. For example, if the tamper is
only in the upper half of the image, then no tamper coincidence will occur;
however, if the tamper extends across the upper and the lower halves of the
the image, then tamper coincidence will  occur. The probability of tamper
coincidence  for  a  block  in  the  upper  half  of  the  image  equals  to  the
tampering ratio of the lower half of the image and vice versa. Therefore, if a
central area is tampered then the tamper-coincidence probability equals the
ratio of this area (i.e. tamper ratio). For example if 25% central area in the
image is tampered then the tamper-coincidence probability is 25% which
means that about 25% of the tampered blocks will not be recovered. Figure
4.32 shows an example of Dadkhah’s technique, the tampering coincidence
is obvious in part (b).
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• Any block tampering that is done by: rotation, flipping, or transposition of a
block, will not be detected because the SVs do not change due to these
operations (see section 2.11).
4.9- Summary
The beginning of this chapter highlighted the challenge of using one set of data for
both purposes of localisation and recovery, where direct comparison between the
pixels in the watermark and the watermarked image results in having two areas
that are affected by the tampering. The challenge resides in distinguishing the area
that corresponds to the actual tampering in the watermarked image.
The  four  proposed  techniques  were  described.  Three  of  them  overcome  the
problem of using one set of data for localisation and recovery by employing image
filtering  to  localise  the  actual  tampered  area.  The  first  proposed  technique  is
distinguished by using random mapping for the watermark pixels, which helps in
localising  the  tampered  area  by  using  median  filtering.  The  second  technique
maps  the  watermark  pixels  in  three  directions  based  on  maximum-distance
mapping, which enables using non-linear spatial filtering in localising the tampered
area; however, this also results in a reduced recoverable area, about 25% of the
image area.  The third  technique employs DCT to measure the high frequency
contents that appear in the tampered area after XORing the watermark image with
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Figure 4.32: An example of Dadkhah’s technique: a) The tampered image. b) The
recovered image.
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the random sequence used in encryption, this enables recovering a tampering with
ratio of 50% of the image area. The fourth technique is optimised to give the best
results regarding recovery quality, PFA, and resistance of counterfeiting, which is
achieved  by  using  a  larger  block  size  of  8x8  px  and  employing  DCT  to
approximate  block  contents.  Some  methods  were  proposed  to  optimise  the
security of the image when using maximum-distance mapping, such as permuting
the bits in the individual watermark pixels or permuting the bits of the watermark in
the individual block.
The last section in the chapter presented the description and the shortcomings of
two  referenced  techniques.  The  first  one  is  Tong's  technique,  which  is
characterised by  introducing  a novel  chaotic  map for  watermark  shuffling.  The
second  one is  Dadkhah's  technique,  which  is  characterised by  using  SVD for
authentication data generation. The main shortcomings for Tong's technique are its
low  PFA,  which  results  in  low  recovery  quality,  and  its  vulnerability  against
counterfeiting. Dadkhah's technique suffers mainly from high tamper coincidence
probability, due to the used mapping method, which results in low recovery quality. 
Page 95/209
Chapter 5: Experimental Evaluation for the Proposed  and the Referenced Techniques
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Proposed  and the Referenced 
Techniques
5.1- Introduction
This chapter presents an experimental evaluation of the proposed techniques with
respect to: PSNR,  NCC, SSIM, , PFA, PFR, encoding time, and decoding time.
The  proposed  techniques  are  compared  to  the  two  referenced  techniques
described before in Section 4.8.
All simulation codes in this research were programmed using GNU Octave version
4.2.2 [107] and all plots were made using Gnuplot version 5.2 [108]. Appendix G
presents the code used in the experimental evaluation in this chapter.
All of the 24 images in Kodak image database are used in this evaluation. The
evaluation proceeds as follows:
• All of the 24 images in Kodak database are converted to grey-scale and
cropped to the central 512x512 px area.
• A central rectangular area in each image is tampered by replacing that area
with one from the next image in the list. The first image is used to tamper
the last one. The rectangular area has a height-to-width ratio of either 1:1 or
2:1 in order to adjust the shape of the area to match the recoverable area of
each technique. The ratio for techniques 1, 2, and Dadkhah’s is 1:1, while
the ratio for techniques 3, 4, and Tong’s is 2:1. 
• The values of the pixels in the tampered area were adjusted if they have a
close value to original pixels in the untampered image. The adjustment is
done so that the difference between the old pixel and the new one is not
less than 5, so that there will be a difference in pixel value even if 2 LSBs in
the image are set to 0.
• The percentage of the rectangular area increased from 0 to 50% as in the
following list: [0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 24%, 25%, 30%, 35%, 40%, 45%,
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49%, 50%]. The 24% and 49% values were used because some techniques
have sudden change in  evaluation  results  at  25% percent  (The second
technique) and at 50% (The third technique). The 0% ratio means that the
image is not tampered.
• For each technique, each one of the 24 images is tampered with according
to  the  list  shown  in  the  previous  step,  then  the  average  values  of  the
following parameters are measured for the 24 images: 1) PSNR. 2) NCC. 3)
4) SSIM. 5) PFA. 6) PFR. 7) Encoding time. 8) Decoding time. The values
of  PSNR,  NCC,  and  SSIM  are  measured  between  the  original
unwatermarked  image and the recovered image.
In  the  following  sections,  the  experimental  results  for  each  parameter  are
presented and discussed in order to show how the proposed techniques perform
when they are compared to each other and when they are compared to Tong’s and
Dadkhah techniques.
5.2- The Experimental Results for the Average PSNR 
for the Proposed and the Referenced Techniques
The average PSNR corresponding to each ratio is shown in Table 5.1  and Figure
5.1. The following notes should be considered about Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1:
• During recovery, the LSBs that are used to store the watermark are set to 0.
This results in a reduced PSNR because leaving the watermark data in
them will increase the PSNR (See Section 2.8.1); however, setting them to
0 gives more accurate representation of the performance of the technique
(i.e. no irrelevant information is used to enhance the value of the PSNR).
• The experimental results include a hypothetical perfect recovery situation
for Tong’s and Dadkhah’s techniques where: tamper coincidence, PFA, and
PFR are all assumed to be 0, this should not be confused with the actual
results of Tong’s and Dadkhah’s techniques. The assumed perfect recovery
situation was included in the results to show how the proposed techniques
perform  better  than  Tong’s  and  Dadkhah’s  techniques  even  at  a
hypothetical perfect recovery scenario.
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Table 5.1: The experimental results of the average PSNR for the proposed and the 
referenced techniques.
Tam
per R
atio
Average PSNR (dB)
Technique 1
Technique 2
Technique 3
Technique 4
Tong’s 
Technique
D
adkah’s
Technique
Tong’s
(Perfect recovery)
D
adkah’s 
(Perfect recovery)
0% 51.09 44.64 44.68 42.64 35.66 42.64 35.66 42.64
5% 35.42 38.55 38.38 39.66 28.64 34.38 33.82 36.84
10% 32.48 36.46 36.38 38.36 25.82 29.13 32.69 34.64
15% 30.83 35.12 34.9 37.46 23.91 26.18 31.83 33.31
20% 29.48 34.13 33.86 36.49 22.49 24.03 31.16 32.31
24% 28.59 33.53 33.3 36.14 21.56 22.55 30.75 31.7
25% 28.38 29.2 33.14 35.98 21.35 22.39 30.65 31.57
30% 27.22 20.81 32.49 35.47 20.42 20.85 30.19 30.93
35% 26.04 18.28 31.92 35.02 19.6 19.67 29.79 30.35
40% 24.71 16.75 31.41 34.57 18.86 18.44 29.42 29.86
45% 23.5 15.62 30.98 34.16 18.25 17.53 29.11 29.45
49% 22.34 14.91 30.52 34.02 17.77 16.81 28.86 29.15
50% 22.02 14.74 29.08 33.96 17.67 16.65 28.66 29.07
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Figure 5.1: The experimental results of the average PSNR for the proposed and the
referenced techniques.
It is possible to draw the following remarks from the experimental results of the
average PSNR values:
• At no tampering: The first technique has the best results because only one
LSB was used to store watermark information. Tong’s technique has the
worst results because it uses 3 LSBs. Techniques 2 and 3 perform better
than technique 4 and Dadkhah’s technique because of the partial recovery
of the deleted LSBs in the original image.
• Technique 2 gives the same performance as technique 3 until 24% ratio,
where its results drop dramatically after that due to tamper-coincidence and
high PFR.
• Technique 4 gives the best overall performance, especially at high tamper
ratio, which proves that using DCT with a large block size (8x8 px in this
case) gives better results than using the average of a smaller block size
(2x2 px in this case).
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• All of the proposed techniques (except for technique 2 at high tamper ratio)
outperform Tong’s and Dadkah’s technique and that is due to the high PFA
(25%) in Tong’s technique and high tamper-coincidence probability (which
equals the tampering ratio) in Dadkhah’s tachnique.
• All of the proposed techniques, except for technique 1 and technique 2 at
high tamper ratio, outperform the perfect recovery scenario of Tong’s and
Dadkhah’s techniques and that is because the proposed techniques use
more recovery bits (6 bits for technique 2 and 3 when compared to 5 bits in
Tong’s and Dadkhah’s techniques) and due to the partial recovery of the
deleted LSBs in technique 2 and 3.
It can be concluded from the PSNR results that the fourth technique is the best
one regarding the PSNR results,  and the third technique comes in the second
place.
5.3- The Experimental Results for the Average NCC 
and the Average SSIM for the Proposed and the 
Referenced Techniques
The experimental results of the average NCC and average SSIM are presented in
this section, the average NCC values are presented in Table  5.2 and Figure  5.2
and the average SSIM values are presented in Table  5.3 and Figure  5.3. The
SSIM is is calculated using the code ssim_index.m provided in [109]
It can be noticed that relative quality performance is generally the same regardless
of the measuring method; however, the PSNR provides better assessments for
high quality results, where there are small difference values, and that is because
of the use of the logarithmic scale.
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Table 5.2: The experimental results of the average NCC for the proposed and the 
referenced techniques.
Tam
per R
atio
Average NCC
Technique 1
Technique 2
Technique 3
Technique 4
Tong’s 
Technique
D
adkah’s
Technique
Tong’s
(Perfect recovery)
D
adkah’s 
(Perfect recovery)
0% 0.999989 0.999916 0.999917 0.999939 0.999721 0.999939 0.999721 0.999939
5% 0.99914 0.999591 0.999518 0.999775 0.996843 0.999128 0.999383 0.999542
10% 0.998356 0.999305 0.999212 0.999655 0.993604 0.996898 0.999081 0.999177
15% 0.997646 0.999041 0.998923 0.999556 0.989961 0.993776 0.998804 0.998863
20% 0.996863 0.998797 0.998674 0.999427 0.98612 0.989761 0.998564 0.998577
24% 0.996233 0.998629 0.998512 0.999374 0.982936 0.985669 0.998393 0.998377
25% 0.996067 0.996946 0.998465 0.999348 0.982069 0.985115 0.998349 0.998332
30% 0.994979 0.980566 0.998253 0.999263 0.97794 0.979112 0.998138 0.998086
35% 0.993563 0.966594 0.998039 0.999174 0.973475 0.973036 0.99794 0.997835
40% 0.991438 0.954018 0.997824 0.999078 0.9687 0.964948 0.997745 0.997606
45% 0.988865 0.942173 0.997623 0.99898 0.964227 0.957534 0.997565 0.997394
49% 0.985622 0.933483 0.997392 0.998952 0.960277 0.950761 0.997421 0.997234
50% 0.984579 0.931228 0.996608 0.998952 0.959425 0.949011 0.997297 0.997188
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Figure 5.2: The experimental results of the average NCC for the proposed and the
referenced techniques.
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Table 5.3: The experimental results of the average SSIM for the proposed and the 
referenced techniques.
Tam
per R
atio
Average SSIM
Technique 1
Technique 2
Technique 3
Technique 4
Tong’s 
Technique
D
adkah’s
Technique
Tong’s
(Perfect recovery)
D
adkah’s 
(Perfect recovery)
0% 0.998319 0.986236 0.986653 0.991929 0.968525 0.991929 0.968525 0.991929
5% 0.976466 0.976569 0.976538 0.986012 0.93276 0.976112 0.958462 0.98059
10% 0.954296 0.967603 0.967486 0.981108 0.896839 0.945905 0.948996 0.969397
15% 0.933491 0.958829 0.957676 0.976397 0.857231 0.913127 0.9395 0.958917
20% 0.90934 0.949737 0.948826 0.97009 0.817989 0.872494 0.930465 0.948448
24% 0.889084 0.942668 0.942312 0.967155 0.786029 0.836094 0.923819 0.940172
25% 0.883858 0.901602 0.940673 0.965996 0.777869 0.832135 0.922166 0.938223
30% 0.8528 0.75207 0.932489 0.961479 0.737273 0.781839 0.913926 0.927828
35% 0.817941 0.631456 0.924111 0.956592 0.695066 0.737202 0.905811 0.917582
40% 0.775032 0.530318 0.915008 0.951387 0.649282 0.682559 0.897346 0.907798
45% 0.728469 0.439616 0.906569 0.945942 0.605722 0.638337 0.889366 0.898494
49% 0.680519 0.374499 0.899211 0.945035 0.577022 0.598726 0.884016 0.891152
50% 0.666194 0.358903 0.886395 0.945035 0.572888 0.58769 0.882932 0.889104
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Figure 5.3: The experimental results of the average SSIM for the proposed and the
referenced techniques.
5.4- The Experimental Results for the Average PFA for 
the Proposed and the Referenced Techniques
PFA is an important factor when it  comes to tamper recovery and it  has more
critical importance when compared to PFR because accepting a tampered block
as an authentic one is more dangerous than rejecting a valid one, especially that
the rejected block will be recovered while the accepted one will not. Also, a high
PFA will result in a lower recovery PSNR value.
The average PFA values corresponding to each ratio are shown in Table 5.4  and
Figure 5.4. The following notes should be considered about Table 5.4 and Figure
5.4:
• The PFA was measured based on pixel level as in Equation 5.1, this gives
more accurate results.
Page 104/209
Chapter 5: Experimental Evaluation for the Proposed  and the Referenced Techniques
PFA=Number of tampered pixels detected as authentic ones
Total number of tampered pixels (5.1)
• The scale of the y-axis in Figure  5.4 is a logarithmic scale for the values
greater than 0, this scale was selected because some values are very small
(like 0.002%)  and some are large (like 24.9%).
• The values in Table  5.4 and Figure 5.4 are the percentage values, which
means that they should be divided by 100 to get the actual values. For
example  the  value  0.002  (i.e.  0.002%)  represents  the  value  of  PFA =
0.002/100 = 0.00002.
Table 5.4: The experimental results for the average PFA for the proposed and the 
referenced techniques.
Tam
per R
atio
Average PFA %
Technique 1
Technique 2
Technique 3
Technique 4
Tong’s
 Technique
D
adkah’s
Technique
0% 0 0 0 0 0 0
5% 1.1548 0.0513 0.2 0 24.9994 0.0026
10% 1.1145 0.0558 0.1344 0 24.502 0.0129
15% 1.2063 0.0742 0.1089 0 24.7182 0.0128
20% 0.9629 0.0606 0.091 0 24.6133 0.0116
24% 0.8499 0.0566 0.0768 0 24.5842 0.0146
25% 0.8587 0.0438 0.0758 0 24.5861 0.0051
30% 0.7321 0.0335 0.0644 0 24.4428 0.0105
35% 0.6575 0.0263 0.0616 0 24.3961 0.0051
40% 0.5405 0.021 0.0558 0 24.4961 0.027
45% 0.3897 0.0089 0.0499 0 24.3321 0.0091
49% 0.3235 0.0043 0.0873 0 24.4192 0.0183
50% 0.2925 0.0043 0.442 0.002 24.3991 0.0173
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Figure 5.4: The experimental results for the average PFA for the proposed and the
referenced techniques.
It is possible to draw the following remarks from the experimental results of the
average PFA values:
• The best performance (i.e. lowest PFA) is for the fourth technique, and that
is  because  of  using  16  authentication  bits,  which  means  that
PFA≈2−16≈0.0015 % . In fact, no tampered blocks were missed except for
one block in one image of the 24 images at 50% ratio and that results in a
sudden increase in the value of PFA, nevertheless, the PFA values of the
fourth technique are still the lowest.
• The  performance  of  Dadkhah’s  technique  comes  in  the  second  place
because of using 12 authentication bits for each 4x4 px block, which should
result in a PFA of about  2−12≈0.024 % ; however, the experimental results
are lower most of the time because of using the recovery information as a
second authentication level, which reduces the PFA values.
• The  second  technique  has  a  slightly  better  performance  than  the  third
technique because it  uses a  smaller  filter  window size  of  3x3 px  when
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compared to 5x5 px in the third technique, and that gives more accurate
results.  Also  the  filtering  method used in  the  second technique is  more
accurate than the one used in the third one. The PFA for the first technique
is more than the second and the third one because of the lower accuracy of
the filtering method used in it.
• Tong’s  technique has the worst values of the PFA which is about 25% and
that agrees with the theoretical value of using 2 authentication bits for each
block which gives PFA≈2−2=25% .
• The fourth technique has an odd behaviour at tamper ratio of 50% because
it happened that one tampered block in all of the images was detected as
an authentic one. It means that 64 pixels out of (0.5 * 512 * 512 * 24) pixels,
about 0.002%, are falsely accepted. This behaviour is expected when large
number of images is tested even though the PFA is very low, which is about
0.0015%.
• The third technique has an odd behaviour at tamper ratio of 50%, where
there is a sudden increase in the value of the PFA. This is because at that
ratio and due to the use of filtering window, there will be tamper coincidence
at the boundaries of the tampered area and that increases the PFA value.
It  can be concluded from the PFA results that the fourth technique is the best
technique  regarding  the  PFA results,  and  Dadkhah’s  technique  comes  in  the
second place.
5.5- The Experimental Results for the Average PFR for 
the Proposed and the Referenced Techniques
The value of the PFR has less importance when compared to the PFA and less
effect on the value of the PSNR. Therefore, a higher value of PFR is accepted
when comparing to the PFA, especially when the reasons behind this high value
are expected ones. As in the fourth technique, where some untampered pixels at
the boundaries of the tampered area are included because of using a large block
size (8x8 px in this case).
The average PFR values corresponding to each ratio are shown in Table 5.5  and
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Figure 5.5. The following notes should be considered about Table 5.5 and Figure
5.5:
• The PFR was measured based on pixel level, as in Equation 5.2. This gives
more accurate results.
PFR=Number of authentic pixels detected as tampered ones
Total number of authentic pixels (5.2)
• The scale of the y-axis in Figure  5.5 is a logarithmic scale for the values
greater than 0, this scale was selected because some values are very small
and some are large.
• The values in Table  5.5 and Figure 5.5 are the percentage values, which
means that they should be divided by 100 to get the actual values.
Table 5.5: The experimental results for the average PFR for the proposed and the 
referenced techniques.
Tam
per R
atio
Average PFR %
Technique 1
Technique 2
Technique 3
Technique 4
Tong’s
 Technique
D
adkah’s
Technique
0% 0 0 0 0 0 0
5% 0.4087 0.0902 0.1402 0.9501 0.0826 0.185
10% 0.8692 0.1345 0.0613 1.1413 0.0369 0.8501
15% 0.9135 0 0.3933 1.0191 0.253 0.3668
20% 1.459 0.2155 0.3277 3.1709 0.1936 0.6662
24% 1.7398 0.2482 0.2866 2.447 0.1574 1.2826
25% 1.7445 3.7208 0.2057 2.6111 0.0929 0.0034
30% 2.7099 15.9144 0.1307 2.503 0.0814 1.2348
35% 3.1464 26.1817 0.2765 3.0349 0.1921 0.3603
40% 3.9768 34.9109 0.6114 4.1192 0.3662 1.6812
45% 5.3081 43.3705 0.7067 6.1633 0.5149 0.481
49% 6.9284 49.996 0.6399 2.0923 0.3306 1.0859
50% 7.6475 51.5769 0.4325 0 0 1.1101
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Figure 5.5: The experimental results for the average PFR for the proposed and the
referenced techniques.
It is possible to draw the following remarks from the experimental results of the
average PFR values:
• The main  factor  that  affects  the  PFR values  is  the  match  between  the
boundaries of the tampered area and the boundaries of the image blocks.
When a  perfect  match  between  the  tampered area  boundaries  and the
block  boundaries  occurs,  this  results  in  PFA = 0,  this  explains  the  odd
behaviour of the second, and the fourth technique at 15% and 50% ratios
respectively. 
• Unlike the PFA, the number of the authentication bits has no effect on the
PFR.
• The second technique has the worst results for ratios greater than 24%
because of how the filter used for detection works.
• The  third  technique  and  Tong’s  technique  seem  to  have  best  overall
performance because of  using 2x2 px block  size,  which provides better
matching between the boundaries of the tampered area and the boundaries
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of the blocks.
Tong’s technique seems to have the best PFR performance, followed by the third
technique, and that is because of using smaller block sizes. The values for other
techniques  (except  the  second  one  for  tamper  ratios  greater  than  24%)  are
acceptable, especially when the cause of the high PFR is understood.
5.6- The Experimental Results for the Encoding Time 
for the Proposed and the Referenced Techniques
For  the  sake  of  completeness,  the  average  encoding  time  is  included  in  the
results. The time was measured on a 2.10GHz Intel® Core™  i3-5010U CPU. The
average encoding time values corresponding to each ratio are shown in Table 5.6
and Figure  5.6. The following notes should be considered about Table  5.6 and
Figure 5.6:
• The scale of the y-axis in Figure 5.6 is a piecewise linear scale, where the
scale of the values greater than 1 is divided by 100. This scale was chosen
to be able to show small and large values of encoding time.
• The following notes  are also applied to  the  experimental  results  for  the
decoding time, which is presented in the following section.
◦ It  should be kept in mind that  the measured encoding/decoding time
values do not  reflect  the actual  time of  a  real  implementation of  the
techniques using C or C++ languages. 
◦ Best efforts were made to optimise the code and reduce the time, like
using look-up-tables whenever it is possible; however, the code might
not be the most optimised one and a lower encoding time is possible.
◦ A variation in encoding/decoding time is expected, especially since the
machine runs multiple tasks and other programs are using some of the
machine processing power.
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Table 5.6: The experimental results for the average encoding time for the proposed and 
the referenced techniques.
Tam
per R
atio
Average encoding time (Seconds)
Technique 1
Technique 2
Technique 3
Technique 4
Tong’s
 Technique
D
adkah’s
Technique
0% 0.3423 1.1563 1.1447 30.5612 0.364 21.085
5% 0.3418 1.1525 1.1437 30.7184 0.3644 21.259
10% 0.3434 1.1574 1.1442 30.6438 0.3667 21.1083
15% 0.3486 1.1701 1.1422 30.6307 0.3641 21.0224
20% 0.3408 1.1701 1.1438 30.6357 0.3654 21.2726
24% 0.3436 1.1791 1.1422 30.5662 0.3663 21.2725
25% 0.3428 1.1718 1.1426 30.6033 0.3643 21.1242
30% 0.3452 1.1731 1.1436 30.5604 0.3663 21.0909
35% 0.3419 1.1667 1.1431 30.5409 0.3647 21.0699
40% 0.3418 1.1561 1.1463 30.5153 0.363 21.1164
45% 0.3425 1.1566 1.1447 30.5821 0.3637 21.0282
49% 0.3434 1.1584 1.142 30.5837 0.3637 20.9926
50% 0.3458 1.1569 1.1464 30.6229 0.3647 20.9934
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Figure 5.6: The experimental results for the average encoding time for the proposed and
the referenced techniques.
It is possible to draw the following remarks from the experimental results of the
average encoding time values:
• Because the images are not tampered yet, the encoding time is constant
and does not depend on tamper ratio.
• The fourth and Dadkhah’s techniques require significantly more encoding
time  because  they  perform  the  calculations  on  each  block  separately
instead of applying them on the image as a whole, as other techniques do.
Both Tong’s and the first techniques are considered to have the best performance,
followed by the third technique. It should be remembered that the case might be
different if a real implementation is carried out using C or C++ language, also,
Tong's  technique  lacks  many  features,  such  as  watermark  encryption,  which
reduces it encoding time.
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5.7- The Experimental Results for the Decoding Time  
for the Proposed and the Referenced Techniques
As was the case for the encoding time, the average decoding time is also included
in the results. The time was measured on a  2.10GHz Intel® Core™  i3-5010U
CPU. The average decoding time values corresponding to each ratio are shown in
Table 5.7  and Figure 5.7. The following notes should be considered about Table
5.7 and Figure 5.7:
• The scale of the y-axis in Figure 5.6 is a piecewise linear scale, where the
scale of the values greater than 10 is divided by 10. This scale was chosen
to be able to show the small and large values of decoding time.
• The notes on the encoding time are also applicable here.
Table 5.7: The experimental results for the average decoding time for the proposed and 
the referenced techniques.
Tam
per R
atio
Average decoding time (Seconds)
Technique 1
Technique 2
Technique 3
Technique 4
Tong’s
 Technique
D
adkah’s
Technique
0% 3.7588 4.3592 1.5271 24.3584 1.0761 43.8284
5% 3.7652 4.3604 2.1044 24.7649 1.1384 44.2182
10% 3.7654 4.3758 2.6379 25.1408 1.2014 44.1729
15% 3.7565 4.3879 3.218 25.4676 1.2838 44.5587
20% 3.7625 4.3892 3.7854 25.97 1.3409 44.5534
24% 3.7637 4.4141 4.2148 26.2024 1.398 43.922
25% 3.763 4.4161 4.3183 26.2883 1.405 43.5972
30% 3.7603 4.3949 4.8715 26.7129 1.478 43.213
35% 3.752 4.366 5.4273 27.0353 1.5483 42.5625
40% 3.7593 4.3604 6.0311 27.4653 1.6251 41.4114
45% 3.7597 4.3628 6.5889 27.9208 1.7034 40.7209
49% 3.7808 4.3701 7.0108 28.1404 1.7657 39.6711
50% 3.8179 4.3601 7.098 28.1216 1.7707 39.4551
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Figure 5.7: The experimental results for the average decoding time for the proposed and
the referenced techniques.
It is possible to draw the following remarks from the experimental results of the
average decoding time values:
• The fourth technique and Dadkhah’s technique require significantly more
encoding  time  because  they  perform  the  calculations  on  each  block
separately instead of applying them on the image as whole.
• The  decoding  time  for  the  third  technique  increases  linearly  when  the
tamper ratio increases, this is because DCT calculations are required to
distinguish  each  tampered  block  from  its  twin  one.  Therefore,  more
calculations are needed when the tampered area increases.
• There is a slight increase in decoding time for Tong’s technique and the
fourth  technique  because  of  the  additional  time  needed  to  recover
additional tampered area.
• The decoding time for the first  and the second techniques seems to be
constant  for  all  tamper  ratios  and that  is  because the  filtering  used  for
localising  the  tampered  area  is  applied  for  the  whole  image  and  the
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recovery is done using a mask for the whole image and not for each block
separately.
• There is a slight decrease in the decoding time for Dadkhah’s technique as
the tamper ratio increases, this could be due to the second authentication
level that requires comparison with the recovery data for each block and
which is skipped when the block is tampered and that results in a slightly
less decoding time.
Tong’s technique seems to be the best when it comes to decoding time. It should
be remembered that the case might be different if a real implementation is carried
out using C or C++ language, also, Tong's technique lacks many features, such as
watermark encryption, which reduces it decoding time.
5.8- The Effect of Image Size on the Evaluated 
Parameters
Increasing the image size will not have any effect on the efficiency of the detection
and the recovery for the proposed and referenced techniques because they are
based on block-wise operations, also, the required encoding and decoding time
has a linear relationship with image size (i.e.  number of  blocks in the image).
Tables 5.8 and 5.9, and Figures 5.8 and 5.9 illustrate this linear relationship, they
show the required encoding and decoding time for the lighthouse image when its
size is increased from 120x120 px to 1200x1200 px in step of 120 px. 120x120 px
was selected because it is accepted by all techniques. The tampering was done by
replacing  a  squared area  that  has  45% of  image width  with  the  content  from
"peppers" image, both images were scaled before applying the tampering. The
image size is measured in megapixels which is found by multiplying the image
width by its height and dividing the result by 1 million. The time was measured on
a 2.10GHz Intel® Core™  i3-5010U CPU.
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Table 5.8: Encoding time vs image size for lighthouse image for the proposed and the 
referenced techniques.
Im
age size
(m
egapixel)
Encoding time (Seconds)
Technique 1
Technique 2
Technique 3
Technique 4
Tong’s
 Technique
D
adkah’s
Technique
0.0144 0.0797 0.0864 0.0706 1.7007 0.0971 1.3252
0.0576 0.1536 0.2659 0.2604 6.7652 0.1666 5.3916
0.1296 0.2329 0.5737 0.5698 15.2041 0.2534 12.0256
0.2304 0.3151 1.0198 1.0214 26.9472 0.346 21.4887
0.36 0.3991 1.5753 1.5883 42.2893 0.4359 33.4364
0.5184 0.4887 2.2849 2.2726 60.8669 0.5333 48.5468
0.7056 0.5763 3.0986 3.1133 83.1175 0.6367 65.4512
0.9216 0.6776 4.0488 4.0767 108.3992 0.7353 85.0598
1.1664 0.7701 5.102 5.1179 137.5072 0.8412 108.0352
1.44 0.8655 6.374 6.3696 169.5271 0.9471 132.193
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Figure 5.8: Encoding time vs image size for lighthouse image for the proposed and the
referenced techniques.
Page 117/209
Chapter 5: Experimental Evaluation for the Proposed  and the Referenced Techniques
Table 5.9: Decoding time vs image size for lighthouse image for the proposed and the 
referenced techniques.
Im
age size
(m
egapixel)
Decoding time (Seconds)
Technique 1
Technique 2
Technique 3
Technique 4
Tong’s
 Technique
D
adkah’s
Technique
0.0144 0.292 0.2716 0.2278 1.3459 0.2029 2.7718
0.0576 0.8971 0.9706 0.8325 5.6841 0.4624 11.101
0.1296 1.899 2.1135 1.854 11.9352 0.8281 25.2615
0.2304 3.2726 3.7342 3.277 22.728 1.233 44.8969
0.36 5.0424 5.785 5.1331 33.2008 1.7412 70.0066
0.5184 7.1213 8.3892 7.3264 51.2539 2.2723 99.8919
0.7056 9.6382 11.4152 10.022 65.0574 2.9213 136.2091
0.9216 12.5026 14.9404 12.9928 90.4702 3.6301 178.5067
1.1664 15.7116 18.7736 16.6517 108.16 4.416 225.2395
1.44 19.3861 23.3549 20.3933 141.586 5.2669 277.2823
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5.9- Summary
This chapter presented an experimental  evaluation of the proposed techniques
and compared them to the referenced techniques. The evaluation was done for
the following parameters: recovery quality (measured by PSNR, NCC, and SSIM),
PFA,  PFR,  and  encoding/decoding  time.  The  effect  of  image  resolution  on
encoding/decoding time was also measured. In general, the proposed techniques
had better performance and the fourth proposed technique had the best general
performance among the proposed and the referenced techniques.
The performance of the second technique decreases dramatically for tamper ratios
equals to  or  greater  than 25% and that  is  because of  the nature of  the used
localisation  filter.  For  tamper  ratios  below  25%,  the  second  technique  has
approximately the same quality performance as the third one because of having
the same recovery data generation strategy.
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Figure 5.9: Decoding time vs image size for lighthouse image for the proposed and the
referenced techniques.
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A hypothetical perfect recovery scenarios were tested for Tong's and Dadkhah's
technique to show how the proposed techniques have better performance even
when the referenced techniques have a perfect performance.
The PFA depends generally on the performance of the localisation filter in the case
of the first, the second, and the third techniques, and it depends on the number of
localisation bits for the other techniques. For this reason the fourth technique has
the best PFA values followed by Dadkhah's techniques because they have 16 and
12 localisation bits respectively. The worst PFA values are for Tong's technique
because it has only 2 localisation bits for each block.
The  PFR  depends  mainly  on  the  matching  between  the  boundaries  of  the
tampered area and the block partitioning, this is why the PFR drops to 0 whenever
a perfect match occurs.
The required encoding/decoding time for the fourth and Dadkhah's techniques is
significantly higher than the other techniques. This is because they require more
calculations and these calculations are applied for each block separately instead
of doing them to the whole image at once.
Because  the  proposed  and  reference  techniques  are  based  on  block-wise
operations,  the  increase  in  the  image  size  has  no  effect  on  the  recovery
performance.  Also,  there  is  a  linear  relationship  between  the  image  size  and
encoding/decoding time of the proposed and the referenced techniques.
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Chapter 6: Discussion, Future Work, and 
Conclusion
This chapter presents the final discussion about the advantages and shortcomings
of  the  proposed  techniques,  and  which  technique  has  the  most  optimised
performance. The possible future work is also presented in this chapter, followed
by the final conclusion of this research.
6.1- Discussion
This  section  discusses  the  proposed  techniques,  their  advantages  and
shortcomings and the technique that gives the best performance.
6.1.1- Limitations on Tampering Pattern
The use of maximum-distance mapping in the proposed techniques, except for the
first one, gives them the ability to recover a large tampered area without tamper
coincidence (up to 50% in the third and the fourth techniques); however, if any
tamper exceeds half of both image dimensions, such as a diagonal line from top-
left corner to bottom-right corner, it will not be fully recovered even if the tampered
area is a small fraction of the image. Some techniques in the literature [57,  65]
avoid this problem by making the recovery data consist of a linear combination of
the  information all  over  the image and solving this  linear  system for  unknown
variables  due  to  tampering.  However,  the  proposed  techniques  have  less
computational  complexity,  and  maximum  distance  mapping  gives  acceptable
results  for  most  practical  cases  where  the  tampering  usually  affects  a  limited
portion of the image.
6.1.2- Performance of the Proposed Techniques for Noise 
Tampering
The proposed techniques, except the fourth one, use image filtering for detecting
the tampered area, and they rely on the assumption that the tampering is applied
to a contiguous part of the image and that the tampering is not scattered as in the
case of salt and pepper noise.
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In the following example, the lighthouse image was tampered by adding salt and
pepper noise with 0.1 density to the central part of the image as in Figure 6.1. The
detected tampered area for the four proposed techniques is shown in Figure 6.2. A
border line is drawn around the images to show their boundaries. The recovered
image is shown in Figure 6.3. The fourth technique has the best performance in
detecting  and recovering all  of  the tampered blocks,  while  the performance of
other techniques varies from detecting none of the tampered area, for the first
technique, to some of it, for the second one, to most of it, for the third one.
Figure 6.1: The lighthouse image with salt and pepper noise
tampering.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6.2: The detected tampered area (in black) for noise tampering in the four
proposed techniques: a) The first technique. b) The second technique. c) The third
technique. d) The fourth technique.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6.3: The recovered image for noise tampering for the four proposed
techniques: a) The first technique. b) The second technique. c) The third technique.
d) The fourth technique.
6.1.3- Performance of the Proposed Techniques for Black and 
White (B&W) Text-Images
This section illustrates the performance of the proposed techniques for black and
white (B&W) text-images. The top-left area of the 528x528 px image shown in
Figure 6.4 is tampered as shown in Figure 6.5. The text and the rose shape are
replaced to show how effective are the proposed techniques in recovering B&W
text and shapes.
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Figure 6.4: The used image for testing the performance of the
proposed techniques for recovering B&W text images.
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Figure 6.5: The tampered image used for testing the performance of
the proposed techniques for recovering B&W text images. (The
tampering text is taken from [110])
The detection results for the proposed techniques are shown in Figure 6.6, where
the detected tampered area is shown in black. A border line is drawn around the
images to show their boundaries. The recovered image is shown in Figure  6.7.
The  PSNR values  are:  19.78  dB,  23.07  dB,  21.45  dB,  and  26.54  dB for  the
techniques 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6.6: The detected tampered area for the text-image: a) The first technique. b)
The second technique. c) The third technique. d) The fourth technique.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6.7: The recovered tampered area for the B&W text-image: a) The first
technique. b) The second technique. c) The third technique. d) The fourth technique.
From previous figures and PSNR values,  the fourth  technique shows the best
performance for recovering B&W text and shapes.
6.1.4- Performance of the proposed techniques against 
counterfeiting
Except for the fourth technique, the proposed techniques validate the average of
2x2 px blocks, which means that any block could be replaced by another that
produces the same average, also, the exchange of the pixels inside the block will
not be detected. On the other hand, the fourth technique is very robust against this
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kind of tampering due to the use of CRC in the authentication process.
6.1.5- The Recommended Proposed Technique
From the analysis  of  the  proposed techniques,  it  can  be  seen that  the  fourth
technique has the best performance in terms of the recovered image PSNR and
PFA, and it  has an acceptable level of PFR. It  also has the best performance
under noise tampering and the best resiliency for counterfeiting; therefore, it is the
recommended technique among the other proposed ones.
All of the four techniques have been discussed and analysed in this thesis, even
though the fourth technique has the best performance and it is the recommended
one  to  be  used.  The  four  techniques  were  investigated  and  presented  in  this
research for the following reasons:
• To show the development of the ideas which led to a better technique. The
first technique was the first developed one, then each technique came to
provide more enhancements on the performance of the previous one.
• The main purpose of the first three techniques is to investigate the possible
ways  and  the  limitations  on  using  one  data  set  for  both  purposes  of
localisation and recovery. Presenting all of the investigated techniques will
be very helpful for any further research to be taken in this direction.
• Proposing the fourth technique comes to aid the main goal of the research,
which is to provide an optimised and high performance tamper localisation
and recovery watermarking technique. One idea for achieving this goal was
investigated by the first three techniques, which is having one set of data for
localisation and recovery purposes. The other direction was investigated by
the fourth technique, which is having a larger block size with the use of DCT
as recovery data generation method.
• Despite  the  fact  that  the  first  and  the  second  techniques  have  low
performance when compared to fourth or even the third one; however, each
technique has unique ideas that worth mentioning and investigating. For
example, the use of three directional mapping in the second technique and
the localisation filter used in the first one.
The following table shows the pros and cons of each technique and the kind of
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applications that it could be used for:
Technique 1
Pros
• Insensitive to the tampering pattern.
• More robust against VQ attack due to random mapping.
• Consume only one LSB of the image.
• Has low encoding/decoding time.
Cons
• Recovery  quality  drops  significantly  as  tampering  ratio
increases.
• The  recoverable  tampered  area  with  acceptable  quality  is
smaller than other techniques.
• Less resistive to counterfeiting than the fourth technique.
Applications
• Good for application where the expected tamper ratio is small
and  the quality of the recovery is not a priority. This could be
the case with personal images.
Technique 2
Pros
• Constant encoding/decoding time.
• Low  encoding/decoding  time  when  compared  to  the  fourth
technique.
Cons
• More sensitive the tampering pattern than other techniques.
• The maximum recoverable  tampering  ratio  is  small,  which  is
about 25% of image area.
• Less resistive to counterfeiting than the fourth technique.
Applications
• In general, the use of the third or the fourth technique is more
preferred than the second one; however, it  could be used for
applications where the loss of information in the image is not a
problematic issue and the expected tampering ratio is small and
contiguous,  such as personal images.
Technique 3
Pros
• Low  encoding/decoding  time  when  compared  to  the  fourth
technique.
• Ability to recover large tampered area, up to 50% of the image
area.
Cons • Sensitive the tampering pattern.• Less resistive to counterfeiting than the fourth technique.
Applications
• Could be used for applications where the lost of information in
the image is not a problem and the expected tampered area is
contiguous, such as personal images.
Technique 4
Pros
• Higher recovery quality.
• More  resistive  to  counterfeiting  when  compared  to  the  other
techniques.
• More secure than the other techniques.
• Ability to recover large tampered area, up to 50% of the image
area.
Cons
• Sensitive the tampering pattern.
• Has higher encoding/decoding time when compared to the other
techniques.
Applications
• Could be used for applications where higher quality recovery is
required and the tampered area is expected to be contiguous,
such as medical and forensic images.
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6.2- Future Work
This section presents some future work that could be done based on the work in
this research.
6.2.1- Solving the Problem of Sensitivity to Tampering Pattern
In  this  research,  maximum-distance  mapping  was  used  to  increase  the
recoverable  area  size  while  keeping  low  computational  complexity;  however,
maximum-distance  mapping  introduces  the  problem of  sensitivity  to  tampering
pattern, where some tampering patterns are not recoverable even if they occupy a
small fraction of the image area, such as a diagonal line from one corner of the
image to the other. This problem could be solved by converting the information in
the image blocks into a linear system and storing the results of this system into the
watermark, in this way, the recovery will depend on the tampering ratio regardless
of  the  pattern  it  takes.  One  major  problem with  this  solution  is  the  long  time
required for solving the large linear system it produces; therefore, research could
be carried out to investigate computation time reduction.
6.2.2- Focusing Research Direction on Semi-Fragile 
Techniques that Work in Conjunction with Lossy 
Compression Techniques such as JPEG and JPEG2000
Fragile watermarking has some advantages, such as higher embedding capacity
and more tamper detection sensitivity;  however, it  has one major disadvantage
which is the inability to use lossy compression techniques with it and the necessity
of using lossless compression techniques to store the watermarked images. Since
the main advantage of using lossless techniques is to preserve the exact values of
image pixels, which have been altered by the watermark, this makes using lossy
compression more practical.
Semi-fragile watermarking is more practical for everyday applications, especially
when it works in conjunction with lossy compression techniques such as JPEG
and JPEG2000; however, the research taken for fragile watermarking is still helpful
because it gives a good insight and platform for the operation of the semi-fragile
techniques.
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6.2.3- Applying Public-Key Encryption to Secure the 
Watermark
Using private key to encrypt the watermark imposes a security problem when it
comes  to  exchanging  this  private  key  between  the  intended  parties  of
communication. Therefore, public-key encryption is necessary to avoid knowing
the private secret key  by intruders when it being exchanged.
6.2.4- Applying Lossless Compression Techniques to the 
Watermark
Using lossless compression techniques, such as entropy coding, helps in reducing
the  watermark  size  and  enabling  using  less  LSBs to  store  it,  or  storing  more
watermark data in the same number of LSBs to get a better recovery quality. This
could be applied particularly for the fourth technique, because of the flexibility of
adding or removing some DCT coefficients to the watermark data without affecting
the operation of technique.
6.2.5- Extension of the Proposed Techniques to Coloured 
Images
A direct application of the proposed techniques to coloured images is done by
applying them separately to the RGB layers of the image; however, some steps
might be taken to provide better performance for coloured images. For example, in
the fourth technique the image could be converted to YCrCb colour space. Less
LSBs could be taken from the Y channel and more LSBs could be taken from Cr
and Cb channels because the Y channel has more information when compared to
the Cr and the Cb channels. More LSBs could be assigned to the Y channel since
it has more information and hence needs more space. Also the 16 bit detection
data could be assigned for all of YCrCb channels instead of assigning 16 bit for
each channel.
For the other three techniques, the image could be converted to YCrCb colour
space and a larger block size, such as 4x4 px, could be assigned to Cr and Cb
channels, this will reduce the size of the watermark. Also, since all of the colour
layers  are  tampered  in  the  same  place,  the  detection  could  be  improved  by
investigating using the detection results from all  three channels to improve the
detection rate for the tampered area.
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6.3- Conclusion
Image  watermarking  plays  an  important  role  in  many  applications,  such  as:
copyright tracking, hardware control,  multimedia authentication and data hiding.
Image watermarking techniques are divided into three categories based on their
ability  to  resist  attacks,  i.e. modifications  on the  watermarked image.  The first
category is robust watermarking, which resist severe attacks, such as geometrical
attacks, along with other less severe attacks, such as low pass filtering and lossy
compression.  Robust  watermarking  is  used  mainly  in  copyright  tracking.  The
second category is semi-fragile watermarking, which resist less severe attacks,
such as low pass filtering and lossy compression. The third category is fragile
watermarking, which is characterised by its sensitivity to any modification to the
image  and  its  high  capacity.  Therefore,  it  is  used  mainly  in  authentication
applications which include tamper localisation and recovery.
After conducting a general literature survey in the field of image watermarking;
tamper localisation  and recovery was selected to be the topic of this research.
Tamper localisation  and recovery attracted this research because it is an active
and important topic in image watermarking and it is needed in many fields, such as
medical and forensic applications. The images used in these applications contain
critical information that attracts the intruders to tamper with and counterfeit them to
gain  some  benefits or  avoid  some legal  complications.  It  is  very  important  to
ensure the ability of localising and recovering any tamper that might be applied to
these images; therefore, image watermarking is used to solve this issue.
Generally, the process of tamper localisation  and recovery starts by dividing the
image into non-overlapping blocks of nxn px  and reserving some LSBs in each
block to embed the watermark into them. Two separate sets of data are usually
generated from each block, one set is used for localisation and it is stored in the
same block. The other set is used for recovery and it is mapped in another block in
the image, preferably as far as possible from the block from which the recovery
data is generated. Tamper coincidence occurs if the block from which the recovery
data is generated and the block in which it is stored are both tampered.
A literature survey was conducted in fragile watermarking techniques that are used
in tamper localisation and recovery, and that is to determine the different methods,
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shortcomings, trends, and issues in this field. Some of the shortcomings that found
in the techniques proposed in the literature are:
• The use of two separate sets of data in the watermark, one set is used only
for localisation while the other set is used only for recovery. Since both sets
are related the data in  their block, and they contain information that could
be helpful for both purposes of localisation and recovery; it is a wast of data
to use each one in only one purpose and it is more optimal to have one set
of data that is used for both purposes of localisation and recovery. Another
disadvantage of  using two separate sets is  that  few number of  bits  are
assigned  for  localisation  data,  which results  in  high  PFA,  which  in  turn
results  in  low  recovery  quality.  The  PFA  approximately  equals  to
2Number of Localisatoin Bits .
• Using  multiple  copies  of  recovery  data,  which  is  used  to  increase  the
recoverable area ratio; however, this increases the watermark-data waste
problem.
• Complicating the encoding/decoding design without introducing significant
improvement, such as  using  hierarchical  authentication  and hierarchical
partitioning.
• Using few number of localisation bits, which results in large PFA values,
which results in low recovery quality.
After reviewing the shortcomings of the techniques proposed in the literature, four
techniques were proposed in this research. Each one of the proposed techniques
gives  some  enhancements  over  the  techniques  proposed  before.  All  of  the
proposed  techniques  are  presented  in  this  research  in  order  to  show  their
development and to present the ideas in each one.
Three of the four proposed techniques investigate the possibility of using one set
of data for both purposes of localisation  and recovery. In these techniques, the
watermark image, which represents the recovery data, is compared directly with
the watermarked images and the resulting difference image is treated with image
filtering  in  order  to  extract  a  mask  image  that  determines  the  location  of  the
tampered area.  The fourth  technique uses two separate sets of  data and it  is
optimised to  give  better  performance in  terms of  recovered image quality  and
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resistance to counterfeiting.
A brief description of the four proposed techniques is presented as follows:
• In the first technique, the image is partitioned into 2x2 px blocks and one
LSB is reserved for the watermark image, i.e. the recovery data, which is
mapped randomly in the LSB. The watermark is secured by XORing it with
a random sequence and using a secret key as the seed for randomisation.
At the decoding stage, the difference image between the watermark image
and watermarked image is found using XOR operation, and a threshold is
applied to the resulting difference image so that any pixel that has a value
greater than 0 will become 255. Spatial filtering is applied to the difference
image to locate the tampered area. The spatial filter returns white, i.e. 255,
if the ratio of white pixels inside the filter window is more than 70%. The
resulting image of the filtering process is called the mask image and the
white pixels in it correspond to the tampered area. Median filtering is used
to enhance the watermark image before using it to recover the tampered
area. The first technique is not sensitive to the tampering pattern; however,
the recovered area quality degrades as the tampered area ratio increases.
• In the second technique, the image is partitioned into 2x2 px blocks and
two LSBs are reserved for the watermark image, which is divided into 3
interleaved  pixel  groups.  The  three  pixel  groups  are  mapped  based  on
maximum-distance mapping and they are mapped in  the  horizontal,  the
vertical, and the diagonal directions. The watermark is secured by XORing it
with  a  random  sequence  and  using  a  secret  key  as  the  seed  for
randomisation. The bits in each pixel are also permuted randomly based on
the same secret key. The difference image between the watermark image
and the watermarked image is found as in the first technique; however, the
mask image is generated from the difference image using a filtering window
of size of 3x3 px which returns white if the number of white pixels in it is
more than 3. The technique guarantees the full recovery of any tampered
area as long as it does not exceed half the width or half the height of the
image,  hence,  the  recoverable tampered area ratio  reaches 25% of  the
image area.
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• In the third technique, the image is partitioned into 2x2 px blocks and two
LSBs are reserved for the watermark image, which is mapped diagonally
using maximum-distance mapping. The watermark is secured and the bits
in each pixels are permuted as in the second technique. Also, the difference
image is generated as in the first and the second technique. The difference
image will have two twin areas, one corresponds to the tampered area in
the watermarked image and the other corresponds to the tampered area in
the  watermark  image.  In  the  watermark  image,  the  tampered  area  will
appear as a noisy area with high frequency contents, and that is because of
XORing the watermark image with the random sequence to secure it. The
mask image is generated from the difference image by selecting the area
that corresponds the lower frequency contents in the watermark image. The
frequency contents are measured by taking 5x5 px window and finding its
DCT coefficients,  then the  first  row and column of  the  DCT coefficients
matrix are set to 0 and the sum of the absolute values of the remaining
coefficients  is  found.  The technique guarantees the  full  recovery  of  any
tampered area as long as it does not simultaneously exceed half the width
and half the height of the image, hence, the recoverable tampered area
ratio reaches 50% of the image area.
• In the fourth technique, the image is partitioned into 2x2 px blocks and two
LSBs are reserved for the watermark image, which is mapped diagonally
and secured as  in  the  third  technique.  Also,  the  bits  in  each block  are
permuted randomly based on the same secret key. In each block, 16 bits
are dedicated for localisation and calculated using CRC16, while 112 are
used  to  store  the  recovery  data.  The  recovery  data  is  generated  by
quantising the DCT coefficient  matrix  of  the block.  The fourth  technique
shows better recovery quality because of using larger block size and using
DCT to generate the recovery data. As in the third technique, the fourth
technique guarantees the full recovery of any tampered area as long as it
does not simultaneously exceed half the width and half the height of the
image.
The proposed techniques were compared to two techniques from the literature and
showed  better  performance  in  term  of  recovery  quality  and  PFA.  The  fourth
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technique showed the best performance with average PSNR value of 42.64 dB for
untampered image and from 36.84 dB to 29.07 dB for tamper ratios of 5% to 50%,
and it has average PFA value of 0.00153%.
Some of the limitations of the proposed techniques are:
• Except for the first technique, the techniques are sensitive to the tampering
pattern. This sensitivity is because of using maximum-distance mapping,
which  makes  some  patterns  unrecoverable  even  if  they  occupy  small
percentage of the image, such as a diagonal line from top-left corner to
bottom-right corner of the image.
• Except for the fourth technique, the techniques show less performance in
detecting and recovering noise tampering. The fourth technique detects and
recovers any noise tampering just like any other tempering; however, the
other techniques miss some noise. The fourth technique shows the best
performance,  followed by the third,  then the second.  The first  technique
gives the worst performance regarding noise tampering.
• Except for the fourth technique, the techniques show less performance in
detecting and recovering tampered text images. The fourth technique gives
the  best  results  regarding  the  detected  area  and  the  recovery  quality,
followed by the second, then the third. The first technique gives the worst
results.
It is advisable to use the fourth technique for different applications, especially for
sensitive  ones  that  require  higher  recovery  quality  and  more  counterfeiting
resistivity, such as medical and forensic applications. The other three techniques
could be used for less sensitive applications, such as personal images.
The future work for this research includes:
• Solving  the  problem  of  sensitivity  to  tampering  pattern  by  storing  the
recovery information as a linear system of equations. Recovery is curried
out by solving this system for any missing variable that reflects a missing
block due to tampering.
• Redirecting  research  toward  semi-fragile  techniques  that  work  in
conjunction with lossy compression techniques such as JPEG.
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• Implementing public-key encryption to secure the watermark.
• Implementing lossless compression techniques to reduce the data size of
the watermark.
• Extending the proposed techniques to work with coloured images.
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Appendix A: The Implemented Code for 
the First Proposed Technique
A.1: The Used Programming Language for Code 
Implementation
All  of  the  code  for  all  techniques  was implemented using  GNU Octave 4.2.2.
Appendix  A  contains  a  list  of  the  implemented  code  for  the  first  proposed
technique, the code consists of two files: encode.m, and decode.m.
A.2: The Code for the Encoding Stage of the First 
Technique
% function I_enc=encode(I_in,key)
%
% The encoding function for the first proposed technique.
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function I_enc=encode(I_in,key)
[I_H,I_W] = size(I_in);
I_SZ = [I_H,I_W];
W_SZ =I_SZ/2;
W_W = W_SZ(2);
W_H = W_SZ(1);
% Generating the watermark
I_del = bitand(I_in,bin2dec('11111110'));
W = I_del(1:2:end,1:2:end)/4 +  ...
    I_del(1:2:end,2:2:end)/4 +  ...
    I_del(2:2:end,1:2:end)/4 +  ...
    I_del(2:2:end,2:2:end)/4;
% Shuffling the watermark according to the secret key.
rand('seed',key);
key_R = randi([1,W_W],[W_H,1]);
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key_C = randi([1,W_H],[1,W_W]);
for count  = 1:2 % repeat Shuffling once
    for R = 1:W_H
        W(R,:)=circshift(W(R,:),[0, key_R(R)]);
    end
    for C = 1:W_W
        W(:,C)=circshift(W(:,C),[key_C(C),0]);
    end
end
% Encrypting the watermark by XORing it with a random sequence.
% Note: For simplicity, the randomisation depends only on the secret key.
%       However, to make the method resistive to VQ and collage attach
%       the randomisation should depend also on a unique serial
%       number for the watermarked image.
rand('seed',key);
seq  = uint8(randi([0,255],W_SZ));
W = bitxor(W,seq);
% Storing the watermark in the first LSB of the input image.
and_msk = bin2dec('00000001');
I_enc=I_del;
W = bitshift(W,-4);
I_enc(1:2:end,1:2:end) = I_enc(1:2:end,1:2:end) + bitand(W,and_msk);
W = bitshift(W,-1);
I_enc(1:2:end,2:2:end) = I_enc(1:2:end,2:2:end) + bitand(W,and_msk);
W = bitshift(W,-1);
I_enc(2:2:end,1:2:end) = I_enc(2:2:end,1:2:end) + bitand(W,and_msk);
W = bitshift(W,-1);;
I_enc(2:2:end,2:2:end) = I_enc(2:2:end,2:2:end) + bitand(W,and_msk);
return
Page 152/209
Appendix A:The Implemented Code for the First Proposed Technique
A.3: The Code for the Decoding Stage of the First 
Technique
% function [I_fxd,vld_msk]=decode(I_in,key)
%
% The decoding function for the first proposed technique.
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function [I_fxd,vld_msk]=decode(I_in,key)
[I_H,I_W] = size(I_in);
I_SZ = [I_H,I_W];
W_SZ = I_SZ/2;
W_H = W_SZ(1); 
W_W = W_SZ(2);
% Getting the watermark from the first LSB of the input image
I_tmp = bitand(I_in, bin2dec('00000001'));
W = I_tmp(2:2:end,2:2:end);
W = bitshift(W,7);
W_tmp =  I_tmp(2:2:end,1:2:end);
W_tmp = bitshift(W_tmp,6);
W=W+W_tmp;
W_tmp =  I_tmp(1:2:end,2:2:end);
W_tmp = bitshift(W_tmp,5);
W=W+W_tmp;
W_tmp =  I_tmp(1:2:end,1:2:end);
W_tmp = bitshift(W_tmp,4);
W=W+W_tmp;
% Decrypting the watermark by XORing with the random sequence
% Note: For simplicity, the randomisation depends only on the secret key.
%       However, to make the method resistive to VQ and collage attach
%       the randomisation should depend also on a unique serial
%       number for the watermarked image.
rand('seed',key);
seq  = uint8(randi([0,255],W_SZ));
W = bitxor(W,seq);
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% Set 4 MSBs in the watermark to zero
W = bitand(W, bin2dec('11110000'));
% Shuffling back the watermark
rand('seed',key);
key_R = randi([1,W_W],[W_H,1]);
key_C = randi([1,W_H],[1,W_W]);
for count  = 1:2 % repeat Shuffling once
    for C = 1:W_W
        W(:,C)=circshift(W(:,C),[-key_C(C),0]);
    end
    for R = 1:W_H
        W(R,:)=circshift(W(R,:),[0, -key_R(R)]);
    end
end
% Producing the difference image by comparing 
% the watermarked image to the watermark
I_del = bitand(I_in, bin2dec('11111110'));
 
W_tmp = I_del(1:2:end,1:2:end)/4 + ...
        I_del(1:2:end,2:2:end)/4 + ...
        I_del(2:2:end,1:2:end)/4 + ...
        I_del(2:2:end,2:2:end)/4;
W_tmp = bitand(W_tmp, bin2dec('11110000'));
W_diff = bitxor(W,W_tmp);
W_diff(W_diff>0) = 255;
% Applying filter to the difference image
FLTR_SZ = 7;
THRESH = 0.7; % Threshold for the ratio of the white area
fun = @(x) ( sum(x(:)) > ((255*FLTR_SZ^2)* THRESH) );
W_diff = nlfilter(W_diff,[FLTR_SZ, FLTR_SZ],fun);
W_diff = uint8(W_diff)*255;
% Expanding the white area in the difference image
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f = fspecial("average", 5); 
W_diff = imfilter(W_diff, f,'same');
W_diff(W_diff>0) = 255;
% Finding the validity mask image.
vld_msk = imresize(W_diff,2,'linear');
vld_msk = ~(vld_msk > 0);
% Applying median filter to the watermark
W_fltr = medfilt2(W,[3 3]);
% Resizing the filtered watermark
I_fltr = imresize(W_fltr,2,'linear');
% Recovering the input image using the filtered watermark
I_fxd = I_del;
I_fxd(~vld_msk) = I_fltr(~vld_msk);
return
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Appendix B: The Implemented Code for 
the Second Proposed 
Technique
Appendix  B contains  a  list  of  the  implemented code for  the  second proposed
technique, the code consists of two files: encode.m, and decode.m.
B.1: The Code for the Encoding Stage of the Second 
Proposed Technique
% function [I_enc]=encode(I_in,key)
%
% The encoding function of the second proposed technique
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function [I_enc]=encode(I_in,key)
I_SZ = size(I_in);
I_W = I_SZ(2);
I_H = I_SZ(1);
W_SZ =I_SZ/2;
W_W = W_SZ(2);
W_H = W_SZ(1);
if sum(mod(I_SZ,12)) ~= 0
    disp('Dimensions of the image must be multiple of 12');
    return
end
% Store the average the 6 MSB of the input image in the watermark
and_msk = bin2dec('11111100');
I_del = bitand(I_in,and_msk);
W = I_del(1:2:end,1:2:end)/4 + ...
    I_del(1:2:end,2:2:end)/4 + ...
    I_del(2:2:end,1:2:end)/4 + ...
    I_del(2:2:end,2:2:end)/4;
W = bitand(W,and_msk);
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% Store the average 2 LSB of the input image in the watermark
and_msk = bin2dec('00000011');
I_tmp = bitand(I_in,and_msk);
W_tmp = I_tmp(1:2:end,1:2:end) + ...
        I_tmp(1:2:end,2:2:end) + ...
        I_tmp(2:2:end,1:2:end) + ...
        I_tmp(2:2:end,2:2:end);
W_tmp=W_tmp/4;
W_tmp = bitand(W_tmp,and_msk);
W = W+W_tmp;
% Mapping each group of pixels in 3x3 px block using
% maximum-distance mapping
% The positions of the groups are as follows:
%  3  1  2
%  2  3  1
%  1  2  3
dst = 6;
%% Mapping the first group of pixels horizontally
W(1:3:end,2:3:end) = circshift(W(1:3:end,2:3:end),[0,W_W/dst]);
W(2:3:end,3:3:end) = circshift(W(2:3:end,3:3:end),[0,W_W/dst]);
W(3:3:end,1:3:end) = circshift(W(3:3:end,1:3:end),[0,W_W/dst]);
%% Mapping the second group of pixels vertically
W(2:3:end,1:3:end) = circshift(W(2:3:end,1:3:end),[W_H/dst,0]);
W(3:3:end,2:3:end) = circshift(W(3:3:end,2:3:end),[W_H/dst,0]);
W(1:3:end,3:3:end) = circshift(W(1:3:end,3:3:end),[W_H/dst,0]);
%% Mapping the third group of pixels diagonally
%% (horizontally then vertically)
W(1:3:end,1:3:end) = circshift(W(1:3:end,1:3:end),[0,W_W/dst]);
W(2:3:end,2:3:end) = circshift(W(2:3:end,2:3:end),[0,W_W/dst]);
W(3:3:end,3:3:end) = circshift(W(3:3:end,3:3:end),[0,W_W/dst]);
W(1:3:end,1:3:end) = circshift(W(1:3:end,1:3:end),[W_H/dst,0]);
W(2:3:end,2:3:end) = circshift(W(2:3:end,2:3:end),[W_H/dst,0]);
W(3:3:end,3:3:end) = circshift(W(3:3:end,3:3:end),[W_H/dst,0]);
% Shuffling the bits in each pixel in the watermark
% according to the secret key
%% Generating permutation matrix
rand('seed',key);
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PRM = zeros([W_SZ,8]);
for c = 1:W_W
    for r = 1:W_H
        PRM(r,c,:) = randperm(8);
    end
end
%% Permuting the pixels of the watermark
PRM = PRM -1;
Wx = W * 0;
for l = 1:8
    M = uint8(ones(W_SZ));
    M = M  .* 2 .^ PRM(:,:,l);
    M = bitand(M,W);
    M = M ./ 2 .^ PRM(:,:,l);
    M = M  * 2 ^ (l-1);
    Wx = bitor(Wx,M);
end
W = Wx;
% Encrypting the watermark by XORing with the random sequence
% Note: For simplicity, the randomisation depends only on the secret key.
%       However, to make the method resistive to VQ and collage attach
%       the randomisation should depend also on a unique serial
%       number for the watermarked image.
rand('seed',key)
seq = randi([0,255],W_SZ);
W = bitxor(W,seq);
% storing the watermark in the 2 LSB of the image
I_enc = I_del;
and_msk = bin2dec('00000011');
I_enc(1:2:end,1:2:end) = I_enc(1:2:end,1:2:end) + bitand(W,and_msk);
W = bitshift(W,-2);
I_enc(1:2:end,2:2:end) = I_enc(1:2:end,2:2:end) + bitand(W,and_msk);
W = bitshift(W,-2);
I_enc(2:2:end,1:2:end) = I_enc(2:2:end,1:2:end) + bitand(W,and_msk);
W = bitshift(W,-2);
I_enc(2:2:end,2:2:end) = I_enc(2:2:end,2:2:end) + bitand(W,and_msk);
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return
B.2: The Code for the Decoding Stage of the Second 
Proposed Technique
% function [I_fxd,vld_msk]=decode(I_in,key)
%
% The decoding function for the second proposed technique.
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function [I_fxd,vld_msk]=decode(I_in,key)
I_SZ = size(I_in);
I_W = I_SZ(2);
I_H = I_SZ(1);
W_SZ = I_SZ/2;
W_W = W_SZ(2);
W_H = W_SZ(1);
if sum(mod(I_SZ,12)) ~= 0
    disp('Dimensions of the image must be multiple of 12');
    return
end
% Getting the watermark from the 2 LSB of the image
I_tmp = bitand(I_in,bin2dec('00000011'));
W = I_tmp(2:2:end,2:2:end);
W = bitshift(W,2);
W = W + I_tmp(2:2:end,1:2:end);
W = bitshift(W,2);
W = W + I_tmp(1:2:end,2:2:end);
W = bitshift(W,2);
W = W + I_tmp(1:2:end,1:2:end);
% Decrypting the watermark by XORing with the random sequence
% Note: For simplicity, the randomisation depends only on the secret key.
%       However, to make the method resistive to VQ and collage attach
%       the randomisation should depend also on a unique serial
%       number for the watermarked image.
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rand('seed',key)
seq = randi([0,255],W_SZ);
W = bitxor(W,seq);
% Shuffling back the bits in each pixel in the watermark
% according the secret key
%% Generating permutation matrix
rand('seed',key);
PRM = zeros([W_SZ,8]);
for c = 1:W_W
    for r = 1:W_H
        PRM(r,c,:) = randperm(8);
    end
end
%% Permuting the pixels of the watermark
PRM = PRM -1;
Wx = W * 0;
for l = 1:8
    M = uint8(ones(W_SZ));
    M = M  * 2 ^ (l-1);
    M = bitand(M,W);
    M = M  / 2 ^ (l-1);
    M = M  .* 2 .^ PRM(:,:,l);
    Wx = bitor(Wx,M);
end
W = Wx;
% Re-mapping back each group of pixels in 3x3 px block
% using maximum-distance mapping
% The positions of the groups are as follows:
%  3  1  2
%  2  3  1
%  1  2  3
dst = 6;
%% Re-mapping the third group of pixels diagonally
%% (vertically then horizontally)
W(1:3:end,1:3:end) = circshift(W(1:3:end,1:3:end),[W_H/dst,0]);
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W(2:3:end,2:3:end) = circshift(W(2:3:end,2:3:end),[W_H/dst,0]);
W(3:3:end,3:3:end) = circshift(W(3:3:end,3:3:end),[W_H/dst,0]);
W(1:3:end,1:3:end) = circshift(W(1:3:end,1:3:end),[0,W_W/dst]);
W(2:3:end,2:3:end) = circshift(W(2:3:end,2:3:end),[0,W_W/dst]);
W(3:3:end,3:3:end) = circshift(W(3:3:end,3:3:end),[0,W_W/dst]);
%% Re-mapping the second group of pixels vertically
W(2:3:end,1:3:end) = circshift(W(2:3:end,1:3:end),[W_H/dst,0]);
W(3:3:end,2:3:end) = circshift(W(3:3:end,2:3:end),[W_H/dst,0]);
W(1:3:end,3:3:end) = circshift(W(1:3:end,3:3:end),[W_H/dst,0]);
%% Re-mapping the first group of pixels horizontally
W(1:3:end,2:3:end) = circshift(W(1:3:end,2:3:end),[0,W_W/dst]);
W(2:3:end,3:3:end) = circshift(W(2:3:end,3:3:end),[0,W_W/dst]);
W(3:3:end,1:3:end) = circshift(W(3:3:end,1:3:end),[0,W_W/dst]);
% Taking average of 6 MSB of the image to compare it with W
and_msk = bin2dec('11111100');
I_del = bitand(I_in,and_msk);
W_tmp = I_del(1:2:end,1:2:end)/4 + ...
    I_del(1:2:end,2:2:end)/4 + ...
    I_del(2:2:end,1:2:end)/4 + ...
    I_del(2:2:end,2:2:end)/4;
W_tmp = bitand(W_tmp,and_msk);
% XOR the average with the watermark
W_diff = ((bitxor(W_tmp,bitand(W,and_msk)))>0)*255;
% Applying non-linear filter to remove non-tampered area
fun = @(x) (sum(x(:)) > 255*3); % more than 3 pixels are white
tmpr_W = nlfilter(W_diff,[3 3],fun);
tmpr_W = logical(tmpr_W);
% Generating validity matrix
vld_msk = logical(zeros(I_SZ));
vld_msk(1:2:end,1:2:end) = tmpr_W;
vld_msk(1:2:end,2:2:end) = tmpr_W;
vld_msk(2:2:end,1:2:end) = tmpr_W;
vld_msk(2:2:end,2:2:end) = tmpr_W;
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vld_msk = ~vld_msk;
% Generating recovery image by scaling up the watermark
I_rec = imresize(W,2,'linear');
% recovering the tampered area
I_fxd  = I_del;
I_fxd(~vld_msk)  = I_rec(~vld_msk);
% Recover the lost 2 LSBs in the image
I_fxd(vld_msk) = I_fxd(vld_msk) + 
bitand(I_rec(vld_msk),bin2dec('00000011'));
return
Page 162/209
Appendix C:The Implemented Code for the Third Proposed Technique
Appendix C: The Implemented Code for 
the Third Proposed 
Technique
Appendix  C  contains  a  list  of  the  implemented  code  for  the  third  proposed
technique, the code consists of two files: encode.m, and decode.m.
C.1: The Code for the Encoding Stage of the Third 
Proposed Technique
% function [I_enc]=encode(I_in,key)
%
% The encoding function of the third proposed technique
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function [I_enc]=encode(I_in,key)
I_SZ = size(I_in);
I_W = I_SZ(2);
I_H = I_SZ(1);
W_SZ = I_SZ/2;
W_W = W_SZ(2);
W_H = W_SZ(1);
if sum(mod(I_SZ,2)) ~= 0
    disp('Dimensions of the image must be multiple of 2');
    return
end
% Store the average 6 MSB of the input image in the watermark
and_msk = bin2dec('11111100');
I_del = bitand(I_in,and_msk);
W = I_del(1:2:end,1:2:end)/4 + ...
    I_del(1:2:end,2:2:end)/4 + ...
    I_del(2:2:end,1:2:end)/4 + ...
    I_del(2:2:end,2:2:end)/4;
W = bitand(W,and_msk);
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% Store the average 2 LSB of the input image in the watermark
and_msk = bin2dec('00000011');
I_tmp = bitand(I_in,and_msk);
W_tmp = I_tmp(1:2:end,1:2:end) + ...
        I_tmp(1:2:end,2:2:end) + ...
        I_tmp(2:2:end,1:2:end) + ...
        I_tmp(2:2:end,2:2:end);
W_tmp=W_tmp/4;
W_tmp = bitand(W_tmp,and_msk);
W = W+W_tmp;
% Mapping the watermark using maximum-distance
W = circshift(W,W_SZ/2);
% Randomly permuting the bits in each pixel in the watermark
% according to the secret key
%% Generating permutation matrix
rand('seed',key);
PRM = zeros([W_SZ,8]);
for c = 1:W_W
    for r = 1:W_H
        PRM(r,c,:) = randperm(8);
    end
end
%% permutating the pixels of the watermak
PRM = PRM -1;
Wx = W * 0;
for l = 1:8
    M = uint8(ones(W_SZ));
    M = M  .* 2 .^ PRM(:,:,l);
    M = bitand(M,W);
    M = M ./ 2 .^ PRM(:,:,l);
    M = M  * 2 ^ (l-1);
    Wx = bitor(Wx,M);
end
W = Wx;
% Encrypting the watermark by XORing it with a random sequence.
% Note: For simplicity, the randomisation depends only on the secret key.
%       However, to make the method resistive to VQ and collage attach
Page 164/209
Appendix C:The Implemented Code for the Third Proposed Technique
%       the randomisation should depend also on a unique serial
%       number for the watermarked image.
rand('seed',key)
seq = randi([0,255],W_SZ);
W = bitxor(W,seq);
% storing the watermark in the 2 LSB of the image
I_enc = I_del;
and_msk = bin2dec('00000011');
I_enc(1:2:end,1:2:end) = I_enc(1:2:end,1:2:end) + bitand(W,and_msk);
W = bitshift(W,-2);
I_enc(1:2:end,2:2:end) = I_enc(1:2:end,2:2:end) + bitand(W,and_msk);
W = bitshift(W,-2);
I_enc(2:2:end,1:2:end) = I_enc(2:2:end,1:2:end) + bitand(W,and_msk);
W = bitshift(W,-2);
I_enc(2:2:end,2:2:end) = I_enc(2:2:end,2:2:end) + bitand(W,and_msk);
return
C.2: The Code for the Decoding Stage of the Third 
Proposed Technique
% function [I_fxd,vld_msk,W_hfc]=decode(I_in,key)
%
% The decoding function of the third proposed technique
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function [I_fxd,vld_msk,W_hfc]=decode(I_in,key)
get_W_hfc = (nargout == 3); 
I_SZ = size(I_in);
I_W = I_SZ(2);
I_H = I_SZ(1);
W_SZ = I_SZ/2;
W_W = W_SZ(2);
W_H = W_SZ(1);
if sum(mod(I_SZ,2)) ~= 0
    disp('Dimensions of the image must be multiple of 2');
    return
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end
% retreive the watermark from the 2 LSB of the image
I_tmp = bitand(I_in,bin2dec('00000011'));
W = I_tmp(2:2:end,2:2:end);
W = bitshift(W,2);
W = W + I_tmp(2:2:end,1:2:end);
W = bitshift(W,2);
W = W + I_tmp(1:2:end,2:2:end);
W = bitshift(W,2);
W = W + I_tmp(1:2:end,1:2:end);
% Decrypting the watermark by XORing it with a random sequence.
% Note: For simplicity, the randomisation depends only on the secret key.
%       However, to make the method resistive to VQ and collage attach
%       the randomisation should depend also on a unique serial
%       number for the watermarked image.
rand('seed',key)
seq = randi([0,255],W_SZ);
W = bitxor(W,seq);
%% Randomly permuting back the bits in each pixel in the watermark
%% according the secret key
%% Generating permutation matrix
rand('seed',key);
PRM = zeros([W_SZ,8]);
for c = 1:W_W
    for r = 1:W_H
        PRM(r,c,:) = randperm(8);
    end
end
%% permutating the pixels of the watermak
PRM = PRM -1;
Wx = W * 0;
for l = 1:8
    M = uint8(ones(W_SZ));
    M = M  * 2 ^ (l-1);
    M = bitand(M,W);
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    M = M  / 2 ^ (l-1);
    M = M  .* 2 .^ PRM(:,:,l);
    Wx = bitor(Wx,M);
end
W = Wx;
% Mapping W using maximum-distance mapping
W = circshift(W,W_SZ/2);
% Taking average of 6 MSB of the image to compare it with W
and_msk = bin2dec('11111100');
I_del = bitand(I_in,and_msk);
W_tmp = I_del(1:2:end,1:2:end)/4 + ...
    I_del(1:2:end,2:2:end)/4 + ...
    I_del(2:2:end,1:2:end)/4 + ...
    I_del(2:2:end,2:2:end)/4;
W_tmp = bitand(W_tmp,and_msk);
% XOR the average with the watermark
tmpr_W = logical(bitxor(W_tmp,bitand(W,and_msk)));
% Defining the filter used for detecting high frequency contents
FLT_SZ = 5;
FLT_MAT = dctmtx(FLT_SZ);
MAT2=ones(FLT_SZ);
MAT2(1,:)=0;
MAT2(:,1)=0;
W_dbl = double(W);
% If W_hfc is requested, then it will be used in further calculations
if get_W_hfc
    fun = @(x) (sum(sum(abs( (FLT_MAT*x*FLT_MAT') .* MAT2))));
    W_hfc = nlfilter(W_dbl,[FLT_SZ FLT_SZ],fun);
    MAX = max(max(W_hfc));
    W_hfc=uint8(W_hfc/MAX*255);
else
    FLT_SZM = FLT_SZ-1;
    FLT_DF = FLT_SZM/2;    
    W_dbl = padarray(W_dbl,[FLT_DF,FLT_DF]);
end
% Determining which part of tmpr_W refer to a tampered area based on
% high-frequency-contents
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for r=1:W_H
    for c=1:W_W
        if tmpr_W(r,c)
        
            r2 = rem((r-1)+W_H/2,W_H)+1;
            c2 = rem((c-1)+W_W/2,W_W)+1;
            
            if get_W_hfc
                if W_hfc(r,c) < W_hfc(r2,c2)
                    tmpr_W (r,c) =true;
                    tmpr_W (r2,c2) = false;
                else
                    tmpr_W (r2,c2) = true;
                    tmpr_W (r,c) =false;
                end
            else
                tmp_mat = W_dbl(r:r+FLT_SZM,c:c+FLT_SZM);
                hfc1 = sum(sum(abs(FLT_MAT*tmp_mat*FLT_MAT') .* MAT2));
                tmp_mat = W_dbl(r2:r2+FLT_SZM,c2:c2+FLT_SZM);
                hfc2 = sum(sum(abs(FLT_MAT*tmp_mat*FLT_MAT') .* MAT2));  
            
                if hfc1 < hfc2
                    tmpr_W (r,c) =true;
                    tmpr_W (r2,c2) = false;
                else
                    tmpr_W (r2,c2) = true;
                    tmpr_W (r,c) =false;
                end
            end
        end
    end
end
% Generating validity matrix
vld_msk = logical(zeros(I_SZ));
vld_msk(1:2:end,1:2:end) = tmpr_W;
vld_msk(1:2:end,2:2:end) = tmpr_W;
vld_msk(2:2:end,1:2:end) = tmpr_W;
vld_msk(2:2:end,2:2:end) = tmpr_W;
vld_msk = ~vld_msk;
% Generating recovery image by scaling up the watermark
I_rec = imresize(W,2,'linear');
% recovering the tampered area
I_fxd  = I_del;
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I_fxd(~vld_msk)  = I_rec(~vld_msk);
% Recover the lost 2 LSBs in the image
I_fxd(vld_msk) = I_fxd(vld_msk) + 
bitand(I_rec(vld_msk),bin2dec('00000011'));
return
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Appendix D: The Implemented Code for 
the Fourth Proposed 
Technique
Appendix  D  contains  a  list  of  the  implemented  code  for  the  fourth  proposed
technique. The main two functions in encode.m and decode.m call the functions
in  the  files:  blk2dct.m,  crc16.m,  dct2blk.m,  mat2zig.m,  set_global.m,  and
zig2mat.m.  The file  set_global.m must be called before calling the  encode.m
and decode.m files in order to set the global variables used by them.
D.1: The Code for the Encoding Stage of the Fourth 
Proposed Technique
% function I_enc=encode(I_in,key)
%
% The encoding function for the fourth proposed technique.
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function I_enc=encode(I_in,key)
[I_H,I_W] = size(I_in);
I_SZ = [I_H,I_W];
if sum(mod(I_SZ,8)) ~= 0
    disp('Dimensions of the image must be multiple of 8');
    return
end
global PRM64;
% Initialise the encoded image
I_enc = bitand(I_in,bin2dec('11111100'));
% Generate mapped image using maximum-distance mapping
I_map = circshift(I_enc,I_SZ/2);
for r=1:8:I_H
    for c=1:8:I_W
        W_dct = blk2dct(I_map(r:r+7,c:c+7));
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        W_crc = crc16([I_enc(r:r+7,c:c+7)(:);W_dct(:)]);
        W_crc = uint8([bitshift(W_crc,-8),bitand(W_crc,255)]);
        
        % Concatinating DCT recovery bytes and CRC16 authentication bytes
        W_tmp = [W_dct(:);W_crc(:)];
        W_tmp = reshape(W_tmp,[4,4]);
        
        % Encrypting the watermark by XORing it with a random sequence.
        %
        % Note: The randomisation seed changes with the block number
        % in order to prevent using any block in the image to replace
        % another one. However, the randomisation should depend also 
        % on a unique serial number for the image to prevent using 
        % a bock from anther image to replace a block  that has the same
        % block number if the two images are using the same secret key.
        SD = key * 10^9 + r * 10^5 + c;
        
        rand('seed',SD);
        seq  = uint8(randi([0,255],[4,4]));
        W_tmp = bitxor(W_tmp,seq);
        
        % Storing the watermark into 2 LSB of 8x8 block
        W_blk = zeros(8,8);
        and_msk = bin2dec('00000011');
        W_blk(1:2:end,1:2:end) = bitand(W_tmp,and_msk);
        W_tmp = bitshift(W_tmp,-2);
        
        W_blk(1:2:end,2:2:end) = bitand(W_tmp,and_msk);
        W_tmp = bitshift(W_tmp,-2);
        
        W_blk(2:2:end,1:2:end) = bitand(W_tmp,and_msk);
        W_tmp = bitshift(W_tmp,-2);
        
        W_blk(2:2:end,2:2:end) = bitand(W_tmp,and_msk);
        
        % Randomly permuting W_blk
        W_blk = W_blk(PRM64);
    
        % Storing the watermark in the encoded image
        I_enc(r:r+7,c:c+7) = I_enc(r:r+7,c:c+7) + W_blk;
    end
end
return
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D.2: The Code for the Decoding Stage of the Fourth 
Proposed Technique
% function [I_fxd,vld_msk]=decode(I_in,key)
%
% The decoding function for the fourth proposed technique.
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function [I_fxd,vld_msk]=decode(I_in,key)
[I_H,I_W] = size(I_in);
I_SZ = [I_H,I_W];
if sum(mod(I_SZ,8)) ~= 0
    disp('Dimensions of the image must be multiple of 8');
    return
end
global XPRM64;
% Initialise the validity matrix
vld_msk = logical(zeros(I_SZ));
% Generating a matrix to store DCT recovery data
wdct_map = -1*ones(I_SZ);
% Initialise the decoded image
I_fxd = bitand(I_in,bin2dec('11111100'));
% Validating image blocks
for r=1:8:I_H
    for c=1:8:I_W
        % Getting the watermark from 2 LSB of I_blk
        W_blk = bitand(I_in(r:r+7,c:c+7),bin2dec('00000011'));
        
        % Randomly permute W_blk to the original position
        W_blk = W_blk(XPRM64);
        % Converting the watermark into bytes
        W_tmp = W_blk(2:2:end,2:2:end);
        
        W_tmp = bitshift(W_tmp,2);
        W_tmp = W_tmp + W_blk(2:2:end,1:2:end);
        
        W_tmp = bitshift(W_tmp,2);
Page 172/209
Appendix D:The Implemented Code for the Fourth Proposed Technique
        W_tmp = W_tmp + W_blk(1:2:end,2:2:end);
        
        W_tmp = bitshift(W_tmp,2);
        W_tmp = W_tmp + W_blk(1:2:end,1:2:end);
        
        % Decrypting the watermark by XORing it with a random sequence.
        %
        % Note: The randomisation seed changes with the block number
        % in order to prevent using any block in the image to replace
        % another one. However, the randomisation should depend also 
        % on a unique serial number for the image to prevent using 
        % a bock from anther image to replace a block  that has the same
        % block number if the two images are using the same secret key.
        SD = key * 10^9 + r * 10^5 + c;
        rand('seed',SD);
        seq  = uint8(randi([0,255],[4,4]));
        W_tmp = bitxor(W_tmp,seq);
        
        % Getting the DCT recovery bytes 
        W_dct = W_tmp(1:14);
        
        % Getting the CRC16 bytes from the watermark
        W_crc = W_tmp(15:16);
        
        % Converting W_crc into 16 bit number
        W_crc=uint16(W_crc);
        W_crc = bitshift(W_crc(1),8)+W_crc(2);
        % Generating authentication bytes of the current
        % block and current DCT bytes
        I_crc = crc16([I_fxd(r:r+7,c:c+7)(:);W_dct(:)]);
        
        % Validating the current block
        
        if I_crc == W_crc
            vld_msk(r:r+7,c:c+7) = true;
            wdct_map(r:r+3,c:c+3) = W_tmp;
        end
    end
end
% Mapping the recovery matrix
wdct_map=circshift(wdct_map,I_SZ/2);
% Recovering the tampered blocks
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for r=1:8:I_H
    for c=1:8:I_W
        if ~vld_msk(r,c)
            if wdct_map(r,c) >= 0
                W_dct = wdct_map(r:r+3,c:c+3);
                W_dct = W_dct(1:14);
                W_blk = dct2blk(W_dct);
                I_fxd(r:r+7,c:c+7) = W_blk;
            end
        end
    end
end
return
D.3: The Code in the File blk2dct.m
% function lsb_out = blk2dct(blk_in)
%
% Converts 8x8 px block to DCT coefficients and store them in 14 bytes.
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function lsb_out = blk2dct(blk_in)
global PRM64;
global Q
global BT_NUM
global LN
global DCT_MAT
global BT_LUT
global M2ZGZG64
global MAX_LEVEL
% Finding DCT coefficients
dct_blk = DCT_MAT*double(blk_in)*DCT_MAT';
% Quantising DCT coefficients
dct_blk = round(dct_blk ./ Q);
% Converting DCT block to a zigzag sequence
z_seq  = dct_blk(M2ZGZG64);
% Matching the size of z_seq to the size of BT_NUM
z_seq=z_seq(1:LN);
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% Shifting negative values of DCT coefficients
z_seq(2:LN) = z_seq(2:LN) + 2 .^ (BT_NUM(2:LN) -1);
% Adjusting the levels of the the DCT coefficients 
z_seq(z_seq<0) = 0;
indx =z_seq > MAX_LEVEL; 
z_seq(indx) = MAX_LEVEL(indx);
% Converting z_seq into a bit stream
% Look up table reduced the time dramatically
b_stream = [''];
for n = 1:LN
    b = BT_LUT(z_seq(n)+1,:);
    b = b(9-BT_NUM(n):end);
    b_stream = [b_stream,b];
end
% Converting the bit stream into 14 bytes
lsb_out = bin2dec(reshape(b_stream,[14,8]));
return
D.4: The Code in the File crc16.m
% function crc = crc16 (data, create)
% 
% Returns 16-bit Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) for input data.
% The CRC table will be recreated if 'create' string is provided
% after the input data.
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function crc = crc16 (data, create)
if nargin ==1
    create = 'no';
end 
global CRC16TBL;
pol = uint16(0x1021); % Generator polynomial
crc = uint16(0xFFFF); % Initial value of CRC16
ref_in = false; % Should input data be reflected or not
ref_out = false; % Should the output value of CRC16 be reflected or not
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xor_out = 0x0000; % Value to be XORed with the final value of CRC16
% Create CRC16TBL if it does not exist
if isempty(CRC16TBL) || strcmpi(create,'create')
    CRC16TBL = uint16(zeros(1,256));
    for n = 0:255
        reg = uint16(n) * 0x0100;
        for i  = 1:8
            bt = bitget(reg,16);
            reg = bitshift(reg,1);
                if bt
                    reg = bitxor(reg,pol);
                end
        end
        CRC16TBL(n+1) = reg;
    end
end
for n = 1:length(data)
    XR1 = uint8(bitshift(crc,-8));
    crc_index  = data(n);
    if ref_in
        crc_index = bin2dec(fliplr(dec2bin(crc_index,8)));
    end
    crc_index = bitxor(crc_index,XR1);
    XR2 = mod(bitshift(crc,8),0x10000);
    crc = CRC16TBL(crc_index+1);
    crc = bitxor(crc,XR2);
end
if ref_out
    crc = bin2dec(fliplr(dec2bin(crc,16)));
end
crc = bitxor(crc,xor_out);
return
D.5: The Code in the File dct2blk.m
% function blk_out = dct2blk(lsb_in)
%
% Converts the DCT coefficients stored in 14 bytes into
% 8x8 px block.
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
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function blk_out = dct2blk(lsb_in)
global PRM64;
global Q
global BT_NUM
global LN
global DCT_MAT
global ZGZG2M64
% Converting lsb_in to a bit stream
b_stream =(dec2bin(lsb_in(:),8));
b_stream = b_stream(:)';
% Getting DCT coefficients from the bit stream
z_seq=zeros(1,LN);
indx = 1;
% Break the bit stream according to BT_NUM
z_seq=char([]);
indx=1;
for n = 1:LN
    z_seq = [z_seq;b_stream(indx:indx+BT_NUM(n)-1)];
    indx = indx+BT_NUM(n);
end
% Converting bit steam into decimal
z_seq = bin2dec(z_seq)';
% Shifting AC coefficients
z_seq(2:LN) = z_seq(2:LN) - 2 .^ (BT_NUM(2:LN) -1);
% Expanding z_seq length to 64
z_seq=[z_seq,zeros(1,64-LN)];
% Converting zigzag sequence into matrix
dct_blk = z_seq(ZGZG2M64);
% Dequantising DCT coefficients
dct_blk = dct_blk .* Q;
% Finding inverse DCT coefficients
blk_out = DCT_MAT'*dct_blk*DCT_MAT;
return
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D.6: The Code in the File mat2zig.m
% function zig = mat2zig(mat)
%
% Converts a square matrix into zigzag order.
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function zig = mat2zig(mat)
SZ = sqrt(length(mat(:)));
if mod(SZ,1) ~= 0
    disp('Input matrix must be square.');
    error;
end
mat=reshape(mat,[SZ,SZ]);
SZ = SZ(1);
zig = zeros(1,SZ^2);
inc_r = 1; % row increment
inc_c = -1; % columnt increment
indx = 1;
r = 1;
c = 1;
while 1
    zig(indx) = mat(r,c);
    indx=indx+1;
    r=r+inc_r;
    c=c+inc_c;
    if r < 1
        r = 1;
        inc_r = inc_r * -1;
        inc_c = inc_c * -1;
    end
    if c < 1
        c = 1;
        inc_r = inc_r * -1;
        inc_c = inc_c * -1;
    end
    if (r > SZ) || (c > SZ)
        break
    end
end
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while 1
    r=r+inc_r;
    c=c+inc_c;
    if r > SZ
        r = SZ;
        c = c+2;
        inc_r = inc_r * -1;
        inc_c = inc_c * -1;
    end
    if c > SZ
        c = SZ;
        r=r+2;
        inc_r = inc_r * -1;
        inc_c = inc_c * -1;
    end
    zig(indx) = mat(r,c);
    indx=indx+1;
    if (r == SZ) && (c == SZ)
        break;
    end
end
return
D.7: The Code in the File set_global.m
% function set_global(key)
%
% Initiates the global variables needed for the encoding
% and the decoding functions of the fourth proposed technique.
% This function must be called before calling
% the files encode.m and decode.m .
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function set_global(key)
global PRM64;
global XPRM64;
global Q
global BT_NUM
global LN
global DCT_MAT
global BT_LUT
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global M2ZGZG64
global ZGZG2M64
global CRC16TBL
global MAX_LEVEL
% Generating permutation matrices 
rand('seed',key);
PRM64 = randperm(64);
XPRM64 = [PRM64;[1:64]]';
XPRM64 = sortrows(XPRM64)';
XPRM64 = XPRM64(2,:);
PRM64 = reshape(PRM64,[8,8]);
XPRM64 = reshape(XPRM64,[8,8]);
% Quantisation matrix (Luminance Quantisation table for Jpeg)
Q = [16 11 10 16 24 40 51 61;   ...    
     12 12 14 19 26 58 60 55;   ...    
     14 13 16 24 40 57 69 56;   ...
     14 17 22 29 51 87 80 62;   ...
     18 22 37 56 68 109 103 77;  ...
     24 35 55 64 81 104 113 92;  ...
     49 64 78 87 103 121 120 101;  ...
     72 92 95 98 112 100 103 99];
% Defining number of bits assigned for each coefficient
% bt_num_64 =  [8,[7,7],[6,6,6],[6,6,6,6]];
BT_NUM =  [8,[7,7],[6,6,6],[1:4]*0+5,[1:5]*0+4,[1:6]*0+3,[1:7]*0+2];
LN = length(BT_NUM);
MAX_LEVEL = ((2 .^ BT_NUM) -1);    
DCT_MAT = dctmtx(8);
% Generatign look-up-table for binary values of
% the numbers from 0 to 255
BT_LUT = dec2bin([0:255]',8);
% Generating zigzag sequence for 8x8 matrix
M2ZGZG64 = mat2zig([1:64]);
ZGZG2M64  = zig2mat([1:64]);
% Calling crc16 function to create CRC16TBL 
crc16(0,'create');
return
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D.8: The Code in the File blk2dct.m
% function mat = zig2mat(zig)
%
% Converts a zigzag sequence into a square matrix.
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function mat = zig2mat(zig)
SZ = sqrt(length(zig));
if mod(SZ,1) ~= 0
    disp('Zigzag sequence length must have integer square root');
    error;
end
mat = zeros(SZ);
inc_r = 1; % row increment
inc_c = -1; % columnt increment
indx = 1;
r = 1;
c = 1;
while 1
    mat (r,c) = zig(indx);
    indx=indx+1;
    r=r+inc_r;
    c=c+inc_c;
    if r < 1
        r = 1;
        inc_r = inc_r * -1;
        inc_c = inc_c * -1;
    end
    if c < 1
        c = 1;
        inc_r = inc_r * -1;
        inc_c = inc_c * -1;
    end
    if (r > SZ) || (c > SZ)
        break
    end
end
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while 1
    r=r+inc_r;
    c=c+inc_c;
    
    if r > SZ
        r = SZ;
        c = c+2;
        inc_r = inc_r * -1;
        inc_c = inc_c * -1;
    end
    if c > SZ
        c = SZ;
        r=r+2;
        inc_r = inc_r * -1;
        inc_c = inc_c * -1;
    end
    mat(r,c) = zig(indx);
    indx=indx+1;
    if (r == SZ) && (c == SZ)
        break;
    end
end
return
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Appendix E: The Implemented Code for 
Tong's Technique
Appendix E contains a list of the implemented code for the Tong's technique. The
main  two  functions  in  encode.m and  decode.m call  the  function  in  the  file:
blk_map.m.
E.1: The Code for the Encoding Stage of Tong's 
Technique
% function [I_enc]=encode(I_in)
%
% The encoding function for Tong et al. technique (2013).
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function [I_enc]=encode(I_in)
I_SZ = size(I_in);
I_H = I_SZ(1);
I_W = I_SZ(2);
W_SZ =I_SZ/2;
W_H = W_SZ(1);
W_W = W_SZ(2);
if sum(mod(I_SZ,4)) ~= 0
disp('Dimensions of the image must be multiple of 4');
return
end
% Set 3 LSBs in the input image to 0
I_del = bitand(I_in,bin2dec('11111000'));
% generating the recovery bits which are 5 MSBs of the average of
% 2x2 px blocks in the input image
W1 = I_del(1:2:end,1:2:end)/4+I_del(1:2:end,2:2:end)/4+ ...
     I_del(2:2:end,1:2:end)/4+I_del(2:2:end,2:2:end)/4;
W1 = bitand(W1,bin2dec('11111000'));
% Shifting the bits of the watermark
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W1 = bitshift(W1,-2);
% Shuffling (i.e. confusing) the recovery bits
[R_map,C_map] = blk_map(W_SZ);
% To enhance Shuffling, it is repeated once
for count = 1:2
for r = 1:W_H
W1(r,:)=circshift(W1(r,:),[0,R_map(r)]);
end
for c = 1:W_W
W1(:,c)=circshift(W1(:,c),[C_map(c),0]);
end
end
% Make a copy of the recovery bits and apply
% maximum-distance mapping on it.
W2 = circshift(W1,W_SZ/2);
% Count the number of on-bits (i.e. bit = 1) in each 2x2 px block
% in the encoded image
% Construct a look-up-table for the number of on-bits in a number
LUT = sum(dec2bin(0:255)-'0',2)';
bit_cnt = LUT(I_del(1:2:end,1:2:end)+1);
bit_cnt = bit_cnt+LUT(I_del(1:2:end,2:2:end)+1);
bit_cnt = bit_cnt+LUT(I_del(2:2:end,1:2:end)+1);
bit_cnt = bit_cnt+LUT(I_del(2:2:end,2:2:end)+1);
% Adding the on-bit count of the recovery bits
bit_cnt = bit_cnt +LUT(W1+1);
bit_cnt = bit_cnt +LUT(W2+1);
% Finding the first localisation (i.e. detection) bit 
P1 = mod(bit_cnt,2);
% Storing the first localisation bit
W1 = W1 + P1;
% Finding the second localisation (i.e. detection) bit 
P2 = ~P1;
% Storing the second localisation bit
W2 = W2 + P2;
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% Storing the watermark data
I_enc = bitand(I_in,bin2dec('11111000'));
and_msk = bin2dec('00000111');
I_enc(1:2:end,1:2:end) = I_enc(1:2:end,1:2:end) + bitand(W1,and_msk);
W1 = bitshift(W1,-3);
I_enc(1:2:end,2:2:end) = I_enc(1:2:end,2:2:end) + bitand(W1,and_msk);
I_enc(2:2:end,1:2:end) = I_enc(2:2:end,1:2:end) + bitand(W2,and_msk);
W2 = bitshift(W2,-3);
I_enc(2:2:end,2:2:end) = I_enc(2:2:end,2:2:end) + bitand(W2,and_msk);
return
E.2: The Code for the Decoding Stage of Tong's 
Technique
% function [I_fxd,vld_msk]=decode(I_in)
%
% The decoding function for Tong et al. technique (2013).
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function [I_fxd,vld_msk]=decode(I_in)
I_SZ = size(I_in);
I_H = I_SZ(1);
I_W = I_SZ(2);
W_SZ =I_SZ/2;
W_H = W_SZ(1);
W_W = W_SZ(2);
if sum(mod(I_SZ,4)) ~= 0
    disp('The dimensions of the input image must be multiple of 4');
    return
end
% Getting the watermark data
I_tmp = bitand(I_in, bin2dec('00000111'));
W1 = I_tmp(1:2:end,2:2:end);
W1 = bitshift(W1,3);
W1 = W1 + I_tmp(1:2:end,1:2:end);
W2 = I_tmp(2:2:end,2:2:end);
W2 = bitshift(W2,3);
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W2 = W2 + I_tmp(2:2:end,1:2:end);
% Getting the first localisation (i.e. detection) bit 
P1 = bitand(W1,bin2dec('00000001'));
% Getting the second localisation (i.e. detection) bit 
P2 = bitand(W2,bin2dec('00000001'));
% Setting the localisation bits in the watermark to 0
W1=bitand(W1,bin2dec('00111110'));
W2=bitand(W2,bin2dec('00111110'));
% Shifting the bits in W1 and W2
W1 = bitshift(W1,2);
W2 = bitshift(W2,2);
% Count the number of on-bits (i.e. bit = 1) in each 2x2 px block
% in the encoded image
% Construct a look-up-table for the number of on-bits in a number
I_del=bitand(I_in,bin2dec('11111000'));
LUT = sum(dec2bin(0:255)-'0',2)';
bit_cnt = LUT(I_del(1:2:end,1:2:end)+1);
bit_cnt = bit_cnt+LUT(I_del(1:2:end,2:2:end)+1);
bit_cnt = bit_cnt+LUT(I_del(2:2:end,1:2:end)+1);
bit_cnt = bit_cnt+LUT(I_del(2:2:end,2:2:end)+1);
% Adding the on-bit count of the recovery bits
bit_cnt = bit_cnt +LUT(W1+1);
bit_cnt = bit_cnt +LUT(W2+1);
% Finding the first localisation (i.e. detection) bit for the input-image
blocks
P1x = mod(bit_cnt,2);
% Finding the second localisation (i.e. detection) bit for the input-
image blocks
P2x = ~P1x;
% Generate a matrix that determine the validity of the input-image blocks
vld = (P1==P1x) & (P2==P2x);
% Marking the invalid blocks in the W1 and W2 by storing -1 in them
W1 = double(W1);
W2 = double(W2);
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W1(~vld) = -1000;
W2(~vld) = -1000;
% Remappig W2 using maximum-distance mappign
W2 = circshift(W2,W_SZ/2);
% Shuffling back the recovery bits in W1 and W2
[R_map,C_map] = blk_map(W_SZ);
% To enhance Shuffling, it is repeated once
for count = 1:2
    for c = 1:W_W
        W1(:,c)=circshift(W1(:,c),[-C_map(c),0]);
        W2(:,c)=circshift(W2(:,c),[-C_map(c),0]);
    end
    
    for r = 1:W_H
        W1(r,:)=circshift(W1(r,:),[0,-R_map(r)]);
        W2(r,:)=circshift(W2(r,:),[0,-R_map(r)]);
    end
end
% recovering the tampered blocks
I_fxd = bitand(I_in,bin2dec('11111000'));
for r=1:W_H
    for c=1:W_W
        if ~vld(r,c)
            if W1(r,c)>=0
                r1 = (r-1)*2 + 1;
                r2 = r1+1;
                c1 = (c-1)*2 + 1;
                c2 = c1+1;
                
                I_fxd(r1:r2,c1:c2) = W1(r,c);
            elseif W2(r,c)>=0
                r1 = (r-1)*2 + 1;
                r2 = r1+1;
                c1 = (c-1)*2 + 1;
                c2 = c1+1;
                
                I_fxd(r1:r2,c1:c2) = W2(r,c);
            end
        end
    end
end
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% generating the validation mask matrix
vld_msk =  logical(zeros(I_SZ));
vld_msk(1:2:end,1:2:end) = vld;
vld_msk(1:2:end,2:2:end) = vld;
vld_msk(2:2:end,1:2:end) = vld;
vld_msk(2:2:end,2:2:end) = vld;
return
E.3: The Code in the File blk_map.m
% function [R_map,C_map]=blk_map(I_SZ)
%
% The function returns the values that are used to confuse
% the encoded image, the confusing is done by circular rotation
% of the rows and the columns of the image.
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function [R_map,C_map]=blk_map(I_SZ)
% The width and height of the image
I_H = I_SZ(1);
I_W = I_SZ(2);
% The initial value (x0,y0) and the number of iterations (itr)
% are considered as the secret key.
x0 = 0.1;  % This is the value selected in the paper
y0 = 0.3;  % This is the value selected in the paper
itr = I_H; % As in the paper, the iteration number is the same 
           % as the image size.
% Initializing row and column shuffling matrices
max_SZ = max([I_H,I_W]);
R_map = zeros([1,max_SZ]);
C_map = zeros([1,max_SZ]);
% Initialising the chaotic sequence
for n  = 1:itr
    x1 = 1 - 2 * y0^2;
    y1 = cos(6 * acos(x0));
    x0=x1;
    y0=y1;
end
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for count  = 1:max_SZ
    x0=x1;
    y0=y1;
    
    x1 = 1 - 2 * y0^2;
    y1 = cos(6 * acos(x0));
    x=x1;
    x=x*10^10;
    x=abs(floor(x));
    x=mod(x,I_W);
    y=y1;
    y=y*10^10;
    y=abs(floor(y));
    y=mod(y,I_H);
    R_map(count) = y;
    C_map(count) = x;
end
R_map = R_map(1:I_H);
C_map = C_map(1:I_W);
return
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Appendix F: The Implemented Code for 
Dadkhah's Technique
Appendix F contains a list of the implemented code for the Dadkhah's technique.
The main two functions in encode.m and decode.m call the functions in the files:
blk_map.m, loc_bits.m, and set_global.m. The file set_global.m must be called
before  calling  the  encode.m and  decode.m files  in  order  to  set  the  global
variables used by them.
F.1: The Code for the Encoding Stage of Dadkhah's 
Technique
% function [I_enc]=encode(I_in,key)
%
% The encoding function for Dadkhah et al. technique (2014).
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function [I_enc]=encode(I_in,key)
I_SZ = size(I_in);
I_H = I_SZ(1);
I_W = I_SZ(2);
W_SZ =I_SZ/2;
W=uint8(zeros(W_SZ));
W_H = W_SZ(1);
W_W = W_SZ(2);
if sum(mod(I_SZ,8)) ~= 0
    disp('Dimensions of the image must be multiple of 8');
    return
end
I_enc = bitand(I_in,bin2dec('11111100'));
N = (I_W*I_H)/(4*4);
map = blk_map(N,key);
blk_num = 0;
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for r = 1:4:I_H
    for c = 1:4:I_W
    
        blk_num=blk_num+1;
        
        blk1 = I_enc(r:r+1,c:c+1);
        blk2 = I_enc(r:r+1,c+2:c+3);
        blk3 = I_enc(r+2:r+3,c:c+1);
        blk4 = I_enc(r+2:r+3,c+2:c+3);
        
        % generating localisation bits and storing them in a matrix
        loc_bts = [loc_bits(blk1),loc_bits(blk2); loc_bits(blk3), ...
        loc_bits(blk4)];
        
        % finding the row and column numbers for current block
        % in the watermark
        rw = floor((r-1)/2) + 1;
        cw = floor((c-1)/2) + 1;
        
        % storing the localisation bits in the current block
        % in the watermark
        W(rw:rw+1,cw:cw+1) = W(rw:rw+1,cw:cw+1)+ loc_bts;
        
        % finding the recovery bits of the current block
        % recoery bits are 5 MSBs of the average of each 2x2 px block
        and_msk = bin2dec('11111000');
        rec_bts1 = bitand(round(sum(sum(blk1))/4),and_msk);
        rec_bts2 = bitand(round(sum(sum(blk2))/4),and_msk);
        rec_bts3 = bitand(round(sum(sum(blk3))/4),and_msk);
        rec_bts4 = bitand(round(sum(sum(blk4))/4),and_msk);
        % finding the row and column numbers for destination block
        % in the watermark
        rwd = (floor((map(blk_num)-1)/(W_W/2)) * 2) +1;
        cwd = (mod((map(blk_num)-1),(W_W/2)) * 2) +1;
        
        % store the localisation bits in a matrix
        rec_bts = [rec_bts1,rec_bts2; rec_bts3, rec_bts4];
        
        % storing the recovery bits in the destination block
        % in the watermark
        W(rwd:rwd+1,cwd:cwd+1) = W(rwd:rwd+1,cwd:cwd+1)+ rec_bts;
    end
end
% encrypting the watermark by by XORing it with a random sequence
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% In the paper, the random sequence depends also on block number
% However, for simplicity the random sequence in the code
% depends only on the secret key.
rand('seed',key)
seq = randi([0,255],[W_H,W_W]);
W = bitxor(W,seq);
% embedding the watermark in 2 LSBs of the image
and_msk = bin2dec('00000011');
I_enc(1:2:end,1:2:end) = I_enc(1:2:end,1:2:end) + bitand(W,and_msk);
W = bitshift(W,-2);
I_enc(1:2:end,2:2:end) = I_enc(1:2:end,2:2:end) + bitand(W,and_msk);
W = bitshift(W,-2);
I_enc(2:2:end,1:2:end) = I_enc(2:2:end,1:2:end) + bitand(W,and_msk);
W = bitshift(W,-2);
I_enc(2:2:end,2:2:end) = I_enc(2:2:end,2:2:end) + bitand(W,and_msk);
return
F.2: The Code for the Decoding Stage of Dadkhah's 
Technique
% function [I_fxd,vld_msk,rec_fail]=decode(I_in,key)
%
% The decoding function for Dadkhah et al. technique (2014)
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function [I_fxd,vld_msk,rec_fail]=decode(I_in,key)
I_SZ = size(I_in);
I_H = I_SZ(1);
I_W = I_SZ(2);
W_SZ =I_SZ/2;
W=uint8(zeros(W_SZ));
W_H = W_SZ(1);
W_W = W_SZ(2);
if sum(mod(I_SZ,8)) ~= 0
    disp('Dimensions of the image must be multiple of 8');
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    return
end
% retreive the watermark from the 2 LSB of the image
and_msk = bin2dec('00000011');
I_tmp = bitand(I_in,and_msk);
W = W+I_tmp(2:2:end,2:2:end);
W = bitshift(W,2);
W = W+I_tmp(2:2:end,1:2:end);
W = bitshift(W,2);
W = W+I_tmp(1:2:end,2:2:end);
W = bitshift(W,2);
W = W+I_tmp(1:2:end,1:2:end);
% encrypting the watermark by by XORing it with a random sequence
% In the paper, the random sequence depends also on block number
% However, for simplicity the random sequence in the code
% depends only on the secret key.
rand('seed', key);
seq = randi([0,255],[W_H,W_W]);
W = bitxor(W,seq);
% Setting 2 LSBs in the input image to 0
I_tmp = bitand(I_in,bin2dec('11111100'));
N = (I_W*I_H)/(4*4);
map = blk_map(N,key);
% Note: the authentication process is done for all of 4x4 px blocks
% i.e.: if any 2x2 block is tampered then all 4x4 block is tampered
% performing first level authentication which depends on the
% localisation bits that are stored in eachblock, -1 is stored
% in the watermark block if it is tampered
blk_num = 0;
% vld is block validation matrix, tampered blocks = 0
vld = logical(zeros(W_SZ)); 
for r = 1:4:I_H
    for c = 1:4:I_W
    
        blk_num=blk_num+1;
        
        % getting the 2x2 px blocks from the input image
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        blk1 = I_tmp(r:r+1,c:c+1);
        blk2 = I_tmp(r:r+1,c+2:c+3);
        blk3 = I_tmp(r+2:r+3,c:c+1);
        blk4 = I_tmp(r+2:r+3,c+2:c+3);
        
        % generating localisation bits and storing them in a matrix
        loc_bts = [loc_bits(blk1),loc_bits(blk2); loc_bits(blk3), ...
        loc_bits(blk4)];
        % finding the row and column numbers for current block
        % in the watermark
        rw = floor((r-1)/2) + 1;
        cw = floor((c-1)/2) + 1;
        
        % getting the localisation bits matrix from the watermark
        wloc_bts = W(rw:rw+1,cw:cw+1);
        wloc_bts = bitand(wloc_bts,bin2dec('00000111'));
        
        % Compare generated loacalisation bit to the localisation bits
        % in the watermark.
        
        vld(rw:rw+1,cw:cw+1) = min(min(wloc_bts == loc_bts));
    end
end
blk_num = 0;
% Second level authentication based on recovery bits matching
for r = 1:4:I_H
    for c = 1:4:I_W
        
        blk_num=blk_num+1;
        
        % finding the row and column numbers for current block
        % in the watermark
        rw = floor((r-1)/2) + 1;
        cw = floor((c-1)/2) + 1;
        
        % Skip if the current 4x4 px block is tampered
        if ~vld(rw,cw)  
            continue;
        end
        % Finding row and column numbers for the destination block
        % in the watermark
        rwd = (floor((map(blk_num)-1)/(W_W/2)) * 2) +1;
        cwd = (mod((map(blk_num)-1),(W_W/2)) * 2) +1;
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        % Skip if the destination block is tampered
        if ~vld(rwd,cwd)
            continue;
        end
        
        % Check if the recovery bits stored in the destination block are
        % equal to the generated ones for the current block.
        
        % Getting the 2x2 px blocks from the input image
        blk1 = I_tmp(r:r+1,c:c+1);
        blk2 = I_tmp(r:r+1,c+2:c+3);
        blk3 = I_tmp(r+2:r+3,c:c+1);
        blk4 = I_tmp(r+2:r+3,c+2:c+3);
        % Finding the recovery bits of the current block.
        % Recoery bits are 5 MSBs of the average of each 2x2 px block.
        and_msk = bin2dec('11111000');
        rec_bts1 = bitand(round(sum(sum(blk1))/4),and_msk);
        rec_bts2 = bitand(round(sum(sum(blk2))/4),and_msk);
        rec_bts3 = bitand(round(sum(sum(blk3))/4),and_msk);
        rec_bts4 = bitand(round(sum(sum(blk4))/4),and_msk);
    
        % Store the localisation bits of the current block in a matrix.
        rec_bts = [rec_bts1,rec_bts2; rec_bts3, rec_bts4];
                
        % Getting the recovery bits from the watermark in
        % the destination block.
        wrec_bts = bitand(W(rwd:rwd+1,cwd:cwd+1),bin2dec('11111000'));
        % Compare the generated recovery bits to the stored ones.
        vld(rw:rw+1,cw:cw+1) = min(min(wrec_bts == rec_bts));
    end
end
% Generating a matrix to indicate block-recovery failure
rec_fail = logical(zeros(I_SZ));
% Recovering Tampered blocks
I_fxd=bitand(I_in,bin2dec('11111100'));
blk_num = 0;
% Second level authentication based on recovery bits matching
for r = 1:4:I_H
    for c = 1:4:I_W
    
        blk_num=blk_num+1;
        
        % finding the row and column numbers for current block
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        % in the watermark
        rw = floor((r-1)/2) + 1;
        cw = floor((c-1)/2) + 1;
        
        
        % Skip if the current 4x4 px block is not tampered
        if vld(rw,cw)
            continue;
        end
        % Finding row and column numbers for the destination block
        % in the watermark
        rwd = (floor((map(blk_num)-1)/(W_W/2)) * 2) +1;
        cwd = (mod((map(blk_num)-1),(W_W/2)) * 2) +1;
        
        % Skip if the destination block is tampered and update
        % failure matrix
        if ~vld(rwd,cwd)
            rec_fail(r:r+3,c:c+3) = true;
            continue;
        end
        % Getting the recovery bits from the watermark in the
        % destination block.
        wrec_bts = bitand(W(rwd:rwd+1,cwd:cwd+1),bin2dec('11111000'));
        
        % Recover the tampered block
        I_fxd(r:r+3,c:c+3) = imresize(wrec_bts,2,'linear');
    end
end
% generating the validatoin mask matrix by resizing the validation matrix
vld_msk =  logical(zeros(I_SZ));
vld_msk(1:2:end,1:2:end) = vld;
vld_msk(1:2:end,2:2:end) = vld;
vld_msk(2:2:end,1:2:end) = vld;
vld_msk(2:2:end,2:2:end) = vld;
return
F.3: The Code in the File blk_map.m
% function output = blk_map(N,seed)
%
% The mapping for the blocks in Dadkhah et al. technique (2014)
% The output is 1 by N matrix that has the corresponding
% mapped block for the blocks from 1 to N
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%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function output = blk_map(N,seed)
if mod(N,2) ~= 0
    disp ('The input value must be multiple of 2');
    return;
end
rand('seed',seed);
R2 = randperm(N/2)+N/2;
% The following code ensure that if A is mapped to B then 
% B will not be mapped to A
map = [R2;1:N/2]';
map=sortrows(map)';
R1 = map(2,:);
R1 = circshift(R1,[0,floor(N/4)]);
output = [R2,R1];
return
F.4: The Code in the File loc_bits.m
% function output = loc_bits(input)
% 
% Returns the authentication bits for 2x2 block in 
% Dadkhah et al. technique (2014)
% The bits are returned as a decimal number
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function output = loc_bits(input)
global PARITY;
SV = svd(input); % calculate singular values
FL1 = floor(SV(1));
FL2 = floor(SV(2));
if FL1~=SV(1) | FL2~=SV(2) % one of the SVs is not integer
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    A1 = floor((SV(1)-FL1)*100) > 50; % Condition is not clear
    A2 = floor((SV(2)-FL2)*100) > 50; % in the paper.
    A3  = (PARITY(FL1+1) == 0) & (PARITY(FL2+1) == 0);
        
    if A1 & A2 & A3
        output=0;
    elseif A1 & ~A2 & A3
        output=4;
    elseif A1 & A2 & ~A3
        output=2;
    elseif ~A1 & A2 & A3
        output=1;
    elseif ~A1 & ~A2 & A3
        output=6;
    elseif A1 & ~A2 & ~A3
        output=5;
    elseif ~A1 & A2 & ~A3
        output=3;
    elseif ~A1 & ~A2 & ~A3
        output=7;
    end
else % all SVs are integers
    B1 = (PARITY(FL1+1) == 0) & (PARITY(FL2+1) == 0);
    B2 = (SV(1) <= 50) & (SV(2) <= 50);
    B3 = ~B1;
    output = B1*4 + B2*2 + B3;
end
return
F.5: The Code in the File set_global.m
% function set_global()
%
% Initiates the global variables needed for the encoding
% and the decoding functions of Dadkhah et al. technique.
% This function must be called before calling
% the files encode.m and decode.m .
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function set_global()
global PARITY;
PARITY=zeros(1,1024);
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for indx = 1:1024
    PARITY(indx) = mod(sum(bitget((indx-1),1:10)),2);
end
return
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Appendix G: The Implemented Code for 
the Experimental Evaluation
Appendix  G  presents  the  code  used  for  the  experimental  evaluation  of  the
proposed and the referenced techniques.
G.1: The Folder Structure and File Description of the 
Implemented Code
The folder structure and the contained files in the main code folder My_Code are
shown in Figure G.1, the code is organised in such a way it could be reused for
the different techniques.
Each technique has its own subfolder, which contains a subfolder called  coder,
The coder subfolder contains the main encoding and decoding files along with any
functions they need. In each technique's folder there are two files: test_kodak.m
which is used in finding the experimental evaluation using Kodak image database,
and the other file is  test_resolution.m which is used to find the encoding and
decoding time for different image resolutions.
The  images folder  contains  the  images  used  by  the  code,  such  as
lighthouse.png and peppers.png. It also contains some subfolders that contain
different formats and sizes of the Kodak database images.
The  folder  shared contains  some  functions  files  that  are  used  by  the  files:
test_kodak.m and  test_resolution.m.  The  files  are:  pfa.m which  is  used  to
calculate the PFA, pfr.m which is to calculate the PFR, rect_tmpr.m which is used
to tamper the images. 
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My_Code/
├── Dadkhah_2014/
│   ├── coder/
│   │   ├── blk_map.m
│   │   ├── decode.m
│   │   ├── encode.m
│   │   ├── loc_bits.m
│   │   └── set_global.m
│   ├── test_kodak.m
│   └── test_resolution.m
├── images/
│   ├── kodak512/
│   ├── kodak516/
│   ├── kodak_grey/
│   ├── kodak_rgb/
│   ├── lighthouse.png
│   └── peppers.png
├── shared/
│   ├── pfa.m
│   ├── pfr.m
│   └── rect_tmpr.m
├── Technique1/
│   ├── coder/
│   │   ├── decode.m
│   │   └── encode.m
│   ├── test_kodak.m
│   └── test_resolution.m
├── Technique2/
│   ├── coder/
│   │   ├── decode.m
│   │   └── encode.m
│   ├── test_kodak.m
│   └── test_resolution.m
├── Technique3/
│   ├── coder/
│   │   ├── decode.m
│   │   └── encode.m
│   ├── test_kodak.m
│   └── test_resolution.m
├── Technique4/
│   ├── coder/
│   │   ├── blk2dct.m
│   │   ├── crc16.m
│   │   ├── dct2blk.m
│   │   ├── decode.m
│   │   ├── encode.m
│   │   ├── mat2zig.m
│   │   ├── set_global.m
│   │   └── zig2mat.m
│   ├── test_kodak.m
│   └── test_resolution.m
└── Tong_2013/
    ├── coder/
    │   ├── blk_map.m
    │   ├── decode.m
    │   └── encode.m
    ├── test_kodak.m
    └── test_resolution.m
Figure G.1: Folder structure for the
implemented code in the experimental
evaluation.
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G.2: The Code in the File test_kodak.m
The code in the test_kodak.m file that corresponds to the first technique will be
listed here, the differences for other techniques are highlighted inside the code.
% Testing Kodak database images for the first technique
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
clear all;
close all;
warning ('off','all');
display(strftime ("Start at: %H:%M:%S", localtime (time ())))
fflush(stdout)
T0 = tic;
% adding paths for shared code
addpath('coder/');
addpath('../shared/');
% adding image directory
img_dir = '../images/kodak512/';
% Note:
% The directory '../images/kodak512/' is used for all techniques
% except for the second one where the folder '../images/kodak516/'
% is used.
% load image processing package (Required for Octave)
pkg load image
pkg load signal
% reading image list
img_lst = dir([img_dir,'*.png']);
img_count = length(img_lst);
% Creating results directory
DT = clock;
DT = floor(DT(2:end));
DT = sprintf( '%02d', DT );
r_dir = ['results',DT];
mkdir(r_dir);
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% creating the results files
f_psnr = fopen([r_dir,'/kodak_psnr.csv'],'w');
f_pfa = fopen([r_dir,'/kodak_pfa.csv'],'w');
f_pfr = fopen([r_dir,'/kodak_pfr.csv'],'w');
f_t_enc = fopen([r_dir,'/kodak_t_encoding.csv'],'w');
f_t_dec = fopen([r_dir,'/kodak_t_decoding.csv'],'w');
key = 12345;
ratio = [0,0.05,0.1,0.15,0.2,0.24,0.25,0.3,0.35,0.4,0.45,0.49,0.5];
fprintf(f_psnr,["Ratio",sprintf(',%.2f' , ratio),"\n"]);
fprintf(f_pfa,["Ratio",sprintf(',%.2f' , ratio),"\n"]);
fprintf(f_pfr,["Ratio",sprintf(',%.2f' , ratio),"\n"]);
fprintf(f_t_enc,["Ratio",sprintf(',%.2f' , ratio),"\n"]);
fprintf(f_t_dec,["Ratio",sprintf(',%.2f' , ratio),"\n"]);
for img_num = 1:img_count
    fprintf(f_psnr, img_lst(img_num).name);
    fprintf(f_pfa, img_lst(img_num).name);
    fprintf(f_pfr, img_lst(img_num).name);
    fprintf(f_t_enc, img_lst(img_num).name);
    fprintf(f_t_dec, img_lst(img_num).name);
    
    I = imread([img_dir,img_lst(img_num).name]);
    
    % Selecting the image used in tampering which is the next one
    % in the list and for the last one the first one is selected.
    
    if img_num == img_count;
        tmpr_img = 1;
    else
        tmpr_img = img_num+1;
    end
        
    I_tmpr = imread([img_dir,img_lst(tmpr_img).name]);
    for rat_indx = 1:length(ratio)
    
        % Finding the width and height the tampered area
        tmpr_w = sqrt(ratio(rat_indx));
        tmpr_h = tmpr_w;
        tmpr_ratio = [tmpr_h,tmpr_w];
        
        % Note:
        % The previous tmpr_w and tmpr_h are used for the techniques:1,2,
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        % and Dadkhah's technique while for other techniques
        % the values are:
        % tmpr_w = sqrt(ratio(rat_indx)/2);
        % tmpr_h = tmpr_w*2;
        t0_enc = tic;
        I_enc = encode(I,key);
        T_ENC = toc(t0_enc);
        
        [I_mod,tmpr_msk] = rect_tmpr(I_enc,tmpr_ratio,I_tmpr);
        
        t0_dec = tic;
        [I_fxd,vld] = decode(I_mod,key);
        T_DEC = toc(t0_dec);
        
        PSNR = psnr(I,I_fxd);
        PFA = pfa(tmpr_msk,vld)*100;
        PFR = pfr(tmpr_msk,vld)*100;
        
        fprintf(f_psnr,",%.4f", PSNR);
        fprintf(f_pfa,",%.4f", PFA);
        fprintf(f_pfr,",%.4f", PFR);
        fprintf(f_t_enc,",%.4f", T_ENC);
        fprintf(f_t_dec,",%.4f", T_DEC);
    end
    
    % Adding new-line to the files
    fprintf(f_psnr,"\n");
    fprintf(f_pfa,"\n");
    fprintf(f_pfr,"\n");
    fprintf(f_t_enc,"\n");
    fprintf(f_t_dec,"\n");
end
%closing the files
fclose(f_psnr);
fclose(f_pfa);
fclose(f_pfr);
fclose(f_t_enc);
fclose(f_t_dec);
% Reading files the results files
PSNR_mat = dlmread ([r_dir,'/kodak_psnr.csv'],',',1,1);
PFA_mat = dlmread ([r_dir,'/kodak_pfa.csv'],',',1,1);
PFR_mat = dlmread ([r_dir,'/kodak_pfr.csv'],',',1,1);
T_ENC_mat = dlmread ([r_dir,'/kodak_t_encoding.csv'],',',1,1);
T_DEC_mat = dlmread ([r_dir,'/kodak_t_decoding.csv'],',',1,1);
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% Finding the mean values 
PSNR_av = mean(PSNR_mat);
PFA_av = mean(PFA_mat);
PFR_av = mean(PFR_mat);
T_ENC_av = mean(T_ENC_mat);
T_DEC_av = mean(T_DEC_mat);
% Storing the mean values in a file
f_av = fopen([r_dir,'/kodak_average.csv'],'w');
fprintf(f_av,["Ratio",sprintf(',%.2f' , ratio),"\n"]);
fprintf(f_av,["PSNR",sprintf(',%.4f' , PSNR_av),"\n"]);
fprintf(f_av,["PFA*100",sprintf(',%.4f' , PFA_av),"\n"]);
fprintf(f_av,["PFR*100",sprintf(',%.4f' , PFR_av),"\n"]);
fprintf(f_av,["T_ENC",sprintf(',%.4f' , T_ENC_av),"\n"]);
fprintf(f_av,["T_DEC",sprintf(',%.4f' , T_DEC_av),"\n"]);
fclose(f_av);
T_total = toc(T0);
disp(['Total time = ',num2str(floor(T_total/60)), ...
' Min ',num2str(mod(T_total,60)),' Sec.']) 
G.3: The Code in the File test_resolution.m
% The code for testing different image resolutions
% This code is the same for all techniques
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
clear all;
close all;
warning ('off','all');
% adding path for common codes
addpath('coder/');
addpath('../shared/');
% load image processing package (Required for Octave)
pkg load image
pkg load signal
img_dir = '../images/';
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% Creating results directory
DT = clock;
DT = floor(DT(2:end));
DT = sprintf( '%02d', DT );
r_dir = ['res_results',DT];
mkdir(r_dir);
% creating the results files
f_t_enc = fopen([r_dir,'/res_t_enc.csv'],'w');
f_t_dec = fopen([r_dir,'/res_t_dec.csv'],'w');
I = imread([img_dir,'lighthouse.png']);
I_tmpr = imread([img_dir,'peppers.png']);
key = 1234;
res = 120*[1:10];
fprintf(f_t_enc,["Image Size",sprintf(',%d' , res .^ 2),"\n"]);
fprintf(f_t_dec,["Image Size",sprintf(',%d' , res .^ 2),"\n"]);
t_enc = zeros(1,length(res));
t_dec = zeros(1,length(res));
i = 1;
for r = res
    % scaling images
    Ix = imresize(I, [r,r]);
    Ix_tmpr = imresize(I_tmpr, [r,r]);
    
    t0_enc = tic;
    I_enc = encode(Ix,key);
    t_enc(i) = toc(t0_enc);
    ratio=[.45,.45];
    [I_mod,tmpr_msk] = rect_tmpr(I_enc,ratio,Ix_tmpr);
    
    t0_dec = tic;
    [I_fxd,vld] = decode(I_mod,key);
    t_dec(i) = toc(t0_dec);
    
    i=i+1;
end
% Saving data to files
fprintf(f_t_enc,["Time (sec)",sprintf(',%0.4f' , t_enc),"\n"]);
fprintf(f_t_dec,["Time (sec)",sprintf(',%0.4f' , t_dec),"\n"]);
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% Closing files
fclose(f_t_enc);
fclose(f_t_dec);
G.4: The Code in the File pfa.m
% function PFA = pfa(tmpr_msk,vld_msk)
%
% Probability of false acceptance
%
% tmpr_msk: Tampered area mask (tampered pixel = 1)
% vld_msk: Validity mask image returned by tamper recovery decoding
%         functions,valid (i.e. untampered) pixels = 1.
%
% PFA: Probability of false acceptance
% = number of tampered blocks detected as valid/number of tampered blocks
%
% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function PFA = pfa(tmpr_msk,vld_msk)
SM = sum(sum(tmpr_msk));
if SM == 0
    PFA = 0;
else
    PFA = sum(sum(vld_msk & tmpr_msk))/SM;
end
return
G.5: The Code in the File pfr.m
% function PFR = pfr(tmpr_msk,vld_msk)
%
% Probability of false rejection
%
% PFR = number of 
% tmpr_msk: Tampered area mask (tampered pixel = 1)
% vld_msk: Validity mask image returned by tamper recovery decoding
%          functions, valid (i.e. untampered) pixels = 1.
%
% PFR: Probability of false rejection
% = number of valid blocks detected as tampered / number of valid blocks.
%
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% Author: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function PFR = pfr(tmpr_msk,vld_msk)
SM = sum(sum(~tmpr_msk));
if SM == 0
    PFR = 0;
else
    PFR = sum(sum(~vld_msk & ~tmpr_msk))/SM;
end
return
G.6: The Code in the File rect_tmpr.m
% function [I_out,msk] = rect_tmpr(I_in,ratio,I_tmpr)
%
% Tampering the central rectangular region of the input image.
% I_in: The input image.
% ratio: The hight and the width ratios of the tampering rectangle
%        with respect to the image dimensions.
% I_tmp: The image used for tampering (default is 0).
% msk: A logical matrix where the tampered area 1.
%
% Auther: Mahmoud Alnaanah (malnaanah@gmail.com)
% Update: 19 July 2018
function [I_out,msk] = rect_tmpr(I_in,ratio,I_tmpr)
I_SZ = size(I_in);
I_H = I_SZ(1);
I_W = I_SZ(2);
if sum(mod(I_SZ,2))~=0
    error('Input image dimensions must be multiple of 2.');
end
r1 = floor((I_H/2)*(1-ratio(1))) + 1;
r2 = r1 + round(I_H*ratio(1)) -1;
c1 = floor((I_W/2)*(1-ratio(2))) + 1;
c2 = c1 + round(I_W*ratio(2)) -1;
if nargin == 3
    if sum(size(I_tmpr) == I_SZ) ~= 2;
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        I_tmpr = imresize(I_tmpr,I_SZ);
    end
end
if nargin==2
    I_tmpr = zeros(I_SZ);
end
%  Adjust the tampering image pixel level so that the minimum difference 
%  between it and the tampered image is 5.
MIN_DF = 5;
DF = double(I_tmpr)-double(I_in);
indx = DF <= MIN_DF  &  DF >= 0;
DF(indx) = -DF(indx) + MIN_DF;
indx = DF >= -MIN_DF & DF < 0;
DF(indx) = -DF(indx) - MIN_DF;
indx = DF < -MIN_DF | DF > MIN_DF;
DF(indx) = 0;
I_new = double(I_tmpr) + DF;
indx = I_new > 255;
I_new(indx) = I_new(indx) - 2 * MIN_DF;
indx = I_new < 0;
I_new(indx) = I_new(indx) + 2 * MIN_DF;
I_tmpr = uint8(I_new);
I_out = I_in;
msk = logical(zeros(I_SZ));
I_out(r1:r2,c1:c2)=I_tmpr(r1:r2,c1:c2);
msk(r1:r2,c1:c2) = true;
return
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